

MODERN INDIA


A CO-OPERATIVE SURVEY

Edited by

SIR JOHN CUMMING

K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

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In pocket at end of the book

PREFACE

MORE than fifty years ago Sir Richard Temple published his *India in 1880*. The survey, he wrote, 'will be as exact and comprehensive as can be obtained in the limited space, and will be nothing more than a survey'. The limitations of the present survey could not be expressed in more precise terms; but whereas Sir Richard Temple was an encyclopaedist in Indian subjects with an almost unique range of personal experience, the task in the present instance has been entrusted to no fewer than seventeen writers. The qualifications common to each contributor are an affection for India and her peoples, and a peculiar and expert knowledge of his particular subject.

This symposium is not a history of India: it does not profess to supply solutions of the problems of current politics, nor does it forecast the future. But it does strive to set forth some important elements of the Indian situation by means of a dispassionate presentation of things as they are, together with some account of the causes which have made them what they are. It is hoped that *Modern India* will be of service to men of good will who are seeking a path through what often seems to be the impenetrable jungle of Indian controversies.

The Editor desires to express his cordial appreciation of the co-operative spirit of all the contributors, and his sense of gratitude to all those who have assisted him in the preparation of this book; especially Sir John Kerr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Mr. F. H. Brown, C.I.E., and the Oxford University Press.

15th September, 1931.

NOTE REGARDING CURRENCY

Prior to 1893, when the Indian Mints were closed to the free coinage of silver, the value of the rupee was entirely determined by the price of silver, and there were serious fluctuations. In 1899 the exchange value of the rupee was fixed at 1s. 4d., at which figure it remained till 1917, when it rose rapidly till 1920. The exchange value was fixed in that year at 2s. gold, but this ratio could not be maintained; and the exchange value fell until eventually in 1927 the ratio was fixed at 1s. 6d. after a Royal Commission. The equivalents at this rate are given below:

<i>Indian Currency</i> <i>Rupees.</i>	<i>British Currency</i> <i>Sterling.</i>	<i>American Currency</i> <i>Dollars.</i>
	£ s. d.	
1		
10		0.365
13.33	15 0	3.65
1,000	1 0 0	4.866
100,000 (one lakh)	75 0 0	365
1,000,000 (one million)	7,500 0 0	36,500
10,000,000 (one crore)	75,000 0 0	365,000
	750,000 0 0	3,650,000

NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

The style is that adopted by the *Imperial Gazetteer* (Oxford, 1909) and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names of the Royal Geographical Society in their *List* of May 1924.

Chapter I

THE COUNTRY, PEOPLES, LANGUAGES, AND CREEDS

By SIR HARCOURT BUTLER, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., D.LITT.,
D.C.L.

[Sir Harcourt Butler was a member of the Indian Civil Service for nearly forty years. He was Secretary to the great Famine Commission of 1900-1, which laid down principles of famine policy which have endured to the present day. In 1910 he was selected to organize a new Department of Education, as a Member of the Viceroy's Council. From 1915 to 1927 he governed successively Burma, the United Provinces, and again Burma. His last important service for India was as Chairman of a Committee which inquired into the position of the Indian States. After his retirement he became Chairman of the School of Oriental Studies in London.]

THE activity of man in all ages and places is largely determined by his physical environment. The past of India strikingly illustrates the close relation between geography and history. The varied geographical features, which distinguish the regions and subdivisions of India, account largely for the part that they have played at different periods of her political history, and in the development of her culture and ethnography. Conditions of climate and cultivation, natural lines of communication, density and ethnic character of the population have profoundly influenced political and economic growth. Judged by her extent, the variety of her physical conditions, and her independent articulation, India can only be regarded as a sub-continent of Asia.

The determining factors of her environment are the mountain ranges, the river systems, the climates, and the rainfall. The Himalayan range, about fifteen hundred miles in length and about a hundred miles in depth, is

an effective barrier against invasion or interference from the north. The Himalaya (abode of snow) contains in Everest, K₂, and Kinchinjunga, the three highest measured mountains of the world. We know that from early times Chinese and other adventurous travellers have found their way over the difficult passes and through the valleys of this mountain system, but their efforts have not opened a path for the passage of armed forces. On the north, India is still secure against military attack. This can only be said of the north-east with considerable qualification, for in the past China has overrun Nepal and Tibet, and the British have sent an expedition to Lhasa. It cannot be said at all of the North-West Frontier, which through the ages has admitted in successive waves invading armies, Aryans, Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Huns, Tartars, and Mongols, who have conquered and occupied large tracts of India. In fact, India is dominated by her north-west frontier, which is vulnerable on two lines, through the North-West Frontier province and through Baluchistan. Four passes lead from Afghanistan into the North-West Frontier Province, important in the following order, the Khyber, the Kurram, the Tochi, and the Gomal. Between the North-West Frontier Province and the Afghan border is a neutral zone of hilly country occupied by warlike Pathan tribes, who have a back-door and means of escape into Afghanistan. Baluchistan is occupied by the British right up to the Afghan border and the open plain of Kandahar. The other important ranges of hills are the Aravalli Hills, which run through Rajputana and roughly bound on the east the desert, or dry zone, of Baluchistan, Sind, and Rajputana; the Vindya Mountains which divide the southern plateau from the Indo-Gangetic plain; and the series of hills running north and south which separate Burma from India and China. These hills are usually

covered by forest of greater or lesser density, the vegetation being thickest on the northern slopes, which are protected from the fiercest scorchings of the sun. They have from time immemorial afforded shelter and refuge to the shy aboriginal tribes, who with true instinct see destruction in contact with people more advanced than themselves.

Three great snow-fed rivers rise in the Himalaya, the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra. The Indus, with its five great tributaries, from which the Punjab (five waters) derives its name, the Jhelum, the Chenāb, the Ravi, the Beās, and the Sutlej, rises in the east of the Himalaya and flows after a westerly course of seventeen hundred miles into the Arabian Sea. The Brahmaputra rises in the west of the Himalaya and flows in an easterly direction as the Tsan-po down through Tibet, Assam, and Eastern Bengal, where it becomes the Brahmaputra (the son of Brahma), and discharges its floods after a course of sixteen hundred and eighty miles into the Bay of Bengal. Both these rivers rise in the hinder parts of the Himalayan range. The Ganges, with a course of fifteen hundred miles, drains its southern slopes, and with its tributaries the Jumna, the Gogra, the Gandak, the Chambal, and the Son enters the Bay of Bengal, like the Brahmaputra, through extensive deltas with a multitude of channels. These are always changing as floods come down, or obstructions arise; islands are formed, and the land is constantly gaining accretions, which come under cultivation, continuous or temporary as the case may be. The Indus in the west also steadily increases the land, but it has not the tropical forests and moist areas which mark the deltas of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. The Indus waters the Punjab and Sind; the Ganges, the United Provinces, Bihar, and Western Bengal; the Brahmaputra, Assam and

Eastern Bengal. In Southern India the flow of the rivers is generally from west to east, the more important being the Mahanadi, the Godavari, the Kistna, and the Cauvery. The Nerbadda and the Tapti are the two exceptions, flowing through deep, rocky cuttings from east to west. The deltas of the Godavari, the Kistna, and the Cauvery are famous for their fertile rice fields. The larger rivers used, in the old days, to be navigated for considerable distances. The railways now carry the traffic, and the water is drained off by canals for irrigation. The principal historic cities of India have grown up on the banks of rivers in the populous inland areas. The British in founding Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras naturally attached first importance to access from the sea.

The climate varies greatly with the rainfall and proximity to the coast. Leaving aside the almost rainless deserts of the north-west, India falls into two main parts, the Indo-Gangetic plain to the north and the southern peninsula or Deccan. The Indo-Gangetic plain was at one time the bed of a sea. It is now a wide, fertile, and populous alluvial plain growing all kinds of crops, cereals, millets, pulses, oil-seeds, tobacco, spices, hemp, and sugarcane. In the extreme west by Delhi the soil is light, the rainfall twenty to thirty inches, the trees few; in the United Provinces the rainfall is thirty to forty inches and trees are a feature of the landscape; in Bihar and Bengal moisture increases the nearer one approaches the sea, the rainfall is fifty to sixty inches and the vegetation is sub-tropical, plantains and bamboos, palm-trees and heavy creepers. The delta of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra forms a vast rice plain, and here the world's monopoly of jute is grown. Northern India has a real cold season from October till March. The mornings and the evenings are cold and there is freshness in the air, although the sun at

noon is hot. The cold increases as one travels north-westward, and at Peshawar one wants thick furs morning and evening. The coldest months are November and December. From March the heat increases, dry hot winds blow and sandstorms are common. By the end of May the heat is almost unbearable, reaching 125° F. in the shade. The land is as iron and the sky as brass. Agricultural operations are suspended. At last the monsoon breaks, usually in torrents of rain, about the middle of June. The parched land in a few hours becomes green, water stands in the fields, the earth is soaked, ploughing commences busily, and all nature breathes once more. There is no relief in the world greater than that which follows the breaking of the rains. The great heat sucks in the south-west trade winds and these break upon the mountains and descend in life-giving showers.

The southern peninsula, which was once connected by land with Africa, is moister than the Indo-Gangetic plain, and the moisture increases as one goes farther south. Central India has a dry hot weather and a marked cold season. As one nears the extreme south, the air is more heavily laden and the variations in temperature are less marked. Indeed, in the south the months of December and January are the months of heaviest rainfall. The most southerly point of India is only eight degrees north of the equator. The vegetation is tropical, the heat is enervating, but conditions of life are easier and healthier than in the north. In both north and south the prosperity of the people depends on the amount and distribution of the rainfall. At the extreme south the rainfall is about a hundred inches. The centre of the peninsula is a plateau sloping to the west, with hills known as the Western Ghats dropping sheer into the coastal fringe. On the east the hills are lower, and in many cases forest or cultivation

stretches to the sea-shore. The Nilgiri (Blue Mountain) Hills on the south-west have a healthy and agreeable climate for Europeans and are one of the great hunting grounds of India. Big game abounds also in the forests of Central India and the Himalayan foot-hills, and in the low-lying tract at the foot of the eastern Himalayan ranges known as the *terai*.

'The Indian Empire', writes Professor Rapson, 'is the abode of a vast collection of peoples who differ from one another in physical characteristics, in language and in culture more widely than the peoples of Europe.' In them are to be found representatives of the three primary ethnographical divisions of mankind, the Caucasian or white with its subdivisions of blond and dark, the Mongolian or yellow, the Ethiopian or black, the last being confined to people of the Andaman Islands. India is in fact one of the greatest ethnographical museums in the world. Invaders after invaders seem to have settled in the sub-continent, in some cases maintaining the purity of their race, in others inter-marrying freely with the people of the country, who often preceded them in invasion. They were impelled either by the desire of enjoying the fertility of India, or by the necessity of leaving tracts that had suffered physical deterioration, such as the dessication which is known to have reduced large tracts of Asia to desert within historic time. Linguistic and anthropometrical research has discovered the existence of seven different ethnographical types in India.

1. Dravidian, now found in the Madras Presidency and Central India.
2. Indo-Aryan, now found in Kashmir and the Western Punjab as far as the Indus.
3. Turko-Iranian, now found west of the Indus, the North-West Frontier Province.

4. Scytho-Dravidian, now found in Baluchistan and the Bombay Presidency.
5. Aryo-Dravidian, now found in the South-East Punjab, the United Provinces and Bihar.
6. Mongoloid, now found in Burma, Assam, and a belt of sub-Himalayan country, and also in Nepal and Bhutan.
7. Mongolo-Dravidian, now found in Bengal and Orissa, and known as the Bengali type.

For practical purposes one may confine one's attention to the three main groups, Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, and Mongoloid.

Some three thousand five hundred years ago, the Aryans, a people of European descent, made their way into north-western India. Scholars conclude that they migrated in mass with their families and flocks. By degrees they overran the greater part of Northern India and eventually crossed the Vindhyas into the southern peninsula. They found in possession a darker race, of stunted growth in comparison with themselves, namely the Dravidians. Whether the Dravidians were aboriginal or earlier invaders of India is as yet unsettled. The Indo-Aryans had apparently stronger physique, higher culture, and a superior language. Their oldest books have affinities with Greek and Iranian thought. They are the progenitors of the high-caste Hindus of to-day, and in time they developed the social and religious institutions and ideas which go to make up modern Hinduism. The Mongoloids resemble the Chinese with yellowish skins and slanting eyes. How these races intermixed and what were the stages of their intermixture, we can conjecture but never know. Leaving origins aside, we are faced with a mass of peoples of varying degrees of culture and language, of habit and custom, such as is found nowhere else under one system of government.

'Four of the great families of human speech,' says Professor Rapson, 'the Austric, the Tibeto-Chinese, the Dravidian, and the Indo-European—are directly represented among the living languages of India, of which no fewer than two hundred and twenty are recorded in the Census Report for 1911; while a fifth great family, the Semitic, which has been introduced by Muhammadan conquerors in historical times, has through the medium of Arabic and Persian greatly modified some of the Indian vernaculars. The Austric, Tibeto-Chinese, and Indo-European families are widely spread elsewhere over the face of the earth. The Dravidian has not been traced with absolute certainty beyond the limits of the Indian Empire; but there is evidence which seems to indicate that it was introduced into India in pre-historic times.'¹

One of the curiosities of the linguistic survey, with which Sir George Grierson's name will always be associated, is that Brahui, a Dravidian language, is still found in Baluchistan. On the other hand, there is no Dravidian influence of any kind in the Punjab. The chief Dravidian languages, Telugu, Tamil, Kanarese, and Malayalam, have their home in the Madras Presidency, where English is rapidly becoming a *lingua franca*. The other predominant languages are Bengali, Western Hindi, Bihari, Eastern Hindi, Marathi, Punjabi, Rajasthani, Gujarati, and Orya. The people who speak Western and Eastern Hindi can understand, though with difficulty, one another's speech, so that in all there are twelve main languages in India, which are as distinct as the languages of Europe. 'The present population', says Mr. W. Crooke, 'thus represents the flotsam and jetsam collected from many streams of ethnical movement, and as a result of this there is a bewildering variety of language and dialect.'² Language is not, of course, a test of race, but it sometimes gives a clue to tribal migrations.

¹ *Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 37. Cambridge University Press, 1922.

² W. Crooke, *The Native Races of Northern India*. Constable, 1907.

The main lines of cleavage in modern India are not so much racial or linguistic as religious. The Hindus who observe caste number about one hundred and seventy millions, the Muslims eighty millions, Hindus not in caste seventy-five millions, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Parsis twenty-four millions. The Buddhists are found in Burma, which, it is proposed, should be separated from India. The early Aryan invaders worshipped bright deities personifying natural elements and forces, the gods of water, of fire, of the wind, of rain, of the sun, etc., who enjoyed eating and drinking and were propitiated with sacrifices. At that time there were different social classes, but there is little real evidence of the existence of caste. That grew up at some later period under the sacerdotal influence of Brahmins. At some later period also there appeared the doctrine of the Hindu Trinity, Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, and Siva the Destroyer, and the doctrine of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls according to the law of Karma (lit. act, work), that one's future existence and status depends on one's merits and demerits in the present existence. Long sojourn in India and experience of its climate, its tremendous physical forces, famine and pestilence, plunged the successors of the Aryans into the pessimism which has saturated Hindu thought. Matter is evil, the world is Maya or the great illusion, and happiness is to be sought by limiting desire, by asceticism, by retirement from the world. By subduing the senses and by meditation alone can one obtain real understanding and mental peace, and by purification through many existences alone can one attain to the final beatification of absorption in the one reality, the eternal, universal, and unconditioned mind. In essence pantheistic, in form Hinduism or Brahminism, is polytheistic. Its contact with and assimilation of many

indigenous beliefs has led Brahminism to the recognition of a multitude of godlings and forms of worship. Its subtle restless speculations have embraced many schools of philosophy, idealistic and realistic, but in its social applications it has concentrated on the definite and living institution of caste.

According to the ancient digest of law contained in the book of Manu, Indian society is divided into four main castes: (1) the Brahmin or priestly caste, (2) the Kshatriya or warrior caste, (3) the Vaisya or trading caste, and (4) the Sudra or serving caste. The first three of these castes are twice born and wear the sacred thread, which is conferred on them with regulated ceremonial, when they are fitted by age to take part in the full ritual observances. The facts of modern social life do not conform to the simple classification of Manu. The origin of caste is lost in antiquity. The Sanskrit word for caste, *varna*, seems to imply a colour distinction. Whether it should be translated as class or caste is still a question disputed by eminent scholars. The outstanding fact to-day is that Hindu society is divided into hundreds and indeed thousands of separate castes or sub-castes which cannot inter-marry or feed with one another. Hindu society is stratified horizontally, not vertically. A man or woman born into a caste or sub-caste cannot escape from the conditions of his birth. There is no social ladder for him. As he is born so will he die; he cannot marry or eat outside his caste or sub-caste nor can he marry within his family. He is thus endogamous and exogamous. His social life is limited for the whole of his existence by the fact of his birth. In another existence he may be born into another caste or sub-caste but that does not affect his position now and here. The institution of caste is accepted as divine by all orthodox Hindus and it gives a predominant position to the highest

or Brahmin caste. Brahmins must be fed or paid on all ceremonial occasions; they must be treated with the greatest respect; the killing of a Brahmin is the one unforgivable sin to be expiated by long penances through many existences. The Brahmins have thoroughly secured their position with religious sanctions, and this position is still accepted by the mass of Hindus. Caste seems to be based on colour and race and also on occupation. For good or for evil, the Brahmin is supreme. The institution of caste appears to be fixed and permanent. It adapts itself to modern conditions in many ways, but in marriage or the preservation of the purity of stock and in all those things that make for the purity of ritual caste seems to be as strong and persistent as it has ever been. To Western eyes this may seem extraordinary, but it is apparently in close conformity with the genius of Hindu society and its unassailable conservatism which prefers the preservation of social order to the advancement of the individual or mankind. On the other hand, it must be remembered that caste has advantages as well as disadvantages. The Abbé Dubois thought the former were greater than the latter, and that caste had saved the Hindus from relapsing, like other peoples, into barbarism. The orthodox Hindu regards it as the only bulwark left against the revolutionary or communistic movements which shake society in the West.

Outside caste are the masses of the depressed classes to whom Brahminism refuses admission to social Hindu life. In Southern India these are so numerous and powerful that they have been able to secure a majority in the Madras Legislative Council. The future of these classes is one of the great problems of the time. Some have embraced Christianity in order to escape from their intolerable position. Some again have embraced Islam in their

searching for social status. Under Christianity and Islam the depressed classes can obtain a recognition which Brahminism denies them at present. But Hindu reformers have realized that their importance is steadily increasing and it is possible that Brahminism, which in some ways is one of the most adaptable religions of the world, will in the end give them a place in its social system. At present in most parts of India, the orthodox Hindus deny them access to their schools and temples and demand that they shall live apart and not contaminate them by their proximity or intercourse.

In the history of Hinduism there have been many revolts or revivals animated by the desire to escape from the trammels of Brahminic priestly influence and the social restrictions of caste. The earliest of these was Buddhism. The latest, or one of the latest, was Sikhism. In the sixth century before Christ a prince of Northern India, by name Gautama, impressed by the all-pervading pain and suffering of his fellow men, renounced the world and became the Buddha or supremely enlightened one. He instituted a monastic order free from caste and preached a middle way between self-indulgence and self-mortification, condemned idolatry, sacrifices, and metaphysical speculation. He preserved the doctrine of transmigration through successive existences according to the law of Karma, or reaping as one has sown, until one reaches the final end of things—*nirvana*—or absorption in ultimate rest or annihilation. There were, he preached, four noble truths to be reached by eight noble paths of moral life; and the commandments were five directed against the destruction of life, stealing, unchastity, untruthfulness, and all forms of intoxicants. Adopted as the state religion for some centuries, it was eventually driven out of India by Brahminism, but outside India Buddhism has become one of

the popular religions of the world. It seems to appeal particularly to the Mongoloid races. In essence it is moderate, the middle way, the nothing extreme or excessive of certain Greek philosophers. It has found a home in Burma where it is superimposed on the animistic beliefs of the people.

The Sikhs are another offshoot of Hinduism. They number only four millions, but are a powerful militant body, with conspicuous business capacity which takes them all over the world. The founder of the religion was Nānak, the first Guru, who was born in A.D. 1469 and died in 1546. There have been nine Gurus altogether. The centre of their faith is the Golden Temple at Amritsar where their sacred book, the *Granth Sahib*, is deposited. Sikhism proclaimed equality of men, and the unity of God, rejected idolatry but maintained belief in the transmigration of souls. The Moguls persecuted the Sikhs, and Aurangzeb killed the ninth Guru for refusal to embrace Islam. This the Sikhs will never forgive. Between them and the Muslims there is still fierce animosity. Under the rule of Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, the boundaries of the Sikh Kingdom were carried beyond the Indus and over Kashmir. They were finally defeated by the British in 1847. The memories of their greatness are fresh and strong.

There have been other reforming movements of local origin and extent, which reject priestly influence and caste. Most of them have been unsuccessful in the long run, and have succumbed to the absorbing influence of Brahmanism, and its resolute maintenance of the caste system. Against this, social reform has broken itself in vain. For better or for worse, the caste system seems to be an inseparable part of Hinduism, and although it will adapt itself from time to time to the needs of modern life, such

as travel and inter-feeding, in the essentials of marriage or purity of birth, and also in purity of ritual, it seems to remain unchanged and unchangeable. Individuals and societies devote themselves to social reform, but they are at every turn confronted with the difficulty that the social system is based on and permeated by religion. Child marriage, perpetual widowhood, and all other customs which seem to keep the Hindus in a condition resembling that of childhood have their sanctions in religion. The Brahmins will not readily forgo their privileges or surrender their position. Such at least is the experience of the past. What the future has in store none can foresee, but it is probable that changes will come slowly if they come at all.

Features of Hinduism are the bathing fairs and monasteries. At certain fixed festivals large numbers of Hindus congregate at some sacred spot on a river to bathe under Brahmin guidance and wash away sin. Since railways made travel easy, the numbers attending fairs often run to more than a million. In addition to religious merit it is a happy outing and a distributing centre for all kinds of goods. The monasteries are the abode of *fakirs* (religious mendicants) who are admitted into some brotherhood and live under the discipline of a *mahant* or abbot. These mendicants travel all over India, living on the alms of the people, curing them by incantations or amulets or drugs, and generally taking advantage of their credulity. From time to time they appear as the secret service of aggressive Hinduism, and they are always mysterious. Some of them are almost naked, some practise various austerities, some wear saffron or other coloured robes. They are a definite economic drain on the country, but the people are used to them and their exactions. Many of them, no doubt, lead exemplary lives but their

reputation even among their own co-religionists is not too high.

Islam, with its great doctrines of the unity of God and the equality of man in the presence of the Creator, stands out as the chief opponent of Hinduism, or Brahminism, in India. Although in some areas it is tolerant of Hindu ideals, and has to some extent adopted them, it is in essence uncompromisingly hostile. It is iconoclastic to the worship of idols, which forms so large a part of popular Hinduism, it ignores caste to a large extent, though it has been influenced by it, rejects child-marriage, and recognizes the remarriage of widows. Again, the Muslim eats meat and especially the flesh of the cow, the cheapest meat in India, an abomination to the Hindus, who reverence the cow. And, finally, Muslims can never forget that they have been a ruling race for many centuries in India before the British came and established their rule over the sub-continent. In their hearts they believe that, with help from Afghanistan, the frontier tribes, and the virile Muslims of the north-west and in Central India, they could, if the controlling hand of British rule were removed, conquer India. The Sikhs and other minorities demand a place in the sun, and the Gurkhas of Nepal look longingly upon the prospect of regaining their lost territories in the sub-Himalayan tract and the loot of the rich city of Calcutta, one of the great achievements of British rule.

While the peoples of India are thus diverse and differentiated by great barriers of language and religious belief, they live under a common sun and have certain characteristics in common. Nearly three-quarters of the population is agricultural, living in about seven hundred and fifty thousand villages. These villages are self-contained in many cases and have their own servants or craftsmen who supply local needs, the jeweller, the blacksmith and other

workers in metals, the carpenter, the potter, the weaver, the dyer, the skinner of dead animals and the worker in leather, the washerman. Their position and remuneration are regulated by custom. There are only thirty-four towns with a population of a hundred thousand in the whole of India. The town population is loosely knit together and has few of the restraints of village life, but often people of one caste or occupation occupy one quarter and look closely after one another. Bad characters of the hooligan type abound, variously called *badmashes* and *goondas*, who are always on the look-out for disorder and loot. Where factories have been put up, the mill-hands are sometimes difficult to control. As yet they have not any active trades unions. Many of them are not whole-time industrial workers. When they have saved a considerable sum from their wages, they retire to their villages to spend their savings there.

The influence of the family is all powerful. Every family supports its own members. There are no poor-laws in India. Indifferent to people outside, all Indians are bound up in the fortunes of their family. The conditions of life are such that there is no privacy, no nursery; the children grow up without reticence on the functions of physical life and seem to the sheltered western unusually precocious. They are kindly treated, and though ignorant of learning acquire an intimate knowledge of nature and her ways. The mass of the people are steeped in superstition, believe in magic and any manifestation of the supernatural, and are easily moved to religious fanaticism. The position assigned to women is low, but in practice the influence of women is often decisive in private and in public life. Their seclusion in *purda* (curtain) is said to date from the times of Muslim invasion, and varies in extent and rigidity over different parts of India. In towns and

amongst the English educated class, *purda* is no doubt breaking down, but at the other end of the scale it is gaining ground as an outward sign of increasing respectability. The desire of having a son is universal, in the case of the Hindu for the proper performance of funeral ceremonies, and female infanticide has been practised by many castes and especially by the Rajputs who follow the custom of hypergamy, or marrying their daughters into families higher than their own. Infanticide, *suttee* or the voluntary burning of a widow on her husband's funeral pyre, and human sacrifices are now only occasional. Slavery and thuggee have been abolished throughout India.

Among the aboriginal tribes are found endless varieties of primitive culture. Very prevalent is the belief in the evil eye. Criminal tribes move all over India, thieving and kidnapping, committing dacoities (gang robberies with violence) and other forms of violent crime under the protection of some tutelary god or goddess, to whom they make offerings and whom they approach in ordered ritual. Village crime is common, sordid and brutal, and it is often undetected. As in other countries, the criminal has taken advantage of improved communications and many inventions to circumvent the police. The police are feared in many ways and no one seems to want to help them, but whenever a police station in any locality is closed there is an outcry from the countryside.

The mass of the people take no interest in politics but much interest in religion. Their lives are simple but they love pithy sayings, and their observations and traditions give them often a curious imaginativeness. Their ways are not as our ways, nor are their thoughts our thoughts; the ignorance of simple arithmetic leads to many curious results, but perhaps the most distinguishing feature of

Indian life, as we see it, is that from birth to death the Indian peoples are surrounded and circumscribed by custom and by an etiquette which had its origin in some religious idea. In short, their lives and their outlook are bounded by religion.

Chapter II

THE INDIA OF THE PRINCES

By SIR WILLIAM BARTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

[Sir William Barton, in the course of thirty-five years in the Indian Civil Service, served for more than twenty years in the North-West Frontier Province, and was then employed as Resident successively in the three great Indian States of Baroda, Mysore, and Hyderabad. Few men have had such a varied experience of the India of the Princes as well as on the Frontier.]

ONE of the outstanding events in India in the past ten years has been the rapid development in the political influence of the Indian States—those portions of India outside of British India. Occupying two-fifths of the sub-continent and absorbing over a fifth (about eighty millions) of its population, they must obviously be a factor of immense importance in the solution of the problem of a united India. In point of fact a clear view of the problem of Indian politics is impossible without a study of the position in Indian polity of the Indian States.

The States¹ number 562. Of the more important States, 108 share between them 514,886 square miles with a population of over sixty millions, and a revenue exceeding 420 million rupees (over £30 millions sterling or 146 million dollars) out of a total of 460 million rupees for the States as a whole. These 108 States are members in their own right of the Chamber of Princes. One hundred and twenty-seven States with an area of 76,846 square miles and a population of over eight millions are represented by twelve members of their order elected by themselves. About half of these two groups fall into the category known in official parlance as 'salute States', i.e. States

¹ See the yellow-printed portions in the map at the end of the volume.

whose chiefs are entitled to a salute of guns. The remaining 327 are of little practical importance, and are States only in name.

The States vary in importance from great territories like Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Travancore, and Kashmir with up-to-date administrations and large revenues, to States with an area of a few hundred square miles and strictly limited powers. These latter are in many cases feudatories of the larger States, holding a guarantee from the British Government against oppression by their overlords.

A brief historical retrospect will help to illustrate the setting of the Indian States in the constitutional fabric of the Indian Empire. For this purpose the States may be roughly grouped as follows:

The Rajput States, including Kashmir.

Hyderabad and the Muslim States.

The Maratha States.

The Sikh States.

Mysore and the southern Indian States, and

The Orissa Feudatory States.

The Rajput States are the most numerous, with the widest range. They occupy practically the whole of Rajputana and Kathiawar. Rajputs predominated in Central India till the rise of the Maratha Empire. Many Rajput States survive on the central tableland. Rewa and Orchha are among the most important. We find Rajput chiefs also in the Feudatory States of Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces. In fact there is a great belt of semi-independent Rajput States from the Indus to the Bay of Bengal. The military hegemony of the Rajput in Northern India from the seventh to the twelfth century of our era is one of the most brilliant episodes of Indian history. The feudal baron of Europe had his counterpart in the Rajput

baron of the tenth century. Rajput India was an India of the golden age. But behind the passes militant Islam was gathering force. The storm burst early in the eleventh century. Rajput chivalry stood up against the shock for over a century, only to retire decimated to its fastnesses in Rajputana, Central India, and Kathiawar where its leaders have maintained themselves ever since. This in brief outline is the origin of the Rajput States of to-day. That they succeeded in preserving their identity during seven hundred years of Muslim rule is a tribute to their tenacity and resource. Throughout this period their relations with their Muslim rulers were of a feudal character. This was especially the case under the Moguls. The Mogul emperors married Rajput princesses; Rajput military contingents fought under their own chiefs in the Afghan highlands; Rajput chiefs served as provincial governors in all parts of the empire. A Rajput prince served as Governor of Kabul. The exhaustion of the Mogul Empire, following on Aurangzeb's military adventure in the Deccan, opened the path to Maratha dominance. During the whole of the eighteenth century Rajput and Maratha were locked in a death struggle which only ended when British military power became supreme. Many of the Rajput States lost the bulk of their territory to the Marathas, many were reduced to the position of Maratha feudatories or vassals both in Central India and Kathiawar.

Kashmir has a history all its own. A Mogul province, the bulk of the people embraced Islam. To the Moguls succeeded the Afghans, only to lose the province to the Sikhs. The British inherited it from the defeated Sikhs: they sold it to a Dogra Rajput, Chief of Jammu, a feudatory of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, ancestor of the present ruler. The petty Rajput States in the Simla Hills were tributaries of Nepal till after the Nepalese war of 1815.

The most important of the Muslim States are Hyderabad, Bhopal, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Junagadh (Kathiawar), and Rampur. The paralysis of the Mogul power gave them their opportunity. Hyderabad was built up by Asaf Jah, the first Nizam, a great general and administrator under the Moguls, out of the Deccan territory conquered from the Muslim kingdoms of the south by Aurangzeb. Asaf Jah became practically independent in 1725. A chain of Muslim fiefs from Kurnool to Trichinopoly acknowledged his overlordship. Bhopal was founded by another Mogul general, an Orakzai Pathan from the Frontier, early in the eighteenth century. Junagadh and Rampur had a similar origin. During the same period Oudh, which was to figure so prominently for a century in the history of the British in India, broke away from the control of the centre. Over all these new political entities Delhi held a shadowy suzerainty till the beginning of the nineteenth century. Khairpur and Bahawalpur were fiefs of the Durani Empire of Kabul, relics of the conquests of the Punjab by Ahmad Shah in the middle of the eighteenth century.

The Maratha Empire represented a revival of Hindu nationalism against Muslim domination. It owed its wonderful success largely to the genius of Sivaji and his military successors. The decay of the central power at Delhi created the opportunity. Had the Marathas allied themselves with the Rajput chiefs of Central India and Rajputana, they might have dealt the Delhi Empire its deathblow and swept away all traces of Muslim dominance. They adopted a different policy, and we find them tearing down the old-time political structures the Rajputs had built and maintained for centuries, in Rajputana, Central India, and Kathiawar. Maratha generals carved out for themselves great provinces: Baroda with its tributaries in Gujarat and Kathiawar; Gwalior, Indore, Nagpur in

Central India, most of them with satellites of small Rajput chiefs in unwilling subordination. The Maratha Empire by the middle of the eighteenth century included most of Central India. It may be described as a loose confederation of big provinces, Gwalior, Baroda, Indore, Nagpur, and Satara acknowledging subordination for common purposes to the central authority, the Peshwa at Poona. Hyderabad and remote territories not actually in the military possession of the Marathas paid *chauth*, or one-fourth of their revenues as blackmail.

The Sikh States, Patiala, Nabha, Jhind, Kapurthala, &c., were established by military chiefs of the Sikh Khalsa (meaning 'select'), a religious brotherhood founded by the successors of Guru Nanak. They preserved their identity by allying themselves with Britain to avoid absorption into the Punjab of Ranjit Singh.

Mysore began its existence as a fief of the Vijayanagar kingdom in the fifteenth century, and grew in extent and importance as that kingdom faded into insignificance after the crushing defeat it received in 1565 at Telukottah at the hands of the Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan. The Travancore State followed a similar evolution. It was built up early in the eighteenth century by an ancestor of the present ruling family out of a group of military fiefs held by Nayar chieftains.

The Orissa Feudatory States and the feudatory States of the Central Provinces fall into a category of their own. They are mostly peopled by aboriginal tribes. The ruling families are in some cases Rajputs: in others there is an admixture of Rajput blood. Most of them were in feudal relations first with the Moguls and later with the Maratha State of Nagpur. They came into relations with the British when Nagpur was annexed in 1853. The rulers of these States do not enjoy full political jurisdiction.

The historical panorama attempted in the preceding paragraphs will help to give an idea of the India of the eighteenth century, when the British emerged successfully from their struggle with the French in the South and stood forth as a recognized political power in the country. The Maratha Empire was at its zenith. The British held Bengal. From 1760 onwards their policy was to establish and maintain a balance of power among the rival forces contending for supremacy on the ruins of the Mogul Empire. With this end in view they contracted defensive alliances with Hyderabad and Travancore in the South, Oudh in the North, and with Baroda in Central India. They avoided conclusions with the Maratha Empire till Mysore had been brought into subjection. With Mysore out of the picture, the two great rivals, Maratha and Briton, stood face to face. There followed the Maratha war at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The British victories broke the cohesion of the Maratha Empire. Up to this period, the British alliances with the so-called country powers had been practically on an equal footing. The new series of treaties established in most cases a military protectorate, though at the same time the British abjured all claim to interfere in the administration of the allied States. The most important members of the allied groups at this period were Hyderabad, Travancore, Mysore, the Peshwa at Poona, Baroda, and Oudh. Military protection was provided for by the location in each State of a large subsidiary force commanded by British officers and under British control. The cost of these troops was provided for by cession of territory or by subsidy.

The alliance with Hyderabad had been throughout the period under review the keystone of British policy in the Deccan. It placed the resources of this great State at the disposal of the British in their final struggle with the

Marathas. The subsidiary force of Hyderabad was ten thousand strong, to which later was added the Hyderabad contingent with a strength of seven thousand. Large territories were occupied for the upkeep of the subsidiary force: the Nizam had ceded the extensive and valuable territory of the Northern Circars for a comparatively small quit-rent in 1765, thereby adding greatly to the resources of the British.

The Maratha wars of 1801-3 closed the first phase of British relations with Indian States. As already noted, up to that time the various alliances had been concluded on a more or less equal footing. The Treaty States now came within the orbit of British military protection. By far the greater part of India was at this time parcelled out among the Indian States. In the South were Tanjore (Maratha), Travancore, Cochin, and Mysore, with a few smaller States. The greater part of the Deccan, including the Berars, was under the flag of the Nizam; the rest of the Deccan was ruled by the Peshwa; the whole of the Central Provinces with the Orissa Feudatory States comprised the territories of the Bhonsla of Nagpur; Nagpur also held the Orissa coast-line; Sindhia and Holkar between them shared the rest of the central plateau to the Ganges. Baroda dominated Gujarat and Kathiawar. The Punjab was under the rule of Ranjit Singh the Sikh; the Afghan Duranis of Kabul had ceased to exercise control over Sind, which was ruled by its own Amirs; the Oudh Wazir whom we created a king in 1819 was practically independent of Delhi.

The British might now have stood forth as the Paramount Power in India, with all the responsibilities involved in the position. The policy of non-interference was, however, adopted, termed the 'policy of the ring fence'. The inevitable consequence followed. Rajput and Maratha in

Central India and Rajputana engaged in a war of extinction. The British turned a deaf ear to appeals for help from Rajputs dispossessed of their heritage. They refused a treaty with Bhopal. The framework of government broke down in Central India, and the country was ravaged by the hordes of banditti known as the Pindaris. In the end the British had to interfere. By a series of treaties they enlisted the support of the Rajput Chiefs in a policy of pacification. The great Maratha Chiefs in Central India and the Peshwa instead of supporting the movement rose against the British. The rising was crushed: the Peshwa disappeared and with him all hope of the revival of the Maratha Empire. There remained only the great Maratha States of Nagpur, Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda, with a few smaller States in Central India and the Deccan, like Kolhapur and Satara, and Tanjore in Madras. Baroda already had a subsidiary force. The policy of the ring fence was abandoned; the British accepted the position of suzerain. In most cases, the new series of treaties provided for non-interference, though in some the rulers agreed to accept advice. All agreed to place their foreign relations and their relations with other Indian States in the hands of the suzerain. Many dispossessed Rajput Chiefs who had gone into outlawry to escape their Maratha oppressors were reinstated as 'mediatized Chiefs', a term implying that the British Government guaranteed them against ill-usage from their feudal superior. The position of the Simla States is similar: so is that of the petty chiefs of Kathiawar and of the western slopes of the central Indian plateau, all tributaries of Baroda. These latter Chiefs are included in the Rewa Kantha and Mahi Kantha Agencies. Mediatized States stand in an entirely different category from the Indian State properly so-called.

The subsidiary forces of the States comprised in 1820 nearly half of the British Indian Army. The system was a simple, cheap, and effective method of developing military power from the British point of view. But it had its drawbacks. Incentive to good government is largely attenuated where the State has no longer to husband its resources in order to be able to speak with the enemy in the gates. A full treasury ceases to be an imperative necessity, a result which prompts extravagance: there is no inducement for the ruler to propitiate his subjects. The result is the weakening of the fibre of the administration: misrule often followed by chaos. The process of moral degeneration here described was exemplified in Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Baroda, and particularly in Oudh and Indore during the quarter of a century following the settlement of 1818. The result was that we had to interfere in several cases to prevent bankruptcy or to restore order. In Baroda the British Government asserted the right to be consulted in the appointment of the Chief Minister: in Travancore an insurrection was quelled. In Hyderabad the right to be consulted on the appointment of Chief Minister was asserted as far back as 1801: a few years later the Resident took it upon himself to raise the Hyderabad Contingent in order to pacify the country: for fifteen years British Revenue Commissioners were largely responsible for the administration of the State. In 1831, as a result of an insurrection, the British took over the administration of Mysore, an arrangement which was to continue for fifty years.

With all this, however, the British Government refused to shoulder the responsibility of ensuring reasonably good government in the States as an incident of paramountcy. It preferred the less onerous theory of a feudal superiority with its concomitants of wardship, escheat, and the right

of confirming succession. Wardship involved the responsibility of regency administration in cases of minority; escheat was an easy method of dealing with inefficient administration on failure of lineal heirs. Escheat involved the repudiation of the Hindu practice of adoption, and gave widespread dissatisfaction among the Princes of India. It was undoubtedly one of the contributing causes of the Mutiny. Its chief exponent was Lord Dalhousie. The great Maratha State of Nagpur (the Bhonsla) was escheated in 1853: Satara, Tanjore, and Jhansi were similarly absorbed. So was Oudh, though here the excuse was continued misgovernment.

A new era of hope for the States dawned just before the Mutiny, when a distinguished school of Indian statesmen such as Salar Jung of Hyderabad, Dinkar Rao in Gwalior, Sakurni Menon of Travancore, and Mashar Rao of Indore set the example of improved administration. Britain owed much to the support of the Indian States in the great struggle of 1857, and especially to the Rajput States and Hyderabad.

The support given by the Indian States in the Mutiny was recognized by the concession of the right to adopt. This went a long way towards allaying the anxieties of the Princes.

The next half-century witnessed the slow development of political practice as governing the relations between the States and the Supreme Government. The principle most in evidence was the responsibility of the Paramount Power for protecting the country and maintaining peace and order. This took shape in railway policy, in the control of posts and telegraphs, maritime customs, Imperial taxation such as the salt tax, the limitation of armaments, the suppression of organized crime, such as thuggee and dacoity. The old policy of isolation was continued. Despite

the lack of confidence thus displayed towards them, the Chiefs gave a splendid example of loyalty in 1886 when the Penjdeh incident on the Afghan Frontier threatened war between Great Britain and Russia. Many of the Chiefs offered to raise regular troops at their own expense. The movement developed into the institution of the Imperial Service Troops of the States, which has added greatly to the strength of the British Indian Army. The closer interest taken by the Government of India in the internal affairs of the States during Lord Curzon's viceroyalty, largely because of the semi-bankruptcy of many States in the prevailing famine conditions, led to a good deal of anxiety as to Imperial policy. There was a widespread feeling that the interests of the States where they clashed with the interests of the provinces were in danger of being disregarded. Lord Minto, who succeeded Lord Curzon, made it his special endeavour to reassure the Princes, with some measure of success.

The Indian States adopted the Imperial cause as their own during the Great War: the resources of the States both military and economic were placed at the disposal of the Empire. The war was followed by a change of policy and attitude on the part of the British Government. It was felt that the old policy of isolation with the distrust it implied had long since been outworn. The British Government now recognized that the Princes had won the right to share in the counsels of the Empire. British India was progressing rapidly towards self-government, and it was impossible in the altered conditions to deny to the Princes their claim to consult together in order to preserve the privileges of their order. One of the results was the institution in 1920 of the Chamber of Princes, a consultative and advisory body in which the leading Chiefs are members in their own right; the rest elect

their representatives. A new era of confidence had begun.

The Chiefs of the more advanced States took the opportunity of joint consultation to clear their position as regards the incidence of paramountcy. It was felt that their treaty rights had been slowly eroded by the development of political practice, and they desired to set up a barrier against further encroachments. In response to their wishes an effort was made to codify political practice so far as this was feasible. It was found impossible to bring the major problem, the claim of the Crown to intervene to redress gross misrule, within the framework of the new code. A problem of equal importance forced itself on the attention: in the event of the grant of self-government to British India, in whose hands would paramountcy vest, in the Indian Government or in the Crown? This question with its implications and other issues arising from the claim of the States to share in British Indian customs duties, etc., was referred to the Butler Commission in 1927. The Commission reported in 1929. They found that paramountcy vests in the Crown. It was, they held, impossible to devise a formula that would define its scope. Paramountcy must be paramount in the interests of the Princes themselves. The hesitancy of the Committee to define the sphere of the Crown in its relations with the States caused disappointment in some quarters. The Commission did not entirely endorse the views of the States in the matter of financial relations. A further examination of the position with regard to customs was recommended. Final orders have not yet been passed on the Butler Report.

Side by side with the Commission, the States set up a commission of their own presided over by Sir Leslie Scott, to examine the questions under inquiry. This Commission

scrutinized very closely the existing treaties and the occasions on which it was claimed that the treaties had been infringed. The report of the Commission was laid before, and examined by the Butler Commission. It is sufficient to note here that Sir Leslie Scott and his colleagues would confine paramountcy to the conduct of the foreign relations of the States, including inter-state relations, and the whole responsibility of defence; in other words, the sphere of the Crown should be confined to foreign relations and internal and external security. It is admitted as a corollary of these principles that the Crown has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a State if such intervention is necessary for the purpose of exercising the rights or fulfilling the obligations of the Crown in connexion with foreign relations and external and internal security—not otherwise. Some Princes, it is believed, desire to set up an independent tribunal to decide the question whether in any particular case the claim to intervention is justified. This attitude involves an anomaly. The authority of the suzerain power cannot be delegated to a third party.

The federation of British India and the States which the Butler Commission regarded as a remote ideal has now become a matter of public discussion. In such a scheme the responsibility of the Crown as Paramount Power will become a task of ever-increasing difficulty. The position would be simplified if the Chiefs would adopt a proposal recently put forward by several of their number that a self-denying ordinance should be passed fixing a reasonable civil list; introducing the reign of law; establishing a graded civil service on modern lines; and generally developing a reasonably up-to-date administration. Several States have already reached such a standard; others have adopted some but not all of the principles involved; many have considerable leeway to make up. There is yet another

outstanding difficulty, the question of the military protectorate set up by the treaties, and by agreement and usage in the case of the non-treaty States. The British Crown cannot abjure its responsibility in the matter: it can only divest itself of it with the full consent of the Chiefs. It must not be forgotten that British military protection has in many cases been paid for by the cession of vast tracts of territory, e.g. the Berars, the 'ceded Districts' of Madras, the Northern Circars (Madras) by the Nizam of Hyderabad, extensive territories in Gujerat by Baroda, and in Central India by Gwalior and Indore. From the point of view of the Chiefs military protection is the most essential safeguard. They will not forget that the British Navy has protected the shores of India for a century and a half, and that India must rely on that protection for some time to come. Most of them realize that without the moral support of the Paramount Power the States might find themselves faced by almost insuperable difficulties, in a Federated India. Paramountcy and military power cannot be dissociated.

The opinion is held in some quarters that the claim of the States that they have contributed their share of the military burden by cession of territory over a century ago, is an anachronism; and that their existing territories should share proportionately in Imperial military charges with the rest of India. This is not the place to discuss the equity of such a proposal. Let it be noted as an historical fact that the States paid for forty per cent. of the British Indian Army at the Mutiny period. Their help and resources contributed largely to the ultimate achievement of the British in bringing under one Crown the India of to-day and in holding it against all comers. If one takes into account the territories ceded by existing States, the subsidies paid, the proportion of British India forces

they maintain for Imperial purposes, the share of the Princes in the military charges of India to-day will not be found to be far short of the contributions of 1857. It is true that some States do not contribute in proportion to their resources. There is every reason that they should do so.

In the foregoing paragraphs an attempt has been made to describe the main phases through which British relations with the Indian States have passed as Britain built up her Empire in India. As already noted, a large group of the more progressive Chiefs think that the theory and principles of paramountcy which overlies the constitutional structure have been pushed too far. The question is complicated, and a full discussion of it lies beyond the scope of the present survey. There is something to be said for the point of view that the theory of feudal relations has been over-elaborated. The British Crown did not in fact succeed to the position of the Moguls *qua* the Rajput States. Their relations are governed by treaty or written agreement (*sanads*) as modified by subsequent usage. In the case of States of later origin, Hyderabad, Mysore, the Maratha States, and Travancore, the genesis of British relations was a definite treaty. In some cases it is true that the relations between the Government and a State or estate are in essence feudatory. Take, for example, the mediatised Chiefs of Central India, Kathiawar, and the Rewa and Mehi Kantha Agencies, and the Sirdars and jagirdars of the Deccan. These States have little real power. Political authority in their borders is mainly exercised by the political agent as representative of the Crown. There is, perhaps, an element of feudalism in the position of more important States such as the Orissa Feudatory States, where the political powers of the Chief in his territories are subject to limitation. As regards States with

full political powers whose position of subordinate alliance was originally defined by treaty or *sanad*, the diminution of their treaty status as paramountcy developed can be explained simply by the fact that the responsibility for external and internal protection in most cases justify the restrictions that have been developed. In other words, in order to secure immunity from external attack and internal disorder, it has been inevitable in the interests of India as a whole that the Chiefs should forgo some of the privileges of their position. That is paramountcy in brief. And there can be no doubt that no British Government would ever wish to push the boundaries of the principle beyond the limits prescribed by the interests of the States, and of British India, in the maintenance of internal and external peace.

The States are merged internationally with the British Empire. For international purposes their subjects are British subjects entitled to British protection when abroad. Similarly, the subjects of foreign countries can claim British protection in the States. The British Government claims jurisdiction over Europeans in State territories.

If we look at the political map of India inserted at the end of the book we see vast masses of territory represented by yellow patches in the white of British India. One could travel from Kashmir to Travancore almost without passing through British territory; or in the same way from the Indus to the Bay of Bengal. The great Maratha States of Baroda, Indore, and Gwalior lying as they do across Central India are in a very strong strategic position. They are highly developed States. The Gwalior army is perhaps the strongest of the State armies in India. If we were to colour with yellow Oudh, Tanjore, Jhansi, Nagpur, and the Berars on the map, then we may consider for a moment what the role of Britain might have been since

the Mutiny without the principle of escheat, especially if the British had created a native government equal to its task in the Punjab and on the Frontier. India might then have had an opportunity of developing in her own way on her own lines.

Many of the States are progressive, and in some administrative standards compare not unfavourably with British India. Travancore and Mysore have advanced almost as far as British India along the path of self-government. On the whole, however, the administrative structure is less elaborate, the minor officials less numerous, if not less rapacious in the States than with their political neighbours. In some States the administration is confided very largely to an executive Council, as for example, in Hyderabad, Baroda, Kashmir, Gwalior, Mysore, Indore, Bikanir, Patiala, and Bhopal. In a large number of States the judicial system is organized on the same lines as in British India, and not infrequently the local Bar has produced High Court Judges of ability and character. The system of finance is in most cases based on British Indian models. Education has made great strides in Indian India. Hyderabad has its university. So has Mysore. The standard of literacy in Travancore is the highest in India. Baroda is carrying out a policy of free compulsory education. Many States have an up-to-date medical department. In many there are scientific departments. It very frequently happens that State governments borrow expert officials, British and Indian, from the Indian Government in order to improve their own standards. In fact, there is no doubt, as observed by the Butler Commission, that a sense of responsibility to their people is spreading among all the States. The wave of political agitation that is sweeping over India has not left the States completely immune. Associations of State subjects working in British

India have in some cases sought to bring pressure to bear on the rulers. Mysore, in spite of the broadmindedness and sympathy of its ruler, has passed through a period of political liveliness. In Hyderabad, where the three great races of the Deccan meet, Maratha, Andhra, and Kanarese, all Hindu be it noted, there have been signs of political discontent. We do not find in the States great industries and business centres like Bombay and Calcutta: there are no teeming centres of rural life as in the Gangetic plains. Still, if in some cases the opportunities of life are less complex, there is compensation in the comparative absence of poverty and the struggle for existence. In many States are to be found rulers who give themselves almost entirely to the welfare of their subjects; and also devoted loyalty to the ruler. Much of the old picturesqueness of life in India still lingers in the States: in ancient ceremonial and stately processions such as the Dasserah (Hindu festival) processions in Mysore and Baroda. The capitals of many of the States are set in surroundings of great natural beauty: many of them are adorned with noble buildings. Many Chiefs prefer quiet dignity to ostentatious display. Everywhere will be found lavish hospitality and old-world courtesy. It is true to say that the States enshrine much of the best of India's past glories. They are splendid schools for political training, and they have produced statesmen of the first rank in India to-day among their Chiefs and Ministers. There is every hope that they will play a great part commensurate with their traditions and resources in the India of the future. Combined, they will be a dominant factor in a reasoned settlement of the political problems which now occupy the Indian stage.

Chapter III

THE AFGHAN FRONTIER

By SIR WILLIAM BARTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

[See heading of Chapter II.]

THE problem of the Afghan Frontier is in its essence a question of military strategy. The great mass of tangled mountain and plateau, conveniently described as the Afghan highlands, that flanks the Indus Valley, stretching from the Hindu Kush to the Arabian Sea, enfolds the gateways into India from Central Asia. Through those gateways invading hordes for thousands of years have swept into the fertile plains of the Punjab and the Gangetic river valley. Beyond the passes virile tribes have developed their military strength in preparation for the conquest of the promised land. The menace is still there. The Afghan still turns hungry eyes on the wealth of India: still hopes that some day the tide of a *jihād* or Holy War will sweep across the Indus. Farther north the shadow of the Russian Bear obscures the horizon.

Unless she holds the passes, India cannot protect herself from the menace of Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is for this reason that she must not weaken her hold on the North-West Frontier. But for the urgent requirements of military policy she might very well decline all further responsibility for the Frontier and its people. For the Frontier is not India. In fact the most difficult of the problems before the Indian constitution-builder at the moment is to bring into the framework of an Indian Federation the million and a half fighting men domiciled between our political boundary with Afghanistan (the Durand line) and the Indus. Turco-Iranian by origin,

these people are alien in race, language, and historical traditions from India. Their fanatical devotion to Islam is another disturbing factor. For them the ideal of a united India has no attraction. The 'Durand line' divides Afghan tribes akin in race and traditions; they share the same political instincts. These instincts attract them to Kabul rather than to Delhi, and there can be little doubt that the Pathans of our tribal area would prefer to see the Frontier absorbed in the Kingdom of Kabul rather than in a Federated India. It is true that they dislike Afghan rule: they dislike any kind of rule for that matter: they are not enamoured of the rule of the Indian Government. The tribesmen of the settled districts are less ultra-montane in their political tendencies, but with many Kabul is undoubtedly their spiritual home.

A glance at the historical background will show how rarely the country beyond the Indus, now included in the British-Indian boundary, has gravitated towards Delhi. The gravitation has in fact been persistently towards either Persia or Kabul. The Indus Valley was a province of Darius, ruled by Persian satraps. Alexander's generals absorbed the Afghan highlands in their Graeco-Bactrian Kingdoms. Still later Kabul and its dependencies were included in the Buddhist Kingdom of Kanishka, the Indo-Scythian ruler of the Punjab. Buddhism had ousted Brahminical Hinduism from the Indus valley. It has never re-asserted its sway. And Brahminical Hinduism is at the core of the great political movement in India. It has no appeal on the Frontier.

Islam drove out Buddhism from Kabul in the eighth and ninth centuries, gathering strength for a mighty effort against the Hinduism of India. Tartar and Turk and Mongol swept over the passes to establish empires at Delhi. From the fifteenth century hardy tribesmen from

the central highlands beyond Kabul poured into the Indus valley hinterland and into the plains beyond. The population of the borderland completely changed its texture in the next two hundred years. The great tribes of the Yusafzai, the Mohmands, Afridis, Wazirs, Bangash, Khataks, and others established themselves in the Indus valley and the adjacent hill tracts, Swat, Buner, Tirah, Tochi, Waziristan. The Kabul provinces were an appanage of the Moguls, who utilized them as a reservoir of manpower. From the middle of the seventeenth century history repeated itself and the Afghan highlands gravitated afresh towards Persia. Kandahar and Herat were lost to the Moguls towards the end of the seventeenth century. A little later Nadir Shah, the Persian emperor, absorbed the whole country to the Indus, before his onslaught on Delhi in 1739. On his death Ahmad Shah Durani, one of his generals, founded the Afghan Kingdom and the present ruling family at Kabul. He held most of the Punjab after his great victory in 1761 over the Marathas at Panipat. Half a century later the Sikhs pushed the Afghans beyond the Indus. A little later they extended their conquests beyond the river to the foot-hills, and held the country by a precarious tenure till the British succeeded them in 1849.

It will be seen then that political life on the Frontier has had little, if any, real contact with political life in India for more than 1,500 years. For the last eighty years the nexus has been British rule. That in itself has not been adequate to change the orientation of the Pathan. Will the position improve when the control of a Federal Government with a conceivable Hindu majority is substituted for that of Britain? One may blame Britain for the difficulties of to-day; a reasoned criticism must give due weight to the complexity of the problem which faced the British administrator in 1850. The policy adopted was to attempt

to assimilate the Pathan with the Punjab: to give his political ideals a definitely Indian tinge. That it has failed is perhaps not the fault of the British administrator: it is due rather to the fact that it is incredibly difficult to blend Pathan and Indian psychology.

The politician, especially the Indian politician, would perhaps not entirely disapprove of the early policy on the Frontier, in view of its objective. The alternative would have been to adopt a policy resembling the system introduced later on in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman after 1877. This would have involved the recognition of the political individuality of the Frontier, by the establishment of a separate administration. There was much in existing institutions and in the structure of social life which might have been worked up into a rough system of administrative machinery. Tribal jirgahs (conferences of tribesmen) could have been utilized for settling disputes and obtaining redress for crimes. The influence of the Khans and Arbabs (lords), or great landowners, when available, might have been co-ordinated with the tribal system. It would have been possible to devise a scheme of tribal police. A policy of the kind would have transferred responsibility for their own political, social, and economic development to the people themselves under the supervision of British officers. In a society riddled with the blood feud, the rigid code of criminal law imported from England was more likely to aggravate than diminish violent forms of crime characteristic of the Pathan temperament. Tribal law aims at redress and conciliation rather than punishment. The vendetta murder is regarded leniently in Pathan society: why the British should set their ponderous machinery to work to punish it with death has never been understood. It is true the Frontier Crime Regulations did modify to a considerable extent the British code: it did not

go far enough in substituting tribal law and procedure for Western standards. British law created the outlaw problem. Outlaws operating from tribal territory have been a pest ever since the British took over the Frontier. They have been responsible, directly or indirectly, for a large proportion of border crime leading to military expeditions as reprisals. The Pathan who commits a murder in a blood feud has many friends and sympathizers to facilitate his escape across the Frontier, and to harbour him when he returns to exact further retribution from his enemies. He is always sure of a welcome in tribal territory, where he is beyond the reach of the arm of the law. A less complicated system of administration would have made it possible to adopt measures for dealing with the blood-feud murder, more in accordance with the moral outlook of the Pathan. The removal of the outlaw problem would have greatly facilitated the maintenance of a quiet border. The Pathans on both sides of the Frontier have always hated our police and the police courts. There can be no doubt that, if it had been possible to devise a system of criminal law more congenial to border psychology, it would have had sympathetic reactions beyond the Frontier. The dislike of our administration by people of the settled districts has had the effect of strengthening the determination of their neighbours and kinsmen in tribal territory to maintain their independence. It was too late, when Lord Curzon separated the Frontier from the Punjab in 1901, to put back the clock and give the Province the administrative system that might have been evolved fifty years earlier. The only change of importance was to establish a Judicial Commissioner's Court at Peshawar in substitution for the Chief Court at Lahore.

The policy we adopted at the outset with the trans-frontier tribes was known as the close-border system. We

had no desire to add to our responsibilities by penetrating into the hills. In many places we were face to face with Afghan officials. Afghan troops held the Khyber; the Kurram Valley had an Afghan governor; the Afghans had advanced posts in other parts of the Border. The Amir of Kabul claimed an indefinite overlordship over many of the tribes adjacent to British territory, but did nothing to control them. Raiding and kidnapping were of almost everyday occurrence. The outlaw problem developed in intensity. Where possible British officers enforced the principle of tribal responsibility by seizing men and property of the tribes to whom the offenders belonged. In the end, when the chapter of murders and dacoities was full to overflowing, a punitive expedition was dispatched against the miscreant tribe. Escape from the vicious circle was impossible.

The Afghan war of 1878-9 is a landmark in British Frontier policy. The Khyber Pass was opened up: the Afghans were excluded from the Kurram Valley. The strategic position was greatly strengthened by the opening of the Bolan Pass and the occupation of Quetta and Chaman. This gave the British Indian Army the control of the line of approach to India most likely to be followed by an invader. The next few years saw the development in Baluchistan of what is known as the Sandeman policy, the keystone of which was to utilize the tribal system as the dominating factor in our relations with the tribes. Tribal jirgahs or assizes settled all disputes, tribal and inter-tribal, under the supervision of British officers; there were no Revenue or Criminal Courts. The system owed its success largely to the oligarchic organization of the Baluch tribes. In this respect the Baluch tribes differ from the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. Another point is that we have carried our outposts up to the Afghan

border in the tribal area of Baluchistan. The result is that military pressure can be brought in the rear of the tribes, which means stopping their bolt-holes into Afghanistan. The position is exactly the reverse on the North-West Frontier.

In the decade following the second Afghan war the close border system began to crumble before the attacks of the school of forward policy. Without some form of control over the tribes any kind of progress seemed impossible. No improvement could be hoped for, so long as the Afghans claimed overlordship over our border tribes, and the border tribes could play off the British official against the Afghan. The demarcation of spheres of influence became an imperative necessity. This was achieved by the 'Durand line' to which the Amir agreed in 1892. It was demarcated throughout most of its length during the next two or three years from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the south. The Boundary Commission was attacked in Waziristan in 1895, and this led to the military occupation of Wana and the Gumal Pass. In 1893 a chain of forts was built along the high ridge of the Samana overlooking Tirah, on the Kohat border, thereby effectually controlling the Orakzai Afridis. Strategic points were occupied in Waziristan, in the Tochi Valley, and at Jandola. The Kurram Valley was occupied in 1893. Garrisons were placed on the Malakand and in Chitral in 1895, a line of levy posts being constructed in the Panjkora valley to keep the road open to Chitral. Tribes in many cases were paid large allowances for protecting the roads.

The forward policy had asserted itself effectually by 1896. The widespread disturbances of 1897 were largely due to what the tribes regarded as a threat to their independence. The extensive military operations then undertaken left the position practically unchanged.

The policy now came under heavy criticism on the ground that it frittered away the military resources of India by absorbing large bodies of troops in isolated positions, where they could not be used effectively in the event of war with Russia or Afghanistan. Lord Curzon decided to withdraw the troops to their base and to substitute for them irregular tribal corps under British officers. This plan was carried out in the Khyber, Kurram Valley, Tochi, Wana, and in the Zhob Valley. At the same time Lord Curzon adopted the view that Frontier administration was an Imperial responsibility. The Frontier was accordingly separated from the Punjab and placed directly under the Government of India. As a consequence Frontier administration has undoubtedly been more efficient, though it cannot be said that the Pathan is any more attracted than before by British-Indian rule. It is true that he respects it when it is strong: he worships force. And he often forms close friendships with British officers whom he knows and trusts. Frontier expeditions have hardly been less frequent under the Curzon system. It held during the Great War despite sporadic outbreaks, in one case (the Mahsud expedition) involving military operations on a large scale. Pathans in the settled districts enlisted in large numbers in the British armies. Trans-border Pathans, on the other hand, proved unreliable. That the whole border did not burst into flame was largely due to the steady friendship of the late Amir of Kabul, His Majesty Habibullah Khan. Had he chosen to proclaim a *jihād*, or holy war, there is little doubt that all his own tribesmen and the tribesmen on the British side of the 'Durand line' would have followed his lead. The shock would have taxed to the full the resources of the Indian Empire.

The Frontier system of Lord Curzon broke down a few

months after the close of the Great War. Amir Habibullah was murdered and his successor, influenced by the rumours of insurrections in the Punjab, proclaimed the holy war for which the tribesmen had long been waiting. The irregular corps in the outposts, the Khyber, Tochi, and South Waziristan gave way under the strain. Fortunately for the Indian Government, there was no serious outbreak in Tirah or north of the Khyber, while British subjects only joined in the risings in a few isolated cases. The *jihād* was a dismal failure. The aftermath of the war was a great campaign in the Mahsud country involving some of the heaviest fighting we have ever had on the Frontier. When peace was restored it was decided to locate a strong military force at Razmak, a position dominating Mahsud country. Strategic roads were driven through the country, and handed over to well-paid tribal levies (*khassadars*) to police. The result has been a quiet border. The militias have been re-formed in the Tochi and South Waziristan with more reliable material and a different name. Frontier salients are now all re-occupied by regular troops.

The position at the moment is difficult. The new King of Afghanistan has not yet established full control over his border tribes and the result is a feeling of unrest which reacts on the Indian Frontier. Political agitation in the settled districts has accentuated the trouble. The agricultural crisis is another disturbing factor. When the strong arm re-asserts itself in Afghanistan the situation should improve.

The feeling is, however, insistent that a clearer outlook is required in Frontier policy, especially as regards trans-border relations. We have been ploughing the sands for too long. The recent appointment of the Howell Committee to inquire into the problem of border administration gave expression to this feeling. The essence of the

problem is to devise means for assimilating into the Indian constitution the five and a half million Afghans, with their fighting strength of nearly a million and a half, domiciled between the Indus and the 'Durand line'. It may be said that the trans-border tribesman is no concern of Indian politics. The Indian Government cannot control trans-border territory and must leave its people to their own resources. But is this any longer possible? The great mass of warlike people in our tribal areas cannot be left indefinitely in the air. They must gravitate either towards Kabul or Delhi. An improved system of government in Kabul bringing with it economic and social development—and all this is not at all unlikely—might make the appeal of Afghan nationalism too strong to be resisted. That will be an ever-present danger, unless a new policy is evolved which would induce a definite gravitation towards India.

Afghanistan is an important element in the problem that presents itself, for the problem has an international aspect, especially in view of the reactions of Soviet Frontier policy on the Indian border. Now the Afghan kingdom for the most part is built up on a congeries of small tribal republics acknowledging allegiance to Kabul, in most cases with reluctance. Their country is mountainous and difficult of access to regular troops. Then there are great nomad tribes like the Ghilzais and Powindahs, probably nearly a million people, who stream down the passes into India every year with their camels and flocks and are almost as much British as Afghan subjects. They persistently avoid their civic burdens. And they dislike the Duranis. Apart from the nomads, thousands of settled tribesmen leave their frozen mountains in the winter for India where they work as labourers, earning enough to eke out their subsistence in the summer. Most of the Afghan tribesmen are well armed, which increases the

difficulty of control. They are in fact only kept within bounds by an admixture of force and Oriental diplomacy, playing off one faction of a tribe against the other and so on. In such conditions a strong and well-equipped standing army is the first essential—no easy matter in an undeveloped country. Faced with such difficulties, it is not surprising that the Kabul Government should utilize the national spirit in an endeavour to establish its influence over the tribes on our side of the 'Durand line' as well as over its own. It is simply a continuation of an old-time policy. The custom of former governments at Kabul has been to receive deputations from tribes under British-Indian rule: to pay allowances to *maliks* (headmen) from all the big tribal groups, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, Wazirs, &c. All this enhances the prestige of Kabul, while it weakens the political influence of the Indian Government.

Our own tribes are mainly of the extreme democratic type as on the Afghan side of the political boundary. Social life is honeycombed by the blood feud. Each homestead is a fort: cultivation is often impossible because fields are within rifle range of the enemy's tower. There are few if any villages. A rifle is more prized than a wife. Every man is a law unto himself. Tumultuous gatherings assemble at times to settle tribal and inter-tribal affairs, frequently under the influence of the *mullas* (religious leaders). Islam has a strong appeal, and one frequently finds a priest, if gifted with a strong personality, practically ruling a tribe through his religious influence backed by a mob of fanatical disciples. Tribal responsibility, the sheet-anchor of our relations with the tribes, is a well-known rule of border law which the tribesmen enforce among themselves. In most tribes will be found men who by reason of ability and character, or the possession of

a comparatively large area of land and the adherence of vassal outlaws, exercise influence among their fellow tribesmen. It has been our custom to encourage such men by the grant of allowances: in some cases they are recognized as tribal leaders. Very often, however, a tribal conference summoned by a British political officer to settle claims against the tribe is attended by most of the tribesmen as well as the headmen.

One of the outstanding difficulties of promoting the advance of civilization across the Frontier is economic. Almost everywhere the population presses heavily on the means of subsistence. Land is won in most cases by terracing from the hillside and is a scarce commodity. Service in the Indian Army was the chief source of employment till trans-border men proved their unreliability in the Great War. Hill men hate the plains in the summer: many of them, however, are compelled by force of circumstances to seek employment far afield. Pathans are to be found by the hundred in the mill areas of Bombay: many work as stokers in ships. Others cultivate as tenants the lands of their more fortunate kinsmen in British districts. The majority remain in poverty in their bleak hills. Many would be attracted by congenial occupation in the cold weather if such could be found. That way may lie a partial solution of the difficulty.

As already observed, we have had no definite policy with the tribesmen. The close-border policy was no policy. The forward policy was mainly concerned with military strategy. The ideal policy would be to develop the indigenous institutions of the Pathan tribesmen into some form of rough and ready administrative machinery with which the authorities of the Indian Government could deal. Feuds and jealousies would stand in the way of an effort of the kind. It might be worth while trying the experiment

where conditions were favourable. Government support would be necessary, and this would involve expense. Indian statesmen will, however, have to realize that if the Frontier menace is to be exorcized it will mean heavy expenditure: education, economic and political development are the main things necessary if the Afridi, the Mohmand, the Wazir are one day to sit as Senators in the Imperial Councils. And it may be necessary to adopt in other parts of the Frontier the infiltration policy that has been so successful in Waziristan.

The political outlook of the Pathan of the settled districts does not greatly differ from that of his trans-border kinsmen except in the case of those living in close proximity to urban centres. They respect the British-Indian administration when it is strong: they appreciate the effort of British officers to administer impartial justice. Their nationalism is not Indian nationalism: it is Pathan nationalism born of Islam and *Pukhtunwali* (the customs and traditions of the Pathans). By tradition and character the Pathan is far more capable of working popular institutions than is the case with the major portion of the Indian population. Caste is unknown in Pathan social life: the Pathan is democratic; the form of government he likes best is a tribal republic where a man must have both wits and courage if he is to hold his own. There were no reactions on the Frontier following the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. With the transfer to Indian assemblies of a large measure of political power in 1920, the position altered. The effect of the spread of Western education through the agency of the great Islamiah College founded at Peshawar in 1912 had begun to make itself felt. The young Pathan of the middle classes began to realize that Indian politics might react to his prejudice unless he could himself exert some political influence. The fact that he had been denied

reforms was a blow to his national pride. Claims were put forward: the Bray Committee was appointed to investigate the question. It recommended the introduction of a representative council on Morley-Minto lines. The Government of India deferred a decision on the report. Meanwhile agitation was developing, strengthened by the apprehension that the authorities were being influenced by a reactionary group of Khans and Arbabs (lords), anxious to acquire the monopoly of political power. The Congress invasion of 1930 brought on a revolutionary activity known as the Red Shirt movement. This led to serious riots in Peshawar city followed by an Afridi attack on Peshawar itself. The claims of the Province to a recognition of its political rights have received fresh emphasis from the support given them by the Muslim delegation to the Indian Round Table Conference of 1930-1, which demanded popular government in the North-West Frontier Province as a condition precedent to a scheme of Federation.

Can Imperial interests on the Frontier be reconciled with Pathan aspirations? That is the question before British and Indian statesmen. A solution is imperative. It should be possible, if Pathan leaders will adopt a reasonable attitude. Obviously popular government must be confined to internal affairs: it can have no concern with border administration. There must be safeguards impervious to attack. The head of the Government in Peshawar must have full authority, as at present, to utilize the machinery of the police administration when necessary for the protection of the border. This might in some cases involve the overriding of the authority of the Minister. The anomaly might be avoided by placing the police portfolio in official hands for a term of years, or possibly by removing the police jurisdiction of the Ministers

from a belt of country, say, ten miles deep from the boundary.

The Frontier Committee appointed to consider the question of the future status of the North-West Frontier Province in an Indian Federation has now submitted its report. The outstanding proposal is that the Province should have its own budget, with a large subvention from the Central Government. Border administration should continue to be a central subject. Law and order should be provincial. Provision is made for military control of roads when this is urgently necessary in military interests. Presumably the Governor will have the power of veto if he consider the policy or proposal of a Minister such as to endanger the peace of the Border. Some such safeguard appears essential. As regards the financial proposals, it seems doubtful whether the Central Government would leave the charges on account of Frontier administration to the popular vote.

For eighty years the sole responsibility for the Frontier has rested on the shoulders of Britain. That era is now approaching its close. We have to admit failure to assimilate Pathan nationalism into the wider nationalism of India. But there is another side of the picture. British military power has kept India immune from invasion for over a hundred years: the Frontier is held more firmly than ever. The idea of a régime of law and order has been established in the mind of a warlike and turbulent people. The Pathan, too, has learnt to respect the British-Indian administration. All this represents a distinct advance. Without it there could have been no possibility of the merging of the Frontier in India. It will rest with the future Government of India by sympathy, goodwill, and friendship to induce the Pathan to forget his nationalism in the wider patriotism of a united India.

Chapter IV

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

By SIR WILLIAM MARRIS, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

[Sir William Marris spent a large portion of his service in India at the administrative head-quarters of Government, and served as Reforms Commissioner with the Government of India during the period before the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. He was appointed Governor of Assam in 1921, and Governor of the United Provinces in 1922. After his retirement he was created a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. Since 1929 he has been Principal of the Armstrong College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.]

THE development of the system of British government in India falls into well-marked chapters. The first records the gradual assertion of Parliament's determination to be master in matters which in the beginning were entirely controlled by the Directors of a trading corporation or their agents in India. This period lasted till just after the Mutiny. The next chapter marks, first, the completion and improvement of the administrative machine, and, secondly, the beginnings of a process of giving Indians some effective voice in direction of policy and an increasing share in its execution. This stage lasted till just after the Great War. The third epoch began in 1917 with the declaration that policy should henceforward be directed to enabling the people of India to govern themselves. During the years 1919-29 India traversed the initial stage of this third period; and we are now engaged in the difficult investigations and consultations which are to determine what the next stage shall be.

The primary object of the original British settlers was to make trading profits, and no question arose of governing the country until the break-down of native rule in Bengal left Clive no choice but to assume responsibility for ad-

ministering that vast region of the country in the name of the ineffective Mogul emperor at Delhi. The precariousness of the Company's finances, the reports of abuses which followed on Clive's retirement, and the ostentatious arrogance of the retired officials who came to be known as 'Nabobs' were causes which first stirred Parliament to assert its authority. Pitt's India Act of 1784 set up a parliamentary Board of Control which thenceforward was responsible for the political affairs of India, though the direction of commercial policy, and therewith great influence, still remained with the Directors. The Company's charter was made renewable for periods of twenty years, and before each renewal Parliament held a formal inquiry into the Indian administration. In 1831 Parliament first maintained the sovereignty of the Crown over all Indian territories in possession of the Company; and an Act of 1833 required all laws made in India to be laid before Parliament. Thus the indefinite dominion which the Company had derived from the Moguls in virtue of Clive's treaty after the Battle of Plassey came to be gradually overlaid by a new sovereignty resting on parliamentary statutes; but even up to 1857, the Company's Directors who retained the right of initiative and had the advantage of expert knowledge were able to exercise a powerful influence on the administration. It required the shock of the Indian Mutiny to seal the fate of the greatest and strongest mercantile corporation in the world. By the Act of 1858 the powers of the Court of Directors and of the Board of Control passed to a parliamentary Secretary of State of India for India. With him (in this respect unlike all other Ministers of the Crown) was, and still is, associated a Council designed to provide him with expert advice on Indian questions. The Secretary of State, like all other Ministers, is responsible to Parliament for his

official acts, and therefore has a general power of disregarding or overriding the advice of his Council. It is true that in respect of certain particular matters he cannot act without the vote of a majority in Council; but this particular reservation has never operated to render him more immune than his colleagues in the Ministry from parliamentary criticism. The India Act of 1858 thus vindicated the legal supremacy of the British Parliament over administration in India.

The same period 1773 to 1858 witnessed the gradual extension of the administrative system and the growth of most of the major provinces. The early settlements at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta were each administered independently of the others, by a Governor and a Council consisting of senior servants of the Company. But foreign enemies necessitated a common policy, and therefore the Regulating Act (1773) gave the Governor of Bengal superintendence over Madras and Bombay as Governor-General in Council. The Governor-General's authority, vague and ineffective at first, strengthened as wars with foreign powers and native princes led to a pushing out of boundaries which brought the presidencies closer together. Madras and Bombay (except for Sind) had taken final shape as early as 1818; but long after that date, in spite of the frequently expressed apprehensions of the Board of Directors, the need for securing the Presidency of Bengal led to successive extensions up the Ganges valley to the Punjab, into the plateau of Central India, up the Brahmaputra, and even into Lower Burma. Before this process had gone far, it became apparent that the Governor-General in Council could not administer directly so huge an area, and so Lieutenant-Governorships came to be created, first, for what are now the United Provinces, and subsequently for Bengal and the Punjab. Minor provinces

like the Central Provinces and Assam, and for a time Burma, were administered by Chief Commissioners. In this way the Governor-General in Council ceased for the most part to govern directly, but became the directing and supervising authority over the whole country. By 1919 the units of administration of British India comprised, first, the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, administered by a Governor in Council (in Bengal a Lieutenant-Governor in Council had been replaced by a Governor in Council in 1912 when the seat of the Central Government was moved from Calcutta to Delhi); secondly, the other four major provinces of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, and Bihar with Orissa which were all under Lieutenant-Governors (though Bihar by reason of its previous association with Bengal had an Executive Council as well); thirdly, the two Chief Commissionerships of the Central Provinces and Assam; and fourthly, certain minor charges, namely, the North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan, Coorg, Ajmer, the Andamans, and the small enclave of Delhi, which remained more directly under the Governor-General in Council.

Up to 1909, and perhaps for ten years later, it would be accurate to describe the administration of India as a huge civil or non-military autocracy, vesting originally in the East India Company, then shared between the Company's Directors and the Home Government, and after the Mutiny taken over by the latter. Constitutionally speaking, the supreme power ever since 1858 has rested with the electors of Great Britain, who made and unmade ministries and could call the Secretary of State and the whole Cabinet to account if unacceptable things were done in India. From the Secretary of State downwards to the smallest public servant in India, authority ran in an

unbroken chain secured by two simple provisions of the Statute. 'The Governor-General in Council is required to pay due obedience to all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State'; and 'Every local Government shall obey the orders of the Governor-General in Council'. In the provinces again were a series of subordinate authorities, departmental or territorial, having executive officers, deputies, and assistants under them, all under the supervision and amenable to the orders of the local Government. Thus, in theory, even the smallest official transaction in the remotest Indian village was liable to survey and correction by Parliament.

At each successive level, of course, control was less rigid in practice than in theory. Parliament as a matter of fact did not legislate on Indian matters except to alter the constitution or to authorize a loan. Legislation on ordinary matters it left to the Indian legislatures created by itself, which will shortly be described, though over all such legislation the Secretary of State kept fairly close control. Nor did Parliament vote the revenue or expenditure of India, but was generally content to survey the annual statements of receipts and charges, and to receive from the Secretary of State an account of the year's administration. When any Indian question attracted public interest, Parliament had of course perfectly effective ways of making its opinion felt; but in ordinary practice it did not make a custom of interfering. There was a general agreement with the maxim that Indian questions should not be made a subject of party strife lest India be 'lost on the floor of the House of Commons'. The feeling that Indian problems were remote and technical largely explained this indisposition to intervene. Constant interference with the affairs of a distant Asiatic country must have enormously increased the difficulties of those immediately responsible

for its security and welfare. On the other hand, it is possible that a more intimate understanding of Indian conditions on the part of Parliament might have made the political development of that country less spasmodic and contentious. In effect, Parliament and the British people were generally content to leave decisions largely to the Secretary of State and to the Government of India; and power rested, sometimes in Whitehall, but possibly more often in Simla or Calcutta, according as the personality of the Minister or the Viceroy for the time being predominated; and successive Governments in India relied far less on any mandate from the people of Great Britain than upon their own experience and efficiency and the tradition and prestige of a century of rule.

The accepted view of the legitimate duties of government in India is wide compared with that of more advanced countries. The illiteracy and poverty of the masses of the people inevitably limits their capacity and their disposition to manage their affairs; and when British administrators assumed the government, it was natural that they should take a wider view of their responsibilities than if they had been dealing with their own people. An outstanding example is in the minute record, field by field, which is maintained in many provinces, of land-tenures, rents, and harvest-yields, and which serves as a basis not merely for the collection of land revenue, but also for the protection of tenants against landlords, for remedial measures in times of scarcity, for the development of irrigation and the encouragement of agriculture, and indeed for many other subsidiary purposes as well. In times of famine again the Government steps in and organizes relief works. It manages a wide forest area, and also an extensive canal system, besides railways, telegraphs, salt mines, and excise. Its activities in such matters as education,

public works, and the prevention and cure of disease are wider than in England. It takes a lead in promoting co-operative credit or in encouraging industry. It lends money to town councils and county councils and agriculturists and landlords. In these and other ways it has assumed a measure of general responsibility for the physical and institutional well-being of the people which other administrations are content to leave to private or corporate enterprise where these are forthcoming.

Up to 1919 there was no legal distribution of the tasks of government between the centre and the provinces. The Government of India, which was responsible for the whole country, necessarily kept certain business in its own hands, such as the Army and relations with other Asiatic countries, and (for the most part) with the Indian States; and for similar reasons it also controlled the currency and exchanges, the debt, tariffs, the post office and railways, and audit and accounts. It shared responsibility for other internal concerns, such as education or the police or land revenue or public health, with the provincial governments. These, indeed, were primarily the concern of the provinces; but in all of them the Central Government up to twelve years ago exercised an unquestioned right of entry, either of its own motion, or on appeal, which rested on the statutory provision already quoted, and found a practical justification in the fact that the Central Government controlled all the finances of the country.

Though general propositions were from time to time enunciated upon the subject, no plain and positive criterion was established as to the proper occasions and limits of the Central Government's control. 'Minute interference' was reprobated, but it was recognized that, if the Governor-General in Council regarded action taken in a province as seriously mistaken, it was not merely his right but his duty

to step in. In practice, the relations between the centre and the provinces were the result of forces pulling in opposite directions. Material developments, improved communications, the increasing reaction of one part of the country or another were all factors tending to bring the Government of India upon the scene; just as the constantly increasing burden of work and the variety of local conditions were arguments for provincial liberty of action. Among recent Viceroy's the most active centralizer was Lord Curzon, who was not content merely to initiate improvements throughout the administration, but sought to keep control over them till they came to fruition. In the reaction from the strenuous efficiency of his days, which came when Lord Minto succeeded him, there was a disposition to concede more liberty to the provincial governments. The phrase 'provincial autonomy', which has since acquired an entirely different sense, was first used in 1912 as an expression of the desire of provincial governments, not in the least for representative institutions, but for escape from the rigid control of the Government of India. During the years 1909-19, and partly as a result of the Minto-Morley reforms which are described below, the stiffness of the Government of India towards the provinces was thus in some measure relaxed; but it was reserved for the reformers of 1919 for the first time to impose positive limitations upon the power of the Central Government to have its way in certain spheres of business, which were definitely recognized as a purely provincial responsibility.

Except in so far as the Government of India intervened with their policy, the local Governments, whether consisting of Governors in Council, Lieutenant-Governors, or Chief Commissioners, had full executive authority in their own domains. They could not indeed dismiss public

servants appointed by the Secretary of State, and these, and others as well, had a right of appeal to the Central Government and to the Secretary of State against orders of punishment by the local Government; but such cases were comparatively rare: the ordinary work of all officials in a province was guided, supervised, and appraised by the provincial Government. The main task of administration rested with the Indian Civil Service, which constituted the general executive corps. Provinces are divided into districts which are generally combined in groups of from four to six, into divisions under a commissioner. The average district is bigger than the average county in England. Some provinces in size and population are bigger than some of the smaller countries in Europe. In the United Provinces, where the districts are small and the population dense, each district officer is on the average in charge of an area as large as Norfolk and a population as large as that of New Zealand. The Commissioner of Tirhut looks after far more people than the Government of Canada. The district officer, in his dual capacity as head of the revenue system and as chief magistrate, is in touch with every portion of his territory, and acts as the representative of Government to the people in most of the matters which are of concern to an ignorant agricultural population. There are other specialized services dealing with particular matters like canals and roads and buildings, hospitals, agriculture, factories, and co-operative credit, and these are not under the district officer but under their own departmental heads; but in all these matters also the efficient district officer plays his part either by way of stimulus, mediation, or supervision.

The one exception to the all-pervading range of this official system (apart from the development of the legislatures which will be discussed hereafter) consisted in the

institution of municipal and district boards. Ever since Lord Ripon's attempt in 1882 to invest these with vitality, most British administrators had looked upon them as likely to provide the field in which Indians might best be trained in the management of public affairs. It was hoped that experience in dealing with the business of towns and counties might qualify people for the management of bigger issues. Various reasons combined to defeat these expectations. The local boards lacked money to do much, and interest in local affairs, except in a few large cities, was slow in developing. In rural areas where people were ignorant, and where the interests involved were diffused over large areas instead of being visibly concentrated as in towns, the work of the boards even up to 1919 was largely done by the district officer in his capacity of chairman of the board. The town councils generally began to elect their own chairman about 1915; from which time onwards therefore the elected representatives of the rate-payers controlled the business of schools, roads, drainage, lighting, and the like within the towns; but even in these comparatively progressive areas, the influence and support of the district officer were generally needed if real progress was to be made or unpopular reforms effected. Up to the critical year 1919 it cannot be said that except in a few of the largest cities, Indian representative bodies had gained much practical experience or convincingly demonstrated their capacity. This was a serious lacuna, seeing that the aim was to try the experiment of popular control upon a wider stage. In the earlier days of the local boards it can hardly be doubted that official guidance and control were needed if any progress was to be made. But the reformers of 1919 believed that official guidance had been prolonged up to a point at which it had impeded the growth of initiative and responsibility; and together with

their other reforms they desired to see the business of the local boards entirely freed from external control.

We may sum up the position by saying that up to 1909 at all events, and even in some measure up to 1919, the Government of India had remained a great closely compacted official machine, essentially autocratic, well suited to a backward people and well understood by them. It had many virtues: it was impartial, efficient, and (though many Indian critics deny this) relatively cheap; its officers had integrity and tireless devotion to duty; they were seen at their best in emergencies like famine or floods, riots or epidemics. They were generally liked and trusted by the villagers. If some of them were less patient and sympathetic in their dealings with the educated classes, this was largely owing to the reluctance of the practical administrator to see his work pass from him into less competent hands. Government in India had to its credit a long record of achievements of which England may well be proud. It was no slight thing to have redeemed the land from chaos, and given it an ordered and just administration such as it had never known; to have repressed violence and enforced the rule of law; to have built roads, railways, and canals and schools and universities and hospitals. Its critics charge it with having shown a Gallio's indifference to higher things—to all that is concerned with the growth of national character and the soul of a people. Its defenders might plead that the daily administration of so vast a country surely laid sufficiently heavy burdens on a small corps of Englishmen, to explain a possible failure on their part to be prophets, philosophers, or apostles, as well as magistrates, engineers, or doctors. Or rather, if the best defence lies in attack, they might claim that the roots of Indian nationalism spring from soil which their own labours have provided, from the establishment of security

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and the rule of law, improvement of communications, the teaching of the English language and lessons of English literature and thought, and perhaps, above all, from personal inspiration and example. There is no denying the fact that the British administration up to 1919 remained essentially autocratic. But the verdict of history may be that it cannot have been a bad autocracy which stimulated by precept and example those stirrings of spirit which confront us in India to-day.

India entered upon her new political existence with the passing of the last Government of India Act in 1919. In order to realize what momentous changes that statute effected, we must glance at the earlier steps which had been taken in the direction of enabling Indian opinion to affect the policy of government. For a long time the idea never occurred to any one that, in the small legislative councils which were intermittently called together for law-making in India, there lay dormant the germ of parliamentary bodies which should make and unmake executives and thereby assert the sovereignty of the popular will. The Charter granted to the Company by George I empowered the Governors in Council to make 'bye-laws, rules, and ordinances' for the good government of their territory; and even up to the time of Dalhousie law-giving in India continued to be a purely executive process. Even Dalhousie's reforms did not go beyond adding additional official members for legislative purposes and making the business of legislation public. Not till after the Mutiny was the first step taken to associate non-official opinion with the making of laws. The Statute of 1861 gave the Governor-General power to nominate to his Council for legislative purposes not less than six nor more than twelve persons, of whom not less than half were to be non-officials, Indian or otherwise. In Madras and Bombay

also the Governors' executive Councils were to be expanded on similar lines, and steps were taken to establish similar councils in the younger provinces. But these changes were directed strictly to the building of a more efficient law-making engine; there was no notion of allowing the new bodies to question or criticize the executive. The councils were not meant to be the forerunner of responsible parliaments.

The next step forward was taken in Lord Dufferin's time. He desired 'to give a still wider share in the administration of public affairs to such Indian gentlemen as by their influence, their acquirements, and the confidence they inspire in their fellow-countrymen are marked out as fitted to assist with their counsels the responsible rulers of the country'. He, too, contemplated no approach to parliamentary institutions, but he did desire 'to allow Indian criticism, suggestion, remonstrance, and enquiry to exercise a very powerful and useful influence on certain classes of public business'. The Act of 1892 did not indeed provide for the election of the non-official members, but it directed the Governor-General and the local Governors to nominate them after consultation with representative corporations or associations; but, because nominations by the recommending bodies came to be accepted as a matter of course, the fact of election to most of the non-official seats came to be firmly established. At the same time the Councils were given powers to question the executive and to discuss the budget, concessions which obviously involved the important admission that they were no longer purely legislative or advisory bodies:

The Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 not only enlarged the Councils still further and provided that most of the non-official seats should be filled by election, but left the executive government in the enjoyment of the barest

possible majority of votes, and that only if it could obtain the support of a few nominated non-officials. Only in the Governor-General's legislature was a narrow official majority retained. The Act of 1909 further enabled the Councils to discuss resolutions, whether on the budget or any matter of public importance, and to cross-examine Government on its replies to questions. These further changes developed the new conception of the Councils. They were not merely to advise but they were also to check and criticize, though not to control. Lord Morley explicitly disclaimed any intention of moving directly or indirectly towards the establishment of a parliamentary system in India; and yet, by extending to the utmost limit the Indian members' opportunities of question and criticism while leaving the executives unchanged and irremovable, his scheme failed to ensure that criticisms would be tempered by any sense of responsibility, while it also left no room whatever for further advance along the same lines. The Minto-Morley reforms thus represented the last effort to combine the cautionary idea that power and responsibility must remain wholly with the executives appointed by the Crown with the adventurous idea of giving Indian opinion the utmost opportunity of criticizing and influencing the executive. Obviously, when the next advance was due, it would have to be sought on different lines.

Our concern being strictly with the machine of government, we cannot pause to examine the causes or to trace the stages of the growth of nationalism which is reflected in these successive constitutional changes. It must suffice to say that the years 1906-14 had seen a great spread of the political consciousness among the educated classes, which had first begun to manifest itself in the 'eighties and had been stimulated by various causes, economic,

racial, and political, in the generation since that time. On top of other quickening events, both external and internal, came the Great War; and the sentiments evoked by the war and by the part which Indian troops and money played in it did much to stimulate the sense of nationalism. There was general agreement by 1917 that the time was ripe for another move forward; and in 1919 the last Government of India Act gave legal expression to a scheme of reforms which had been propounded by Mr. Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelmsford.

To have carried matters merely one stage farther on the old lines, and to have left executive governments confronted with hostile majorities in the legislature, would obviously have led straight to deadlock. On the other hand, to have transformed the entire constitution on popular lines, and thereby committed the most vital interests of the country to Indian administrators elected by an unpractised electorate, would have been to incur unreasonable risks for which very few, even among fervid Indian nationalists, were then prepared. The reformers tried to solve the problem by a new and ingenious device. Selecting the provinces as the main field of their experiment, they divided the business of administration into two categories, and placed those which were regarded as of critical importance (e.g. the law courts, police, prisons, land revenue, canals, and finance) as 'reserved' subjects under the Governor in Council, and those which might be thought less critical (e.g. education, agriculture, public health, hospitals, etc.) styled 'transferred' under Indian ministers responsible to the legislature. It may be argued that certain fallacies underlay both the fundamental idea of division, and also the particular classification adopted; but no one could produce any more plausible device, and in the end 'dyarchy', or the division of subjects, came to be

adopted largely in the faith that the means would be found to work it. Both as regards legislation and the budget (two essential attributes of government), the scheme was necessarily imperfect; and it left the two halves of the government more interdependent than was to be desired if either was to enjoy the liberty of action which the underlying idea postulated. At the same time the provincial legislatures were enlarged and the franchise lowered. But a most serious obstacle to the free play of the elective principle was presented by the refusal of the great Muslim community to vote in open constituencies with the Hindus. The Muslims clung to the assurance given them by Lord Minto in 1908 that they should have so many seats reserved for them in the legislatures and should vote only for Muslim candidates on a Muslim roll. The reformers with great reluctance felt constrained to meet their wishes, nor could a concession extended to the Muslims be denied to other important religious minorities.

In their dealings with the Central Government, the reformers were more cautious and less logical. They left the executive still irremovable and still responsible to the Secretary of State; but they gave the main chamber of the central legislature a strong elective majority, and they left the Governor-General in Council entirely dependent for his supply or his vital legislation, in cases where he could not secure the assent of the Assembly, upon the use of certain emergency powers. Here, it seems, their judgement was at fault. They failed to realize that our political tradition pays far too much regard to the effect of a majority vote for emergency powers, which are exercised in opposition to such a vote, to afford any real safeguard. Emergency powers in fact can never be made a regular instrument of government; and during the past ten years, out of anxiety to avoid using them, the Government of India

has repeatedly been forced into positions which it is difficult to believe that its better judgement would have accepted.

The plan adopted in 1919 provided also that a Statutory Commission should be set up to review its working and make proposals for the future when a period of ten years had elapsed. This duty was performed by Sir John Simon's Commission which reported in 1930. They have found no way but to venture on another move forward. They propose that in the provinces the dual system shall be discarded and the work of government entrusted entirely to Ministers, though they make certain reservations in respect of law and order which might be interpreted as containing a lingering element of dyarchy, and they, too, rely on certain safeguarding powers entrusted to the Governor. They suggest a further enlargement of the electorates, but like their predecessors they are reluctantly driven to retain separate electorates for minorities. They think it unsafe to suggest fundamental changes in the position of the Central Government. With two matters of the first moment, which in the circumstances of the time could not be adequately handled in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, they make a far-sighted attempt to deal. They propose to remove the control of the defence of India entirely from the Indian legislature and to treat it as an imperial issue; and they sketch the outlines of a federal scheme which should embrace both the British provinces and the Indian States in a Greater India.

At the close of last year (1930) the Home Government summoned a Conference, with a large majority of representatives from India, to discuss the position. The federal idea found general favour; and there was a disposition on the part of the Indian members to press for the diminution of 'safeguards' and for the introduction of dyarchy (in spite of its condemnation by the Simon Commission) in the

Central Government. From the nature of its composition the Conference was better fitted to discuss general propositions than to debate detailed proposals, and eventually it adjourned in order to allow of further discussions in India of particular difficulties. Upon the results of these further deliberations it is too soon to speculate. But one forecast may be hazarded. So far there seems small prospect that the large Muslim minority will consent to abandon the communal electorates which they regard as a vital defence against possible aggression by Hindu majorities: and, so long as an arrangement so wholly discordant with the democratic principle is retained in the constitution, India's political future cannot develop entirely on Western lines, nor can she attain to full and complete self-government.

There has not been much public recognition, however, of one other essential condition of success in the huge enterprise before us. It is one of the peculiar difficulties of the Indian problem that some of its crucial points are difficult ones to discuss with a desirable degree of freedom. Few people seriously believe that India can maintain a civilized and orderly government without a reasonable strength of British officials. But no Englishman can be compelled to serve in India. Thoughtful Indians will therefore do well to ask themselves how such a necessary element is going to be retained under the new conditions unless Indian educated opinion, expressing itself in and through the legislatures, manifests towards the British services a far greater measure of friendship and goodwill than it has shown in recent years.

Note.—See *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (1930): vol. i, Survey, Cmd. 3568; vol. ii, Recommendations, Cmd. 3569.

Also, *Indian Round Table Conference Proceedings* (1931): Cmd. 3778.

Chapter V

THE ARMY

By GENERAL SIR GEORGE BARROW, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.

[General Sir George Barrow has had an exceptionally intimate acquaintance in peace and war with the Indian Army, in which he served in every rank from Lieutenant to General for forty-three years. He became Adjutant-General in India in 1923 and was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Command. He rendered distinguished service in the Great War, taking part in the capture of Jerusalem.]

INDIA is a triangular-shaped continent, bounded on the north by a barrier of immense mountain ranges, and on its other sides by the waters of the Indian Ocean and Arabian sea. Neither mountains nor sea constitute an impassable obstacle. Invading armies have poured, again and again, through the mountain passes; the maritime countries of Europe have entered, uninvited guests, at the portals of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.

Before the period of the Muslim invasions India had witnessed the coming of Alexander the Great, the establishment of the empire of the Guptas, and the reign of the Rajputs. During the tenth century, the Muhammadans first made their appearance in a series of raids into the Punjab. These incursions were followed by a succession of Muhammadan conquests and the rise and fall of dynasties in rapid sequence; such as those of Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad Ghorî, the Slave Kings, the Khiljîs in the thirteenth century; the Tughlak Sultans and Tamerlane in the fourteenth century; and in the fifteenth century the Afghan Lodi Kings who seized the throne of Delhi.

All these invasions, all these conquests brought indiscriminate slaughter, pillage, rapine, and ruthless cruelty

in their train. The lot of the unwarlike and peacefully disposed Hindus was one of misery untold and untellable.

In the year 1526 Babur, on his fifth attempt, became, in his own words, 'Master and conqueror of the mighty empire of Hindustan', and founded the famous Mogul Empire. He was succeeded by one of his sons, Humayun, and Humayun was succeeded by his son Akbar.

The Mogul rule was far sighted and beneficent compared with the rule of previous conquerors. Akbar saw clearly that co-operation, as opposed to fanatical ill-will, between Muslim and Hindu, was the only sure foundation for an Indian Empire. But the Mogul Empire was not destined to survive. Akbar's descendants were men of smaller mental stature. They fought among themselves; they fell to the intrigues of the harem; and Aurangzeb, who was a fine soldier and a versatile and talented king, reversed the wise and tolerant policy of Akbar. The Marathas under Sivaji, the Rajputs, the Sikhs rose in fierce resentment against the oppressions and indignities which were heaped on all non-Muslim subjects. The Mogul house which Akbar had endeavoured to build on the sure rock of co-operation and equity gradually crumbled into dust; for Akbar's successors had substituted a foundation of intolerance and persecution. In 1740, Nadir Shah of Persia defeated the Mogul Emperor, Muhammad Shah, at Karnal, and Delhi was sacked and gutted and the inhabitants given up to a nine hours' massacre. The Persian returned home with his treasure and his invasion was followed by an incursion of Rohillas, who annexed a large and fertile tract north of the Ganges. In 1748 Ahmad Shah Durani invaded India from Afghanistan, and Delhi was again sacked and its inhabitants massacred. In 1761 the Marathas raised a great force to overthrow the sovereignty of Ahmad Shah. They were

defeated near Delhi with immense loss which has been estimated at 200,000 dead. But Ahmad Shah's soldiers refused to remain in India; they hated the heat of the plains, and the Durani was obliged to return to the highlands of Afghanistan.

There is no room here to refer to the many other incursions, raids, internal wars, and internecine struggles which occurred previous to the establishment of British supremacy in India. Together with those already mentioned, they all have one common setting in ruined homes, ravished women, burnt villages, gutted cities, devastated harvests, massacred inhabitants, and destitute populations. Peace and security only came to India with the British. From that time down to the present day there has been no invasion of India by way of land or sea: no women and children slaughtered by the soldiery, no cities burnt or plundered, no countryside wantonly destroyed. Internal wars there have been—Assaye, Laswari, Sobraon, Chilianwala, the Mutiny; but there has been no unnecessary cruelty or destruction, no vengeance taken on the peaceful and defenceless, no extortion or persecution of the vanquished.

On 31st December 1600 Elizabeth granted a charter to 'The Company of Merchants trading into the East Indies'. In the course of time, and as a consequence of the Company's expanding trade and increasing political influence, armed forces were maintained for protective purposes in each of the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. In 1748 these local troops were placed under unified command, and Major Stringer Lawrence, 'the father of the Indian Army', was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Company's forces. Since that year the Indian Army has gone through a steady process of evolution and expansion. It was reorganized under Clive, and important

changes took place on the transfer of British India to the Crown in 1858, and also as a result of the Indian Mutiny. In 1895 the Presidency armies were abolished and the Army in India was divided into four commands under the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener carried out far-reaching modifications in the administration of the army and in the disposition and grouping of the troops. Finally, the lessons of the Great War have led to extensive alterations in the organization of the cavalry, infantry, and supply services; to the introduction of mechanization; and to the maintenance of effective air forces.

The Army in India consists approximately of 60,000 British troops and 150,000 Indian troops which are commanded almost entirely by British officers. (There are also certain Royal Air Force formations.) It is a highly trained and efficient army, comprising cavalry, artillery, infantry, armoured cars, and supply services organized in war divisions and brigades, covering troops, and units detailed for internal protection. It has two duties to perform: (*a*) to protect India from foreign aggression (external defence); (*b*) to secure peace within India's own borders (internal security). When we consider that the proportion of fighting men to civilians is 1 in 1,280, the size of the army would not appear excessive, having regard to its dual responsibility.

As regards external defence, the Simon Commission Report says—'for a very long time to come, it will be impossible . . . to dispense with a very considerable British element, including in that term British troops of all arms, a considerable proportion of the regimental officers of the Indian Army, and the British personnel in the higher command'. The reason for this statement is that the effective defence of India is an Imperial question, in which Empire communication, Empire trade, and the general

position of India in the East are affected. Altogether, the issues are far too vital to permit of any risks being taken in respect of the composition of the forces which are maintained for the purpose of securing India from invasion. Excepting the Canadian frontier, which may be safely left out of consideration, the North-West Frontier of India is the obvious land frontier in the Empire which is open to attack. Every previous conqueror of those Central Asian lands over which Soviet Russia now holds sway, from Alexander the Great to Ahmad Shah Durani, has entered India by the passes which lead down to the North-West Frontier. The defence of this frontier cannot at present be left to an Indian Army, administered and directed by a popularly elected Indian Government.


Next, as regards internal security. Approximately 35,000 British and 30,000 Indian troops are the minimum number considered necessary to secure peace within India's own borders; i.e. more than half the total number of British and one-fifth of the Indians of the entire army. This minimum figure has not been materially altered since Lord Kitchener was Commander-in-Chief, when it was fixed after consultation with the provincial governments. The reason given in the Commission Report (Vol. i, p. 95) for a greater number of British than Indian troops being ear-marked for internal security is that 'the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of favouring Hindus against Muhammadans, or Muhammadans against Hindus', and 'as the vast majority of the disturbances which call for the intervention of the military have a communal or religious complexion, it is natural . . . that the intervention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that which has no bias, real or suspected, to either side'. But there is another and equally cogent reason. Not only is the British soldier impartial; he preserves his temper under

extreme provocation, he does not panic, and he is armed with prestige, as a representative of that Power which has given India a security from dangers, both within and without, which she has never known in her previous history.

In addition to these duties of defence and security the Army in India has frequently been employed for Imperial purposes. It has furnished contingents for operations in Ceylon, Manila, Macao, Java, Bourbon, Egypt, Abyssinia, the Sudan, China in 1865, 1900, and 1926, and South Africa. In all these instances the call was made on India because she was geographically much more favourably situated for the dispatch of troops to the scene of action than the other garrisons of the Empire, and it was made when the horizon had been cloudless and no danger threatened the country from any direction. The Imperial Exchequer paid all the expenses connected with the maintenance of the troops, including their pay, and the Indian revenues benefited accordingly.

During the Great War India rendered immense help to the Empire. When the war was only four months old, she had provided 21 cavalry regiments, 69 infantry battalions, and 204 guns. Her total contribution during the war was 1,302,000 men, 173,000 animals, and 3,692,000 tons of supplies and ordnance stores.

It will be apparent, from what has been said above, that the presence of British troops in India is essential, both for external defence and to internal security. This fact alone presents a difficult obstacle in the path of India's progress towards self-government or Dominion status, if, as expressed by the Simon Commission, 'a completely self-governing India must be in a position to provide itself with armed forces fit to undertake the tasks which armed forces in India have to discharge'. India is not at present



COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY, 1929

More than 85 per cent. of the Indian army are recruited from the area shaded in the map on the opposite page.

<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Territory.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Territory.</i>	<i>Number.</i>
1	N.W. FRONTIER PROVINCE	5,600	10	CENTRAL PROVINCES	100
2	KASHMIR	6,500	11	BIHAR AND ORISSA	300
3	PUNJAB	86,000	12	BENGAL	Nil
4	BALUCHISTAN	300	13	ASSAM	Nil
5	NEPAL	19,000	14	BURMA	3,000
6	UNITED PROVINCES	16,500	15	HYDERABAD	700
7	RAJPUTANA	7,000	16	MYSORE	100
8	CENTRAL INDIA	200	17	MADRAS	4,000
9	BOMBAY	7,000		MISCELLANEOUS	1,900
				TOTAL	158,200

in a position to provide these armed forces out of her own resources; nor does it seem probable that she will be able to do so within a measurable distance of time, because, to quote again from the Simon Commission Report, 'The plain fact is that the formation of an Indian National Army drawn from India as a whole, in which every member will recognize the rest as his comrades, in which Indian officers will lead men who may be of different races, and in which public opinion will have general confidence, is a task of the greatest possible difficulty, and the Indian intellectual has, as a rule, no personal longing for an army career.' The truth of the above statement is borne out, in a marked manner, by the number of recruits which are now furnished annually by the different provinces. Excluding the Gurkhas from Nepal, of the total number of combatants in the Army, 66 per cent come from the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, 11 per cent. from the United Provinces, and 23 per cent. from the whole of the rest of India put together, Bengal's share being nil (see the schedule on p. 77). The recruiting figures for the Great War show the position even more clearly. Bengal with a population of 45 millions provided 7,000 combatants, while the Punjab, with a population less than half the size, provided 350,000 recruits. The Punjab and the United Provinces found three-fourths of the total number of combatant recruits throughout British India. Herein lies the great hindrance to the formation of a National Army: the military traditions and instincts do not pervade all India in a like degree. The martial races inhabit certain portions of India while the inhabitants of other portions are at present either deficient in or wholly devoid of the martial spirit. The latter would dominate any political assembly or machinery, and the former would not readily submit to their ascendancy.

There are also 20,000 Gurkhas who are recruited from outside India. Their military value is well known; they compose some of the finest fighting material of the Indian Army. No Gurkha would follow a leader whom he did not respect as a soldier. The martial races of India are proud of their traditions, proud of their military prowess and contemptuous of the non-fighting classes, to an extent which is hardly realizable in European countries, where these distinctions in fighting values do not exist.

The Simon Commission Report states—‘the obvious fact that India is not . . . a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest’. The corollary of this unequal distribution of martial qualities, and their concentration in practically one part of India is that the formation of a National Army is only possible when two stages in nationalization have been reached. Firstly, the races of India must assimilate in the sense that the German races—Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Hanoverians, Wurtembergers—are assimilated. Secondly, Indians must learn to command and be commanded by men of different origin and with the same mutual respect as is the case in the British Army, where English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish command and are commanded by each other, free from all bias, favour, mistrust, or affection. There can be no genuine national spirit where the military power is confined to a section of the people.

But the apparent remoteness of the goal has not deterred the British and Indian Governments from taking the first steps of the many which will be required in order to cover the distance. In 1918 Indians became eligible to hold the King's Commission. The momentous enhancement of the military career which results from this decision followed, in the first instance, ‘as an appropriate and just recognition

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of the loyalty and gallantry which had been displayed, by all ranks of the Indian Army during the Great War'. It was also the inevitable consequence of the fact that the highest appointments in the civil branches of the public service were open to Indians, and, generally, of India's political evolution. It should be understood that before the war the Indian officers received only a commission signed by the Viceroy. A commencement was made with the bestowal of the King's Commission on a number of Viceroy-commissioned Indian officers as a reward for war services, and was followed by the reservation of a certain number of vacancies at Sandhurst, Woolwich, and Cranwell, for Indian candidates. This number of vacancies has been increased since the start was made and in 1930 twenty-one Indians were admitted to the Royal Military College, the vacancies offered at Woolwich and Cranwell being nine and twelve respectively. Not all who enter are successful in passing out. For instance, up to the end of 1928 there were 112 admissions and only 77 received commissions. The pace at which Indianization proceeds is conditioned by the efficiency of the results obtained; and the primary factor governing the rate of progress must obviously be the number of Indians who qualify to receive commissions. Both civil and military authorities have done their best to induce a greater number of suitable candidates to come forward, and their efforts are meeting with a certain degree of success. Eight units were selected for Indianization as a beginning. As the number of cadets who pass through Sandhurst is now more than sufficient to replace the normal wastage in these eight units, the scheme requires to be extended, as it was always intended should be the case, in due course. Consequently, the next step, and it is a big one, is towards the Indianization of a complete division. The period within which a unit can

be completely Indianized in its establishment of officers is dependent on the time which it takes an officer normally to rise from the rank of subaltern to the command of a regiment, i.e. not less than twenty-five years. It is evident therefore that the time required to Indianize entirely a whole division, dependent as it is on this factor of promotion through the regimental grades, as also on the number of efficient Army candidates who are forthcoming, must be considerable.

The Government of India has given a practical illustration of its determination to assist the course of Indianization by the establishment of the Dehra Dun College which was opened by the Prince of Wales in 1922. The object of the College is to give an education, at a moderate charge, to Indian boys who desire to obtain a King's Commission through the Royal Military College. It is also designed to familiarize the boys with the habits and modes of life which it will be necessary for them to follow in their future military career. The school not only provides literary education, but combines a scientific system of physical training with the development of character. The experiment has so far been entirely successful.

Another important move towards Indianization has been the recent decision of Government to inaugurate an Indian Sandhurst, and a Committee has lately been sitting to work out the plans and details. Its report has not yet been published.

It is well to remember that the 20,000 Gurkhas cannot be Indianized.

The Indian Army is composed of men of many different classes, holding different beliefs, having different customs, speaking different languages. It is obvious, therefore, that the command of forces containing such diverse elements demands special qualities of tact, impartiality, and

acquaintance with the idiosyncrasies of the various castes and classes on the part of the regimental officers. Consequently the responsibility which lies before the young Indian officers of the Indianized units is a heavy one. In the words of the late General Lord Rawlinson, 'they will have in their hands not only the lives of their men, but also the task of maintaining untarnished the high and ancient traditions of the regiments to which they are appointed. . . . Their success or their failure will mean much to India.'

Approximately two-thirds of the men serving in the Army are Sikhs and Hindus, and one-third are Muhammadans.

The expenditure on the army and air forces in India just before the war (1913-14) was 290 millions of rupees. In 1922-3 the expenditure had risen to over 660 millions of rupees. This great increase was due to economic causes which were the outcome of the war, the consequent enhancement of rates of pay for all ranks and the adoption of a higher standard of comfort for the Indian soldier in the form of better barracks, greatly improved hospitals, issue of free rations, and in several other directions. In 1923 a number of economies were effected on the recommendations of the Inchcape Committee and expenditure was reduced to 590 millions of rupees. This reduction was mainly achieved by cutting down the strength of the Army by a number of British units, cavalry and artillery, and by lowering the establishment of British and Indian infantry battalions.

In 1928 the Commander-in-Chief in India undertook to pay and administer the Army in India, including the departments of maintenance and supply at a cost of 550 millions of rupees, provided that the military authorities were relieved of certain financial controls. The Government of India accepted the proposal and the 'Army Con-

tract System', as it is called, was introduced. By this arrangement a lump sum of 550 millions of rupees (£41·3 million sterling or 201 million dollars) was handed over to the Commander-in-Chief, who is responsible for its expenditure in the best interests of the Army. The system has been so successful that it has been found possible to reduce the sum by 30 million rupees during the last three years.

It is often objected that the expense of the Army represents an excessive proportion of the expenditure of government in India. The figure usually quoted, 43 per cent., is, however, misleading, as it is based only on the central budget, which nowadays is separate from the provincial budgets. The correct proportion is approximately a quarter of the central and provincial budgets combined.

Every effort has been made of late years to keep the Army up to date in armaments and equipment. It is largely mechanized. But, on account of the varied nature of the country in which troops may be required to operate, especially the mountainous country of the land frontier, and of the requirements of internal security, it is not desirable to mechanize the fighting troops and their transport to the same extent as is done in the case of European armies.

There are, in addition to the Regular Army, two other military forces in India, viz. the Auxiliary Force and the Indian Territorial Force. The Auxiliary Force is the counterpart of the pre-war Volunteer Force. Its membership of 33,000 is limited to European British subjects, and it is recruited on a purely voluntary basis. Military service in the Auxiliary Force is local, and the form of training varies in the different units so as to accord with local conditions. It comprises all branches of the Service, infantry battalions, railway battalions, machine-gun companies, armoured cars, batteries of artillery, and mounted corps. Many of the units are very efficient. The Auxiliary

Force has justified its existence on many occasions since it was raised, and its presence is invaluable, especially in those wide and difficult tracts of country where few regular units are stationed, and also in the provincial capitals.

The Indian Territorial Force was started in 1923 in order to meet the desires of the Legislature that Indians who did not wish to adopt a profession of arms might still find an opportunity to give expression to their martial instincts. It is, in fact, one of the aspects of the Indianization of the military services. It is a second line to, and a source of reinforcement for, the regular Indian Army. It is embodied, for purposes of training, for short periods annually. Its total strength is about 22,000.

The Indian State Forces are those which are maintained by the rulers of the Indian States. They number about 45,000 men of all arms. The majority are well armed and trained. The Indian Princes have invariably offered their troops in emergencies for the service of the King Emperor, and Indian State Forces have served with distinction in Egypt, China, France, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and elsewhere.

Service in the Indian Army is popular and there has never been any lack of recruits. The profession of arms has always been held in honour among the martial races. And the Indian Army merits the honour and respect of all the classes and creeds that inhabit the sub-continent. In war it has never failed to secure victory by reason of its valour and discipline: in peace, it has never failed to carry confidence by reason of its discipline and comradeship. It has resisted all the attempts which have been made of recent years to seduce it from its allegiance to the British Crown. It has justly earned the gratitude and the respect of both the British and the Indian peoples.

Chapter VI

THE SERVICES

By L. S. S. O'MALLEY, C.I.E., M.A.

[Mr. L. S. S. O'Malley is one of a long line of members of the Indian Civil Service who have made valuable contributions to English literature in India. The latest of these, his book on his own Service, has filled a serious gap in that literature. Mr. O'Malley has also written the history of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa under British rule, as well as a geography of those provinces. He was the Superintendent of the Bengal Census in 1911.]

IT was observed by John Stuart Mill in *Representative Government* that the proper functions of governments are different in different states of society and are more extensive in a backward than in an advanced state. The truth of this saying is exemplified in British India, where the activities of Government cover a wider field than in many more highly developed countries because of its tutelary position towards a population vast in numbers but economically and educationally backward. The recognition of the principle that the functions of a government include the moral and material progress of the people committed to its charge, and the lack or inadequacy either of private enterprise or of private capital, have led to the creation of State Services with a wide range of responsibilities. Many are not merely regulative but to a large extent creative, i.e. those who serve in them are not confined to the application of fixed and perhaps rigid rules in the conduct of the administration, but themselves initiate works of public utility or measures of public benefit.

At the same time, the British Government has been in a peculiar position owing to its heritage of a past system of administration. Administrative functions, to which there is no parallel in Europe, notably in regard to the

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assessment of revenue and the administration of the land, have devolved upon it as the successor of the Mogul Government. In addition to this, the absence until comparatively recent times of local self-governing bodies, of the county council and municipal type, controlling local organizations, has necessitated a unified State control of the public services. The combined result is the existence of an unusually large number of State Services with a remarkable diversity of duties but a general unity of control. The police force, for example, is not controlled, as in the United States and in Great Britain outside London, by hundreds of local bodies, but is a unified State Service working under a centralized and co-ordinated system. Medical relief does not depend on voluntary agencies or municipal authorities but is organized by another State Service, the members of which staff many hospitals, where even the compounders are in Government service. Government, again, owns and directs most of the railways, and constructs and maintains great works of irrigation. It not only has an inspectorate for educational institutions, but itself administers and supports colleges and schools. It is the greatest employer of labour in the country and its employees represent many professions—judges and magistrates, police officers, irrigation, civil and railway engineers, doctors, veterinary surgeons, forest officers, agricultural experts, professors, geologists, botanists, meteorologists, and archaeologists.

An outstanding feature of the Services is the very large extent to which their personnel is Indian. The right of Indians to take part in the administration of their country has been recognized for a long time past. The Charter Act of 1833 specifically enacted that they were not to be debarred by reason only of race, religion, or colour from holding any place, office, or employment under the East

India Company. The Directors accordingly declared that fitness was to be the only criterion of eligibility for public office. The one thing lacking, in their view, was a sufficient supply of qualified Indians, and they looked to education as the means of qualifying them. Every design for their improvement was therefore to be promoted, whether by conferring on them the advantages of education or by diffusing the treasures of science, knowledge, and moral culture.

In pursuance of these orders, the Government of India established colleges and schools, from which to draw a supply of educated men for the public service, and it did not confine its efforts to the literary side of education. It founded medical colleges for the training of medical students; in view of the necessity of training engineers in the country in which they were employed, it set up civil engineering colleges; it even established universities during the turmoil of the Mutiny.

It was further announced by Queen Victoria in her famous proclamation on the transfer of the government of India to the Crown that it was her will that 'so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted to office in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge'. In fulfilment of this pledge, the Government has steadily, though at times perhaps a little slowly, pursued the policy of restricting the European element in the administration, subject to the proviso that a strong, and sometimes even a predominating, proportion of Europeans should be retained in certain Services, such as the Forest Service, in which scientific or technical knowledge is essential, and in Services like the Indian Civil and Police Services where the exercise of particular responsibility is equally essential.

The latter two Services are known as 'Security Services' because, being charged with the organization and direction of the general administrative system, the security of the country largely depends on them.

The working of this policy has brought about a progressive decline of Europeans and a progressive increase of Indians in the composition of the Services. As far back as 1904 out of 26,908 men drawing pay of £60 to £800 a year 16,283 were Indians, 5,420 were Eurasians (now known officially as Anglo-Indians), and 5,205 were Europeans; out of 1,370 men who held higher posts carrying pay of over £800 1,263 were Europeans, 92 were Indians, and 15 were Eurasians. Commenting on the figures, the then Viceroy, Lord Curzon, pointed out that to rule over 230 millions of people, the British Empire employed less than 6,500 of its countrymen and 21,800 of the inhabitants of India itself.

'It reveals', as he said, 'a European system of government entrusted largely to non-European hands: what is called a subject country, though I dislike the phrase, administered far less by the conquering power than by its own sons; and, beyond all, it testifies to a steady growth of loyalty and integrity on the one part, and of willing recognition of these virtues on the other, which is rich with hope for the future.'¹

The latter line of thought may also be traced in the remarks made twenty years later by a distinguished writer who has no official connexion with India, Professor R. Coupland.

'One of the greatest services—perhaps the greatest—which Englishmen have done for India has been the training which they have given to Indian officials in the methods and morals of public service. Consciously or unconsciously, merely through being associated with Englishmen in the same administrative body, working side by side with them on a footing of complete equality, sharing equally their

¹ Sir T. Raleigh, *Lord Curzon in India* (1906), pp. 146-7.

pride in what the Service has done for India and in their hope of what it may yet do, many of them have acquired an *esprit de corps* and a sense of public duty the attainment of which by any other means must have been a long and difficult task.¹

Of late years the Indianization of the Services has proceeded at an accelerated rate. Even in the Indian Civil and Police Services the Indian element is being steadily augmented, and both Services are to be half Indian and half British within fixed terms of years—the Indian Civil Service by 1939 and the Indian Police Service by 1949. In 1929, out of a total of 5,250 men in the All-India Services and in the Central Services of a parallel status, one-third were already Indians; year by year the number of Europeans is being reduced in the higher ranks, while Indians have an almost complete monopoly of the lower ranks. Taking into account all the public services and also the size of the population—2½ times that of the United States—the number of British officials in the country is insignificant. A mere recital of figures, however, fails to give such a clear impression as the remarks made by Lord Curzon in 1909:

‘The Englishman proceeding to India may expect to see his own countrymen everywhere, and above all in the offices and buildings of Government, in the law courts, and on the magisterial bench. As a matter of fact, except in the great cities, he will rarely come across an Englishman at all. I once visited a city of 80,000 people in which there were only two official Englishmen, both of whom happened to be away.’²

The writer of this chapter was himself once in charge of a district, extending over 2,600 square miles and containing

¹ *Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India* (1924), p. 123.

² Lecture on ‘The Place of India in the Empire’ delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, 1909.

a population of over a million, in which there was only one other British official.

The Services may be placed in different categories according to the authorities by which their members are appointed and according to those under which they serve. The main classification is into All-India and Provincial Services. There are only four All-India Services, viz. the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, the Indian Forest Service (outside Bombay and Burma), and the Irrigation Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers. Their members are appointed by the Secretary of State for India, and, as the name implies, are liable to serve anywhere in India: in practice transfers from one province to another are rare because languages and administrative practices vary from province to province. Members of the Provincial Services on the other hand are appointed by the Governments of the provinces, by which also they may be dismissed, whereas members of the All-India Services can be dismissed only by the Secretary of State in Council. Below the Provincial Services, and at the bottom of the hierarchy of Services, there are various Subordinate Services, which are also recruited locally and are sometimes divided into upper and lower branches. Members of both the Provincial and Subordinate Services serve only in the provinces to which they belong.

The other distinction is between the Central Services and those which work under provincial Governments. The latter include the great majority of the public services; the former are comparatively few and are confined to departments directly administered by the Central Government, such as railways, posts, and telegraphs.

The general system of administration in British India is based on the subdivision of territory into charges of decreasing size with a descending scale of offices. Each

administrative area is in charge of an officer who is under the control of another officer of superior authority, and the whole structure may be compared to a pyramid with Government at the apex. The working of the machinery of administration depends on the constant supervision of lower by higher officers, whose control is exercised in various ways. There are periodical and surprise inspections; there is an extensive right of appeal against executive as well as judicial orders; powers are limited according to the degree of responsibility attaching to each office, and there is a consequent necessity for obtaining the sanction of higher authority. There is a regular gradation of offices, and there are different grades in different services with promotion from one to another.

All the Services have one feature in common, viz., that superannuation takes place at an earlier age than in Europe. Members of the Indian Civil Service must retire when they have had thirty-five years of service unless they happen to be holding the office of head of a province, High Court Judge, or Member of an Executive Council. In other Services a man must retire shortly after he passes fifty-five years unless he is of such exceptional merit that his retirement would be against the public interest. Extensions of service are rarely granted, for very few men are indispensable. In consequence of these rules, the public services are staffed by men whose eye is not dimmed nor their physical force abated, and they contain no old men. The rules ensure that, subject to a high standard of efficiency, there is a steady progression in rank and pay; and preclude the dispiriting influence of hope deferred by long-delayed promotion. The system, involving retirement at an earlier age than is customary in the West, naturally increases the cost of the pension roll to the State, but on the other hand it makes for energy and efficiency,

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both because of the infusion of fresh blood in the administrative corps and because of the well-known facts that Indians age more rapidly than Europeans and that the latter after long residence in a trying climate are apt to feel its effects and lose vigour.

The Indian Civil Service has pride of place among the Services because of its past history and present position. The system of civil administration in India has been built up by it, and it is still the driving wheel of the machinery of government. It is the oldest Civil Service in existence: indeed, the term Civil Service originated with it. It had its origin in the body of men who carried on the trade of the East India Company and who were known as its civil servants in distinction from its naval and military officers. When the Company acquired political power and territorial empire, its mercantile employees became administrators, and the term Civil Service acquired its present meaning. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they were, in the words of the Marquess Wellesley, no longer the agents of a commercial concern, but helped to administer an empire and filled the important offices of magistrates, ambassadors, and provincial governors.

The Service is now a *corps d'élite*, much reduced in numbers during recent years owing to the transfer to Indians, outside the cadre, of posts which its members formerly filled. It consists of only about 1,000 men, who are responsible for the general direction and control of the civil administration. A selected few become provincial governors; others, little less highly placed, are Members of the Executive Councils of the Government of India and the provincial governments; some are Secretaries to the different governments; others are Judges of High Courts at provincial capitals or Judges in the interior; the majority are engaged in district work.

Each province is divided into districts, the executive heads of which are called District Officers; and the districts, except in Madras, are grouped in varying numbers, generally four to six, to form Divisions under officers called Commissioners. Each district is usually parcelled out into smaller administrative areas called subdivisions, each under an officer subordinate to the District Officer; and at the district head-quarters each department is under an officer similarly subordinate to him. Responsibility is concentrated in the District Officer to an extraordinary degree. Not only has he to conduct the ordinary administration of the area in his charge, including the collection of the revenues which furnish the sinews of government, but he is called on to deal with any emergency affecting the welfare of the people of his district, a million on the average. The light in which the latter regard the District Officer is reflected in two picturesque titles by which the rural administrative officers of Government are addressed — 'incarnation of justice' and 'cherisher of the poor'. They look to him not only for protection against oppression by their fellow-men and for the redress of their wrongs, but also for relief from the distress caused by visitations of nature, such as famines, cyclones, and even clouds of locusts. He is not a sedentary officer, learning of their needs and grievances only from reports and representations submitted to him in his office, but he moves about his district, going from village to village and coming into direct contact with their inhabitants. Under him is a staff of officers of the Provincial Civil Service engaged in magisterial and other work, who belong to what is called the Executive branch of the Service. Another branch is judicial, and from it are drawn the officers who administer civil justice under the District and Sessions Judges.

Members of the Indian and Provincial Civil Services

are also employed in a special branch of work known as Survey and Settlement, which includes a survey of the land of every landlord and cultivator, the preparation of maps, and the compilation of a record of tenures and landed rights. One example of what this involves will suffice. In Bihar, with an area 6,000 square miles greater than that of Scotland, field maps and a record of rights have been prepared for 7 million holdings and 41 million plots of land at a cost of only tenpence an acre, and the whole agricultural population has been put in possession of reliable title-deeds.

The Political Department forms a separate Service recruited from the Indian Civil Service and officers of the Indian Army. The work which devolves upon it is known as 'political' in the official language of India, but 'diplomatic' is more appropriate; for its members serve as the representatives of the Government of India in countries with which it has diplomatic relations, such as Afghanistan, Nepal, the Persian Gulf, &c., and also as Political Officers and Residents in the States of India, where they advise and assist the Princes in any matters on which they may be consulted and act as intermediaries between them and the Government of India. The Political Department has produced a long series of eminent men whose names are regarded with affectionate esteem in the States,¹ and it has a splendid record of foreign service, discharged, often at the hazard of life, under difficult and dangerous conditions.

Its officers are also employed in the civil administration of districts on the North-West Frontier, where they act as Wardens of the Marches. Here a special problem is presented by the raids of the frontier tribes, which can muster 130,000 fighting men equipped, as has been said, with modern rifles and ageless savagery.

¹ *Report of the Indian States Committee* (1929), p. 38.

'Few people in England', writes Sir Hamilton Grant, a former Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, 'reading of raids on the north-west frontier of India realize the full horror of these outrages. What generally happens is that in the small hours of the morning a wretched village is suddenly assailed by a gang of perhaps 50, perhaps 200, well-armed raiders, who put out sentries, picket the approaches, and conduct the operation on the most skilful lines. The houses of the wealthiest men are attacked and looted; probably several villagers are brutally murdered—and probably one or two unhappy youths or women are carried off to be held up to ransom. . . . Our officers are untiring in their vigilance, and not infrequently the District Officers and the officers of their civil forces are out three or four nights a week after raiding gangs.'¹

Coeval with the Indian Civil Service is the Indian Medical Service, which had its origin in the doctors sent out to the trading stations of the East India Company to attend on its servants, civil and military. They were first organized in a graded service in 1763. Till 1896 there were three medical corps attached to the three presidential armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and as the latter were amalgamated in the Indian Army, the former were united in the Indian Medical Service. The Service has dual functions. It is primarily a military service, for it forms a reserve of medical officers on which the Indian Army has first call in time of war; its value as such was abundantly proved in the Great War. It is also engaged in civil medical work, its officers serving as Civil Surgeons in the districts and holding charge of hospitals and medical colleges or appointments in connexion with them. All must have a period of duty in the Indian Army before filling civil appointments. The world of science, no less than the art of surgery, has been enriched by the Indian Medical Service. Many famous scientists have belonged to it, and among its retired members are Sir Ronald Ross

¹ *Essays in Liberalism* (1922), pp. 94-5.

and Sir Leonard Rogers, whose researches in connexion with malaria, cholera, and leprosy, have earned them an international reputation.

The Service, which was formerly recruited by competitive examination in England and is now filled by nomination, has been materially affected by Indianization. In the whole of British India there are now only 200 Europeans in the Civil Medical Departments out of a total of nearly 6,000 medical men; and the Indian Medical Service has been reduced to the number of men required to form a medical reserve for the Indian Army and to provide medical attendance for European members of the public services and their families.

The second of the 'Security' Services is the Indian Police Service, another small Service consisting of a little under 700 men, with whom rests the control of a force of over 198,000 men. A fuller account is given in Chapter VII on Law and Order. It is organized on a provincial basis, the force in each province being under an Inspector-General. The district units are grouped in ranges under Deputy Inspectors-General, and each district is under a Superintendent, whose position corresponds to that of a Chief Constable in the West; with this difference however, that the latter may only have had a comparatively short training in police work before his appointment, whereas the Superintendent in India has adopted professional police administration as his life career and has had many years experience as a police officer. In subordination to the Indian Police Service is the Provincial Police Service composed of officers of lower rank, which is almost exclusively Indian, as are also the rank and file. Altogether there are less than 600 British officers and about 800 British sergeants, the latter almost entirely employed in the provincial capitals. The great majority of the force

belong to the civil police, a constabulary armed only with batons. A body of military police is employed on the frontiers and in Burma; and there is also a very small armed reserve at each district head-quarters.

The Indian Police Service has had to contend with many difficulties. The strength of the force is relatively very small—less than one man per 1,000 of the population—and the public is inclined to be apathetic in its support. Although they appreciate the maintenance of order, Indians appear to have a prejudice against the punishment of disorder and are slow to assist in the suppression and detection of crime. The task of officers of the Service has, moreover, been complicated by a tendency to corruption in the subordinate ranks, and it has not always been easy to make them realize their position as the servants and not the masters of the public. The sustained efforts of the officers have, however, resulted in an improvement in morale, and it is incontestable that they have instilled into their men a fine sense of discipline, which in recent years has been proof against both temptation and terrorism, and has not been shaken by the grievous loss of life due to assassination by revolutionary fanatics. It would be difficult to speak too highly of the restraint which the police have shown generally during the civil disobedience movement, and of their staunchness and courage under the gravest provocation and even the insidious torture of social persecution.

India is said to stand second to no other country in the world in the achievements of its engineers, and she owes her reputation not only to the constructional wonders of her Railway Engineers, but also to the great feats of the Irrigation Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers. The fruits of their skill are seen in great irrigation works, which have secured the country which they serve against

the visitations of famine or scarcity. The latest of these is the Sukkur Barrage, stretching for a mile across the Indus, which will irrigate over five million acres. This is only one of many great works which spread plenty over a dry and thirsty land. 'Britain', it was said about thirty years ago, 'makes a new Egypt in India every year and the world takes no notice.' This rather overstates the case, but certainly Egypt is dwarfed by the irrigated area in India: the country under cultivation and human habitation in the Nile Valley, the Delta, and the Oases is less than one-third of that supplied with water by State irrigation works in India. The actual area under irrigation is 44,000 square miles and there are 75,000 miles of canals, or nearly 33,000 miles more than the total length of the railways.

The Irrigation engineers were formerly combined with the engineers engaged in the construction of roads and buildings in a common service called the Public Works Department. All were trained from 1871 to 1906 at the Royal Engineering College at Cooper's Hill in England, but since the latter year engineers have been obtained in the open market, and the roads and buildings branch has for some years past been a separate department.

The fourth All-India Service is the Indian Forest Service, which was founded in 1864 and owed its development largely to two German forestry experts, Sir Dietrich Brandis, the first Inspector-General, who held that office for nineteen years, and his successor, Mr. W. Schlich. The State forests, for the conservation of which the Service is responsible, cover 250,000 square miles and yield a revenue of £2,000,000; but revenue is not the only or even the main consideration, for the guiding principle of forest administration, as laid down by the Government, is that the sole object with which State forests are administered is the public benefit.

The Agricultural Department has also done work of solid and permanent value in developing India's natural resources and stimulating its greatest industry—agriculture—though the number of trained workers in this vast field is all too small. In particular, agricultural research has done much to improve the quality and value of the crops; its chief centre is the Research Institute at Pusa. Improved types of wheat, rice, and cotton, which the Department introduced, are now grown on millions of acres and give a return valued at £1 an acre more than local varieties; the cotton in one province alone has increased the cultivators' income by half a million sterling, and the supply of selected jute seed to the cultivators of Bengal has resulted in a gain to them of £400,000 a year.

The Education Service had its inception in a dispatch, said to have been drafted by John Stuart Mill, which the Directors of the East India Company issued in 1854. Recognizing that the education of the people was the duty of the State, and that it needed fuller development in India, they formulated means to secure its advance, including the establishment of universities and the creation of separate Departments of Education in each province. Departments were accordingly established in the following year, under heads designated Directors of Public Instruction, and they have since then directed the educational activities in each province. The Service supervises the main branches of education other than that given in universities, i.e. collegiate, secondary, and primary, as well as technical. Its officers are engaged in teaching in Government educational institutions and in administrative work as an inspecting agency for colleges and schools. There are approximately 1,500 persons in the higher and 11,000 in the lower grades, nearly all being Indians.

It is now nearly eighty years since what Lord Dalhousie

called 'the three great engines of social improvement' were introduced into India, i.e. railways, uniform postage, and the telegraph. The length of railways has now risen to 42,000 miles, on which over 600 million passengers are carried annually. The State directly manages nearly 19,000 miles and employs 473,000 men, the superior staff numbering 1270. There are 100,000 miles of telegraph lines and over 450,000 miles of telegraph wire; the number of letters and other articles passing through the post is 1,400 millions a year; and the postal staff exceeds 100,000 persons under Postmasters-General in the provinces, with the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs as supreme head for all India. The efficiency of the postal system equals, if it does not surpass, that of Great Britain, and is regarded as one of the marvels of the British Raj by the Indian masses, to whom the certainty and dispatch with which letters and money-orders reach the remotest villages are a source of never-ending wonder.

The word Survey is applied to more than one Service connected with scientific and other research, such as the Botanical Survey of India, the Geological Survey of India, and the Archaeological Survey of India; but there is one Service which has a right to it *par excellence*, and without adjectival qualification, and that is the Survey of India.


This Service dates back to the appointment of the famous geographer James Rennell, in 1764, as Surveyor in Bengal and three years later as Surveyor-General. The first Superintendent of the Trigonometrical Survey. Colonel Lambton, was appointed in 1818, and he was succeeded five years later by Sir George Everest, whose name was given to and is perpetuated by the highest mountain in the world, the pre-eminence of which was first discovered in the offices of the Survey in Calcutta. The superior staff of the Survey consists of officers of the

GROWTH OF POSTAL TRAFFIC SINCE 1884 IN MILLIONS OF ARTICLES

Millions

1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100

84-85
89-90
94-95
99-00
04-05
09-10
14-15
19-20
24-25
25-29



Royal Engineers and of the Indian Army, who have trained a staff of Anglo-Indians and Indians to assist them as scientific surveyors. Their mapping work extends not only over India but also to countries beyond the frontier, where it makes a thrilling chapter in the romance of exploration.

It is not possible to make more than a passing reference to other scientific Services. Mention should not be omitted of the valuable work done by the Geological Survey in economic geology and the development of India's mineral resources; and of the services which the Meteorological Department has rendered to aviation by the study of upper air currents, and to the public at large by the issue of forecasts of the annual seasonal rainfall and of timely warning of impending cyclones; further, there is the record of the Archaeological Survey in investigating and conserving the monuments of India's past and in exploring the remains of remote ages.

Chapter VII

LAW AND ORDER

By THE EDITOR

IN all discussions regarding the minimal functions of government, the security of life and property is accepted as fundamental, no less than defence against foreign aggression or the protection of public and private rights. Security of life and property means the maintenance of law and order, and includes the prevention and detection of crime. This duty has been, since the British Crown assumed from the East India Company in 1858 the government of India in name as well as in fact, pre-eminently incumbent on the Central Government as established by law in India, namely, the Governor-General and his colleagues, acting through the heads of all the Local Governments in British India. The transfer of certain branches of government to indigenous responsibility under the Reform Scheme of 1919 (see p. 66) did not diminish the responsibility of the Government of India to the British Parliament for the remaining branches, which include this important function of maintaining internal security for life and property; and this responsibility exists at the present moment.

A radical change in the position was proposed in the report of the Indian Statutory Commission in 1930. They debated very earnestly whether law and order should also be placed under Indian Ministers responsible to elected provincial legislatures; and finally recommended this course, notwithstanding the inherent risks. The main argument was that, otherwise, the unhealthy atmosphere would remain in which elected legislators and Ministers would treat police administration and expenditure thereon as a subject for which others than themselves should bear

unpopularity; hence the Commission recommended that the atmosphere should be changed by fixing responsibility on the shoulders of the critics.

Law and order, the Commission went on to say, is the first interest of every Indian citizen; and 'the time has come when it ought to be no longer possible to represent, or to misrepresent, the agents of authority who are so faithfully supplying this first need of civilized existence as the minions of an alien bureaucracy'.

The principle of local provincial autonomy which was to include the transfer of the portfolio of Law and Order in the Governors' Provinces to Ministers responsible to the provincial legislatures was subsequently in December 1930 'noted' at the Indian Round Table Conference in London, though there were differences of opinion as to the future of the All-India Police Service, and as to the future of the statutory powers dealing with the internal administration of the police. There the matter rests, pending further meetings of the Conference.

In British India the police forces are highly centralized organizations, aggregating 198,000 of all ranks, directly under their respective governments. Each of the provinces has its own force, and all the forces (with certain negligible exceptions) are paid by these provincial governments. This centralized system has its counterpart in various countries and in the Indian States. For instance, large centralized Government-paid forces are to be found in the Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Civic Guard on the continent of Europe; in the States of Australia; in South Africa (where there is only one force for all the provinces within the Union); in Canada (where there is one federal force for the whole Dominion, in addition to certain provincial and municipal forces); and in the Irish Free State. The four provincial maritime capitals (Madras,

Bombay, Calcutta, and Rangoon) have separate police organizations; but these too are paid from provincial funds. Indeed there are in India practically no police forces which are paid from municipal rates. The only force in Great Britain which is comparable in size and centralization with the Indian provincial forces is that of the Metropolitan Police for Greater London: there a force of 20,000 men serves a population of $7\frac{1}{2}$ million, over an area of nearly 700 square miles, and it is directly under the Home Office, though half its cost is met from local rates. In India, however, in the Bombay Presidency a force of approximately the same establishment, 19,000-20,000 men, serves 21 million people, while the police of the United Provinces (i.e. North Central India) number nearly 34,000 and deal with a population of 48 million people over the large area of 106,000 square miles, equal to the whole of Italy.

What a contrast all this is to the municipal control which is the essence of the English system (with the exception of the Metropolitan Police) and the unrestricted local autonomy in the American system! In Great Britain there are no fewer than 240 independent forces: municipal control is tempered by central supervision, and State financial assistance to the extent of one-half of the expenditure is given subject to State inspection. In the United States there is no central subsidy, and the number of municipal forces, including those directly under Mayors and those under Commission-managers, is very large: in one State alone there are between 400 and 500. There are, however, now State Forces in eleven States; and the cost is met from State funds. In India, as has been shown, the forces are all paid by the provincial governments, and are under continuous government control.

The critics of expenditure on the police are inclined to

forget that a peaceful condition of society is a prerequisite for all professional callings, for all trade, crafts, and agriculture, and that it is not in India alone that police administration has become more complex and more expensive. It cannot be too frequently emphasized that India is a sub-continent, and not a country; and that it includes people of every conceivable type of civilization, varying from those classes, on the one hand, who for centuries have been accustomed to prey upon their neighbours, to those, on the other hand, who demand and expect all the amenities which the modern world can provide. Apart from crime properly so called, there is the potential lawlessness on the Afghan Frontier; the serious menace to order in the feuds between Hindus and Muhammadans; the waywardness of many primitive tribes; the hooligan element in the large cities; and the grave incitements to anarchy caused by what was euphemistically styled the 'civil disobedience' movement. There is one policeman to about 400 of the population in the turbulent Frontier Province on the North-West, where, it is stated, murder has been reduced to a fine art, while in the thickly populated, but generally law-abiding, area of Bihar, the proportion is as 1 to 2,400. In peaceful rural England the proportion is 1 to 940, and in the London Metropolitan area it is 1 to 378.

The organization as it exists at present, though it had its birth in Sind after 1843, has been mainly nurtured by an Act of the Central Legislature of India passed in 1861, designed to establish a purely civil constabulary capable of all police duties. Its frame was further developed as a result of a Police Commission which made a special investigation during Lord Curzon's viceroyalty. Indeed, his Government indicated a definite line of policy which has been steadily followed for a quarter of century, the

ideal being to fill the forces with loyal, competent, contented, and self-respecting men, especially by recruiting for the Indian officer rank men of good family and university education.

The local unit of control is the district—corresponding to a county in England and in America: there are about 270 districts in India with an average area of over 4,000 square miles. The title of a district police officer is Superintendent or District Superintendent of Police, which connotes a status equivalent to Chief Constable in England or Chief of Police in America. There are widening concentric rings of authority under Deputy-Inspectors-General and Inspectors-General for the provincial units. Below the District Superintendent the hierarchy consists of Assistant Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents (the invention of the 1903 Commission), Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, Head Constables (equal to Sergeants), and Constables.

The personnel of 198,000 men (in 1930) in British India is almost entirely Indian. The British element consists of less than 600 of the higher officers, and of about 800 police sergeants, who are mainly found in the large provincial capital cities. The higher officers of all the Police Forces in British India form a body called the Indian Police Service. Up to 1905 this All-India Service was recruited entirely from England; the members join as Assistant Superintendents. This service numbered only 732 for the whole of India in 1924 and 692 in 1929, 128 being Indian and 564 British. It is destined under a system of recruitment now in operation—as a result of a Services Commission which reported in 1924—to have an increasingly Indian personnel; 251 Indians and 434 British, in all 685, by the end of 1939, and a half-and-half distribution between British and Indian by 1949.

The grades from Deputy Superintendent downwards

form Provincial Services. Those of the officer rank are recruited direct from the Indian middle classes; and by general consent their standards of education and integrity have greatly risen in the twentieth century. The Sub-Inspector is the head officer of each police station or station house, the jurisdiction of which forms the area into which all districts and cities have been divided (comparable with the English 'station' or the American 'precinct'). The Sub-Inspector corresponds to the English Inspector, or to the American Lieutenant, and has normally a staff of 12, including one who corresponds to the English 'station sergeant' or the American 'desk sergeant'. His trust covers about 100 square miles in the rural areas; so effective patrol with this staff is difficult. He is the real centre round which all revolve: the lesser luminaries, the constables, are his satellites, while the higher officers make their inspection tours with the periodicity of planets, and occasionally with the eccentricity of comets. Since 1906 the recruitment of a superior type of man together with special training has greatly improved the morale. Ample opportunities of promotion are, however, offered to constables and head constables possessing the required competency: indeed the controlling staff is eager to give merit a chance. One of the finest detectives of modern times joined the Bombay Force in the ranks, rose to be one of the heads of the police in Bombay City, and was twice decorated.

The constables are recruited practically exclusively from the agricultural classes: it should not be forgotten, however, that over 70 per cent. of the population in India are directly concerned with agriculture. In all provinces the ideal is to recruit natives of the province as far as possible, for obvious reasons relating to language and knowledge of customs. In Bengal and Burma there has been some

recruitment of men whose homes are in Upper India; but the recruitment of strangers to the province necessarily creates difficulties of its own. The root of the problem, as in so many other branches of the administration in India, is financial. The two main requirements are pay and housing; and the chief difficulties in the recruitment of men of the right stamp have arisen from the fact that in the subordinate ranks the pay was not sufficient. In 1930 the monthly remuneration of constables ranged from 15-20 rupees in the Bihar Province to 20-24 rupees in the Bombay Presidency, while that of station-house officers varied from 50-130 rupees in Bengal to 80-160 rupees in the Punjab (10 rupees = 15s. or 3.65 dollars). The pay in Burma and in the Presidency capitals is on a higher scale.

The press reports of clashes in India between police and mobs in which firearms are used, tend to give to the Western reader an incorrect impression that the Indian Police is wholly an armed force. It is true that every recruit goes through a course of musketry and drill; but when the recruits pass into ordinary police work they are not armed. In every province (except the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province) there is a distinction between the armed police and the civil police. At the headquarters of each district there is a reserve which is an armed force, and it is this body which furnishes men for escort and guard duty. This reserve, too, is used in emergencies when disturbances are apprehended and firearms may have to be employed. The ordinary civil police go about their ordinary duties as unarmed as the rural constabulary in England.

Apart from the District Reserves, there are bodies of men called Military Police or Frontier Constabulary, who in effect relieve the Regular Army of certain duties. These forces number 24,000 men and are distributed mainly

over the North-West and North-East Frontiers of India and at certain key positions: the largest unit, consisting of 10,000, is in Burma, where the circumstances are exceptional, owing to the nature of the country and its history. The motto of the Burma Military Police is *Civis sed Miles*. Of course, as pointed out in Chapter V, the Army in India, British and Indian, is available as a last resource for the suppression of internal disorder; but in most Indian districts there are no cantonments or military forces; and everywhere the first strain of the burden in maintaining peace in case of disorder falls upon the ordinary police forces.

Every province has within the last thirty years made great strides in organizing training colleges for the cadet officers and schools for the constables. The object and result of the curricula have been to stimulate intelligence, to cultivate morale, and to produce better qualified servants of the public. They have done excellent work; and in some cases the principle of a specialized vocational training was accepted in India at an earlier date than in the West. The standard of literacy in the rank and file is being raised, and is distinctly high in South India and in Burma, as might be expected in view of the general literacy of these areas.

The total cost of the 198,000 police forces in British India (including Burma) in 1929 was nearly the equivalent of £8 million sterling, or 38,900,000 dollars. The incidence per head of the population (according to the 1931 Census figures) is 7*d.* or 14 cents. These figures may be compared with the cost of the 30,000 police in the counties and boroughs of England and Wales in the same year, namely, £13·8 millions or 67,100,000 dollars, and the £7·9 millions or 38,400,000 dollars for the 20,000 members of the London Metropolitan Police.

The village watchman in India is not deemed a policeman, either colloquially or officially. He is in some cases the survival of Mogul or even pre-Mogul times: in other cases he is the creation of the British Government with names varying from province to province. He is paid in different ways—by land grants, by money payments, or by both; and the control varies from pure State control to control by village councils. The chief duty of the village officer is to report crime; but he also is expected to give general assistance to the regular police, to keep a watch over bad characters, and to supply local information regarding many subjects about which Government may desire to be informed. The fact that some village watchmen are themselves members of castes who furnish recruits for the criminal classes is sometimes a source of amused criticism; but the system does not work badly on the whole, and a well-organized system of rewards exists in the provinces to encourage good work in assisting the regular police. Prosecution of village watchmen for complicity in crime is not unknown; but against that, there are many instances of remarkable integrity, striking detective powers, and wonderful courage on the part of these humble rural watchmen. The Bengal Presidency, for instance, with an area a little less than England and Scotland combined and a population of 50 millions (1931), has no fewer than 78,000 of such village officials, the number of the regular police in the same province being 24,000. It needs no argument to prove that there should be complete co-operation between these village officials and the permanent police forces of the State: indeed, this is both the ideal and the despair of all police and civil administrators in India. Reams have been written on the subject for well nigh a century. All administrative officers have a warm corner in their hearts for the village watchmen,

though they have sometimes cause to deplore the imperfections of this picturesque survival of the past.

It is now appropriate to survey as a whole the crime which the police forces in India have to handle and curb. While there is much that is familiar in Western countries, a certain class of co-operative crime, a type of hereditary crime, and a special kind of agrarian crime which has no counterpart in England may be examined.

By the term 'co-operative' is meant the crime in which bodies of men work jointly; and although the terms 'gang' and 'gangster' are familiar in the West, yet the peculiarly Indian type of co-operative crime styled 'dacoity' has features which are unfamiliar. This is an Indian vernacular word which has become naturalized in English. It is robbery with violence by bodies of five or more members, as defined in Lord Macaulay's Indian Penal Code, which, framed in the thirties of last century, has survived with surprisingly little change till the present. The commission of the offence is facilitated by the timidity of the average villager; but not infrequently the biter is bit, by the unexpected pluck and resistance of the villagers. A gang of, say, 15 or 20 men appear suddenly in a village; they loot the premises of a rich village merchant; they attack the villagers who assemble, and torture people to make them disclose where valuables are kept; and often use torches (nowadays electric) for their own guidance and the intimidation of the inhabitants. Bands of dacoits are the real bugbear to the police in every province. Mill, the historian, mentioned dacoits more than one hundred years ago; the British authorities, even now, just succeed in coping with this form of crime. Sometimes these men become outlaws; and in Upper India there are from time to time regular battles between armed dacoits and the police. The disease is a morbid growth, and is not primarily due to bad

economic conditions, though it is more active when crops fail and prices are high. The members of the gangs are really professional criminals; they take to crime not on account of poverty, but because they desire to enjoy a higher standard of living than they can earn in an honest way. The problem is how to wean them from their anti-social habits.

Next, there are some castes whose main occupation has always been criminal, or who, originally following honest occupations, have later adopted criminal habits. One interesting instance is a body of men who in former days were camp followers of the Mogul armies and are now professional coiners. As in the West, there are recognized members of the so-called criminal classes. But the real hereditary criminals of India are the criminal tribes—those unfortunate children of nature to whom crime is instinctive. While they add to the cares of administration, they certainly furnish a romance about crime, which drab criminality frequently lacks. Take, for example, the Sansis of the Punjab; reputed to have a full dose of original sin, with all the arts of the gipsy vagabond, from snake charming to jugglery; but every man, woman, and child, a thief. There are about four millions in these hereditary criminal tribes. The reclamation of hardened, hereditary, and wandering criminals is, indeed, a difficult problem. By special legislation measures have been taken to register and place in industrial or agricultural settlements certain scheduled tribes. A small beginning was made seventy years ago; in the twentieth century the aid of the Salvation Army has been invoked, and with some tribes a hopeful degree of success has been obtained. Control and reformation must go hand in hand. It is a long, tedious, and uphill task; success seems more probable on the agricultural side, and among the children.

A third general class of crime is agrarian crime; that is to say, the riots which take place over the possession of lands, crops, fisheries, and the like. Conflicts about land between rival claimants are troublesome enough, even when the solid ground can furnish some silent testimony; but they are ten times more troublesome in certain riverain areas, especially in Bengal, where the ever-shifting silt of the big rivers is constantly making and unmaking cultivable land. It is of course natural that in an agricultural country in which the pressure of the population lies heavy on the land (e.g. over 900 per square mile in North Bihar) the fight for land should be acute; and this form of crime lessens in other parts where the pressure is less. Agriculture, however, in India spells cattle; cattle must graze; the fields are usually unfenced; hence the cattle trespass on crops, and this is another fruitful source of agrarian rioting.

Without straying over the whole field of Indian criminality, it is possible to glean some individual forms of crime which are worthy of note. Cattle-theft is one such. The professional cattle-thief in India is a real pest. Blackmail is the concomitant of this form of theft—a blackmail which is sometimes intimidation, sometimes unconscious humour. If so much money is paid down, the owner will learn where his cattle are to be found. The offence has even created the professional intermediary. The branding of cattle has been adopted in some areas as a check, and is becoming more popular. Cattle-poisoning also is too common; the incentive is the market for the hides.

As in Western countries, murder in India has its principal motives in domestic strife, enmity, and greed; but disputes about land, witchcraft, and superstition are also causal factors. In Madras in 1929 a father killed his boy of 4 years, because the astrologer had given an unfavourable horo-

scope; and in the same year in Upper India a child was sacrificed and his body thrown down a well in order to lay a ghost. The professional poisoner of to-day is the lineal successor of the Indian 'thug', the robber assassin who used to strangle his victim, known to the Western world through the classic work of Colonel Meadows Taylor, *The Confessions of a Thug*, which was first published in 1839.

Again, the hero-worship lavished on persons accused of callous murders because these offences had their origin in religious fanaticism or political terrorism cannot but affect the minds of the ill-balanced to emulation. Mr. Gandhi wrote in *Young India* in April, 1931, that political murder is 'bound to recoil, as it has done in other countries, on our own heads'. The fact that in 1928 there were in all India 6,451 homicides reported and 1,896 convictions indicates that the incidence of murders to population is greater than in England, but less than in Italy.

The house-breakers in India have little opportunity or capacity for using the explosive or other elaborate methods; but the very simplicity of their methods and the opportunities for operating with comparative impunity create special difficulties in detection. As regards crimes of deceit, there are some types of contemptibly mean frauds against illiterate country-folk. Maliciously false cases, too, are a marked feature in the criminal returns. As in other parts of the world, the Indian police have to meet great skill and education amongst wrongdoers; and particularly is this the case in the matter of bogus bank and company promoters, in the forgery of notes and coins, in embezzlements and swindles in commercial houses and the like.

In measures adopted by the police against criminals, prevention comes first. There is one Criminal Procedure Code for the whole of India, and therein are provisions for

preventive action; for preventing riots and for ensuring good behaviour. At the discretion of the Magistracy evidence may be taken against suspects, who may then be called upon by the Courts to show cause why they should not be bound down in specific recognizances to be of good behaviour: the most common ground is that the suspect is an habitual thief. The local trial of such cases near the suspect's own house will usually disclose whether the prosecution is the result of personal animus, village vendetta, vague suspicion against an ex-convict, or real thoroughly-justified ill reputation. It is, however, the judgement, not only of the British administrator but of many competent foreign observers, that one of the immense difficulties of police administration in certain localities is the undeveloped sense of civic responsibility. The prevention of crime raises of course a much larger question than mere police technique; in recent years the creation of children's courts, the working of Borstal institutions, the settlement of criminal tribes, and many other measures have done something to attack at the source crime which depends upon environment.

As regards the second main division of the policeman's work—namely, investigation—a great advance has been made through the reforms initiated after the Commission of 1903. The improved training of the recruits is directed to increase their interest in their work and to stimulate their intelligence and initiative. A better type of cadet for the sub-inspector grade, a vivification of all the Criminal Investigation Departments in the provinces, and a more rigorous selection for the upper grade, called Inspectors, are producing better and cumulative results. The system, which is usually in vogue in Europe, of vertical control from the top in the case of the Criminal Investigation Department is generally in practice. For

pertinacity, integrity, and acumen the best of these staffs can stand comparison with any detective organization in the world. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the station house officer (of the sub-inspector grade) is normally responsible both for patrol and for investigation. About three-quarters of a million accused are brought to trial annually, and convictions obtained in the case of half a million.

Under this subject of investigation it may be of interest to Western readers to know that in regard to the presentation of confessions before the Courts, the law in India is more favourable to the accused than the law in England. In England an accused person is warned by the police officer charging him that any statement made by him may be used in evidence; but in India there is the very substantial protection to an arrested person that any self-incriminating statement made to any police officer—however high his rank—is not admitted in evidence in Court. If an accused does confess to a police officer, the confession can have evidential value only if it is made before a Magistrate, who will record it.

The system of identification by means of finger-prints deserves some mention; for India was one of the earliest countries to put it to practical use, first, through Sir William Herschel to prevent personation, and later through Mr. (afterwards Sir Edward) Henry, who used it for the detection of criminals. The Henry system of classification—amplified by its inventor both in India where he was an Inspector-General, and at Scotland Yard, where he became Commissioner of Police—has since received almost world-wide acceptance. It was an Indian officer who first devised a system of one-finger classification.

The police forces in India during recent years have given

proof that, through their organization, their discipline, and their leadership, their morale has been able to bear the almost intolerable strain of religious disputes between the leading communities and of incitements to disorder. Both during and since the Great War India has had sore trials: unrest, disorder, anarchical outbreaks, inter-religious conflicts, economic strain. The police have had to face an aggressive campaign to break their morale; taunts in the streets, and social boycott as regards marriage and other human activities in their homes, have not been wanting.

There are indeed few forces in the world which have to contend with so many varieties of crime and criminal, with so many differences in environment and with so great a demand on the experience, resource, and courage of the staff. Mr. Raymond Fosdick in his *American Police Systems* (1920) enumerated certain root factors which explained much that is amiss in the American body politic of to-day, forming obstacles to effective police administration. Among these, he wrote, were the heterogeneity of the population; the law's delays and the technicalities of procedure, which are beyond the control of the police; and the unhealthy state of public opinion in its attitude to crime and the criminals. All these might be affirmed of the India of to-day, though of course with local qualifications. One additional factor which Mr. Fosdick mentioned does not apply in India, namely, a faulty judicial personnel; for the general integrity and competency of the Indian magistracy and judiciary can hardly be assailed, and indeed they form one of the tributes to British rule.

The conclusion of the whole matter is this. The problem of the police in India is not static: as in other parts of the world, new methods, sinister uses of new discoveries, and increased communications enhance the normal crime

of the country, which has been shown to be varied and difficult enough. The political developments in recent years have made the problem still more difficult: these have been accompanied by outbursts of revolutionary crime which depends upon physical force through the gun and the bomb; by a campaign of incitement to disorder; and by inter-religious hostility which all observers assert has been growing in bitterness and intransigence. It is a pathetic tragedy that large numbers of a normally law-abiding peasantry have been taught to hold the law in contempt. Above all this is the unpredictable reaction to the contemplated transfer under a new constitution of the responsibility of law and order to provincial Ministers responsible to elected Legislatures. Yet whatever new constitution the future may have in store for India, the need for police forces of high efficiency and lofty morale will be no less than it is to-day.

Chapter VIII

EDUCATION¹

By SIR PHILIP HARTOG, K.B.E., C.I.E., LL.D.

[Sir Philip Hartog, after serving for fourteen years as Academic Registrar of the University of London, went to India in 1917 as a member of the important Commission appointed under the Chairmanship of Sir Michael Sadler to inquire into the working of the Calcutta University. He was appointed, 1920, first Vice-Chancellor of the newly created University of Dacca and held that post for five years. He then served for three years as a member of the Indian Public Service Commission, and also acted as Chairman of the Auxiliary Committee on Education appointed in connexion with the inquiries of the Indian Statutory Commission under Sir John Simon.]

THE present educational position of India is the result of a complex and unique history, in which there are three main cultural factors, the Hindu, the Muslim, and the European. Only at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century did European influence become appreciable. What was the position of Hindu and Muslim education at this time?

The Hindu system itself offers the peculiarity that the small Brahmin, or priestly, caste jealously guarded for itself that knowledge of philosophy, literature, rhetoric, grammar, and, above all, religion, which is the result of two thousand and more years of civilization; the Vaidyas, or doctors, had some kind of higher learning; the trading classes had no doubt an efficient training in commercial arithmetic; the vast majority of the population remained untaught.

The Muslim system, introduced by successive waves of

¹ See the *Review of the Growth of Education in British India* (Interim Report of the Indian Statutory Commission): Cmd. 3407; 1929.

invasion, culminating in that Mogul invasion which led to the splendid empire of Akbar in the time of our Elizabeth, introduced Arabic and Persian classical culture; it led to the use of Persian itself as a refined modern language comparable to French in the Europe of the eighteenth century. It created the new vernacular, Urdu. The Muslim differs essentially from the Hindu system by its democratic character. It is the duty of every boy to recite from the Koran in Arabic, even though he may not understand it.

The two systems alike attached, and still attach, far less importance to the literary education of women than of men. The disparity between the literacy of men and of women in every part of India is least in the provinces with many Indian Christians and in Burma, where, under a system mainly Buddhist, the monks, unlike the Brahmins, regard it as a duty to teach widely, and where the male literacy is higher than anywhere else in the Indian Empire.

At the end of the seventeenth century, largely owing to the long period of internecine wars, the Hindu teaching and Muslim teaching of all grades were at a low ebb; and the first educational efforts of the administrators of the East India Company were directed to stimulating and endowing the higher learning. (See Chap. IX, p. 139.)

Perhaps the feature most significant of the general educational lethargy of India in the eighteenth century (when only a fraction of India was under British control) is the fact that three centuries after printing had been invented in Europe, India left it to European administrators, missionaries, and scholars to introduce the printing-press, alike for the classical languages (Sanskrit and Arabic) and for the vernaculars. As examples of British influence on the spread and development of the vernaculars

we may quote that of the missionary, William Carey (1761-1834), on Bengali literature, and of the official, Charles Philip Brown (1798-1884), on Telugu literature.¹ Until printing was introduced into India teaching could only be oral or given with the help of slates (still largely used) or manuscripts.

In the Charter for 1813 of the East India Company, a clause was introduced authorizing the Company to make a grant for educational purposes.² Pursuing the policy of Hastings, the money was mainly devoted to the teaching of the Indian classical languages, Arabic and Sanskrit, and to translations of Western books into those languages.

Western education in India began in the eighteenth century with the Christian missionaries, of various countries and churches. But it was only in the early nineteenth century that the number of their pupils became significant. At about the same period, Western education was also introduced by another independent movement, the semi-rationalist movement of an Indian of genius, himself a Sanskrit scholar, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, and David Hare, an English watchmaker of Calcutta. They founded a college in Calcutta for 'English education', and through their pupils schools for the teaching of English soon sprang up all over Bengal. The demand for 'English education' in Bengal preceded by nearly twenty years any official attempt to supply it.

But the general problem of 'arresting the rapid decay of

¹ J. B. Gilchrist (1759-1841), head of the Government College at Fort William, first printed textbooks in Urdu and Hindi; but lithography, introduced after printing, is still much more generally employed for the Persian Urdu script than printing.

² The phraseology used is 'the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India'.

literature and the arts',¹ of strengthening also the vernaculars and the vernacular schools, and of giving higher education through the medium of English began to be considered by the governments of Munro in Madras (1822-6), of Elphinstone in Bombay (1823-8), of Lord William Bentinck in Bengal (1835-8). It gave rise in Bengal to the famous struggle between the 'Orientalists', the partisans of the traditional policy of teaching through the medium of the classical languages, and the 'Anglicists', who wished to teach through the medium of English. It was admitted on all sides that the instruction of the mass of the people through the medium of their own language, i.e. the vernacular, was the ultimate object to be kept in view; and the Bengal Committee of Public Instruction wrote: 'We conceive the foundation of a vernacular literature to be the ultimate object to which all our efforts must be directed.'

The struggle between Orientalists and Anglicists was terminated in favour of the Anglicists by the famous minute of Macaulay of 1835 and the decisive minutes of Lord William Bentinck and Lord Auckland endorsing Macaulay's policy. The schools for Oriental learning were maintained, but the translations into Sanskrit and Arabic were discontinued. The system of 'English education' was adopted and encouraged by Government, and developed alongside the vernacular schools.

The motives of various officers of the East India Company in introducing Western education differed; the desire for obtaining efficient officers undoubtedly weighed with many. But men at the head like Munro, Trevelyan, and Macaulay foresaw clearly that the introduction of Western education would probably lead to a demand for Western

¹ See reference to Sir Thomas Munro, in F. W. Thomas, *History of British Education in India* (1891), p. 3.

representative institutions and welcomed that probability.¹

An added stimulus was given to vernacular education by the conferment of the freedom of the Press in 1835 and the substitution of the vernacular for Persian in the lower courts in Bengal in 1837. But an unforeseen and unfortunate effect of the latter measure was the discouragement of education among the Muhammadans, a discouragement from which they have not yet completely recovered.

The general theory adopted by the East India Company is known as the 'filtration theory'. The Company regarded any direct attack on mass illiteracy as an impossibility. They thought that the only means of educating the masses was to educate the literary classes, who were comparatively few in number, and to let education filter down through them. This was to ignore the vast obstacles to such 'filtration', arising from Indian caste and class distinctions. Until comparatively recent times, there has been no organized movement of voluntary and religious effort on the part of the Indian higher classes for the education of the masses corresponding to the efforts which created the voluntary school system in England.

In 1853, for the first time, the British Parliament investigated seriously and sympathetically the development of Indian education. The whole of the modern system as it exists to-day in British India dates from the great dispatch of 1854 of Sir Charles Wood to the East India Company, a dispatch founded on evidence given to the Lords and Commons. The dispatch imposed on the Government of India the duty of creating a properly articulated system from the primary school to the university, under the direction of provincial Directors of Education. It led to the foundation of the three first universities at Madras,

¹ See Mayhew, *Education of India* (1926), pp. 20-1.

Bombay, and Calcutta; it prescribed increased attention to vernacular education, both primary and secondary, and the institution of a system of grants-in-aid; it expressed sympathy for the cause of female education, advocated institutions for the training of teachers and for technical instruction, and insisted on a policy of perfect religious neutrality. It looked forward to a time when the management of higher institutions might be handed over to local bodies, under the control of, and aided by, the State. There are few documents in the history of education more statesmanlike or more democratic in character. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter to deal in detail with the Hunter Commission of 1882-4, Lord Curzon's Universities Act of 1904, the Government of India Resolution of 1913, the Calcutta University Commission's Report of 1919, or the transference of the control of education under the Reforms of 1919 to Ministers responsible to local legislatures. Almost every step has been on the lines laid down in the Dispatch of 1854, and directed towards the transference of the control of education into Indian hands. The transference may now be regarded as almost complete.

So much for the general lines of policy; the stages of education will now be considered.

The following scheme shows the general grading of the non-technical and non-professional educational institutions adopted with variations in the different provinces.

- Age 6-10. Primary stage, taught entirely in the vernacular (selected according to local needs).
- Age 10-14. Middle stage; called Anglo-vernacular, where English is taught, but not yet used as the medium of instruction.
- Age 14-16. 'Higher English' stage, in which English is mainly used as the medium of instruction. Quite recently, there has been a movement to

substitute the vernacular for English as a medium of instruction.

Age 16-20 or more. University stage in which English is mainly used as the medium of instruction; divided into (a) two years' intermediate stage, (b) two years' degree stage, and (c) two years' 'post-graduate' stage, leading up to the M.A. and M.Sc. degrees. In some universities, e.g. Allahabad, Dacca, and Lucknow, students are only admitted *after* the intermediate stage. At a few universities there is a three years' post-intermediate stage for an honours degree.

There are professional university courses in medicine, law, engineering, agriculture, and education (for secondary teachers), and a number of technical institutions of various grades and kinds, including training-schools for elementary teachers.

In British India educational institutions are either 'recognized' by Government, a necessary preliminary for a grant-in-aid, or unrecognized. The number of recognized institutions in 1929 was about 224,000; of unrecognized, 35,000. The number of unrecognized institutions is diminishing.

The object of the majority of the primary schools (though there are some admirable exceptions) is limited to the three r's, and the main object is to secure literacy. At the moment of writing the literacy figures of the census of 1931 are not available. From the census of 1921 we learn that the highest male literacy (51 per 100 males over 5 years of age) is in Burma, a part of British India; next come Travancore and Cochin States in which there is a large Indian Christian population, and Baroda where compulsory primary education has existed for many years. The literacy among males is lower in All India (13.9)

than in British India (14.4); and it reaches a low point in two Indian States, Hyderabad (mainly Hindu, with a Muslim ruler), 5.7 per 100, and in Kashmir (mainly Muhammadan, with a Hindu ruler), 4.6 per 100. Female literacy was 2.1 per 100 females over 5 years of age in All India in 1921; and 2 per 100 in British India.

On the other hand, the Indian ministers and legislatures constituted under the Reforms of 1919, have shown a keen desire for the extension of primary education. Expenditure on primary education in British India rose from 29½ million rupees in 1917 to 69½ million rupees in 1927, while the number of primary pupils increased from 6⅔ millions to 9¼ millions in that period.

But unfortunately the vast majority of children do not spend in the primary school the four years which, under present conditions, are necessary for the attainment of literacy. Out of every hundred primary pupils in 1922 in Class I only thirty-four were in Class II in 1923, twenty-two in Class III in 1924, and eighteen in Class IV by 1925; and of 5,400,000 in Class I in 1927 less than 1,900,000 remained for Class II in the following year.¹

A great Indian political leader, G. K. Gokhale, first proposed universal compulsory primary education in 1911. There is to-day a general feeling in favour of free compulsory education for boys, and all the provinces except Burma (which needs it least) have by legislation indicated their approval of the principle. But the number of areas actually brought under such compulsion is small. Compulsion without really efficient schools merely increases waste. It is by increasing the efficiency of the schools and their rural bias that the Punjab has made the policy of compulsion a practicable one in rural areas. How far literacy is being

¹ See *Education in India*, 1928-9 (Calcutta, 1931), p. 28.

influenced by compulsion cannot be ascertained until the new census figures are issued.

It was the policy of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and of earlier reports to educate the local bodies by handing over to them certain responsibilities. But where the control of primary schools has been transferred to district boards, without keeping strong central control, such as exists and has been found necessary in England, the results have been unfortunate. The local legislatures have completely lost control over the expenditure which they vote; the policy has been as undemocratic as it has been inefficient from the educational standpoint. Primary education in India without efficient central inspection often tends to become illusory.

At the secondary stage there has been a great tendency to neglect the middle vernacular school, so necessary for the production of primary teachers. The lure to ambitious schoolboys is the university matriculation examination, as the portal to Government service, which has hitherto had an attraction which those unacquainted with India can hardly realize. The reason is simple. The greatest industry in India is agriculture, but the average holding is so small that until co-operation effects a revolution such as it has effected in Denmark, agriculture can afford no employment on any large scale to the educated; commerce and industry employ relatively few; and the only profession which compares in attraction with Government service is the great lottery of the law, to which matriculation is again a necessary avenue.

The whole of the high school system, with exceptions great in interest but small in number, is dominated by the matriculation system of the university authorities or matriculation boards. But there has been progress in recent years. The boy-scout system in some provinces, school

societies and clubs and games, better physical training (in many cases on American models) have given new life to many schools, and are helping to make them schools of character instead of only schools of book-learning. The training colleges, and with them many of the teachers, have become more efficient. But the old Indian tradition of making learning and learning by heart synonymous does not die easily.

The typical Indian institution for university education is what is called an 'arts college', providing a four years' course in arts and science leading up to pass, and sometimes honours, B.A. and B.Sc. degrees. Every small town aspires to have an arts college of its own, affiliated to a university by which the degree examinations are conducted; and, though other ideals have been placed before the Indian public, the number of arts colleges increases. In 1922 there were 152 arts colleges, in 1927, 232, and in 1929, 242. The first two years of the teaching is of the standard of school-teaching, and the report of the Calcutta University Commission in 1919 recommended that it should be treated as such. The report has had a profound influence on the aims of Indian university education all over India, though by an irony of fate it has left the constitution of the University of Calcutta unreformed. One of the chief weaknesses of the affiliating system is that it tends to keep the standard down to that of the weakest affiliated college. In some universities, e.g. Calcutta and the Punjab, that tendency has been to some extent counteracted by limiting teaching for the M.A. and M.Sc. degrees entirely or mainly to the university centre, where library and laboratory facilities are more adequate than anything that can be provided in the vast majority of provincial colleges. One of the most important results of the Commission was the creation of new universities at Dacca

and Lucknow and the reconstitution of one old university at Allahabad on a unitary and residential basis, where no 'intermediate' teaching is given, and teaching is definitely associated with research. There are now in all eighteen universities in India, of which two (Mysore and the Osmania University, Hyderabad)¹ are in Indian States. The Muslim University at Aligarh and the Benares Hindu University are unitary and residential, and intended mainly for the communities of which they bear the names. The Rangoon University is 'semi-unitary'. In 1929 the total number of university teachers (including those in the colleges) was reported to be over 6,000 and of students over 90,000.

In some ways there has been a marked advance in the universities since 1919. The standard of examinations varies a good deal in the different universities, but there has been a definite attempt to raise it in some. Again, the output of original work, though still small when the number of teachers and students is taken into consideration, is out of all comparison greater than it was thirteen years ago; and the award of the Nobel prize in physics to Sir C. V. Raman of the University of Calcutta is an event in the history of Indian universities. It is not only in physical sciences that there has been an advance. The great impetus to Indian studies given by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, the first great Indian disciple of modern methods in such studies, has borne fruit; and Indian scholars are taking rank again with the scholars of the world.

Again, the 'pastoral functions' of university institutions are being more fully realized, and more value is being attached to games, clubs, and societies, which help to

¹ In the Osmania University, Urdu is the medium of instruction, English being a compulsory second language.

make a university a school for character as well as for studies. Social service leagues are beginning to be created. But much remains to be done. Owing to their low entrance standards, the universities are overcrowded with men who are not profiting either intellectually or materially by their university training, and an undue burden is placed on the better university teachers. Even among the students who succeed in graduating there is much unemployment, but that is due to social and economic reasons partly indicated above.

Owing to conservatism, the *purda* system, and early marriage, the education of girls, in spite of recent advances, is far behind that of boys. The direct expenditure on 'female education' increased from 9½ million rupees in 1917 to 22 million rupees in 1927, but in the latter year it was still only 14½ per cent. of the amount spent on 'male education'; and there is a growing disparity between the number of educated boys and of educated girls. At the primary stage there are four times as many boys as girls; at the middle stage eighteen times as many; at the 'high' stage thirty-four times as many; in the arts colleges there are thirty-three times as many (1927). The vast majority of 'girls at school' are only in the first class of the primary stage.

There has been no unwillingness on the part of the university authorities to admit women to degrees, but the total number receiving 'university' and 'intermediate' education in 1929 was only 1,800 (if mixed institutions be included). One of the root-causes of the backwardness in Indian education to-day is the illiterate mother. The Education Committee of the Simon Commission reported that, in the interests of the advance of Indian education as a whole, priority should be given to girls' education in any scheme of expansion. The home is in many ways a greater factor in education than the school. In the opinion

of the Simon Commission itself, 'the women's movement in India holds the key of progress.' The increasingly prominent part taken recently by educated Indian ladies in public and social affairs gives ground for hope that the cause of girls' education will receive that support in the future of which it is in such urgent need.

Unlike the Hindus, the Muhammadans fought shy of Western education from a fear that it would mean proselytization, and they are still educationally backward. At the bottom of the educational ladder they are found in numbers more than proportionate to the population, but at every higher stage they drop out. In 1927 the percentage of the Muhammadan pupils to the total was 28 at the primary stage, but only 13 at the university stage. Nevertheless there is progress. During 1922-7 the numbers at the university stage increased by 56 per cent.

Girls' education is far more backward among Muhammadans than among the Hindus. At the primary stage the girls constitute 29 per cent. of the total; in the middle stage only 5 per cent.; in the high stage 2 per cent. In the women's art colleges in 1927 there were only thirty Muhammadan women.

The educational progress of the Muslims has been retarded, especially in primary education, by the conflict of the old Government ideal of religious neutrality with the intense Muslim desire for religious teaching in the schools, in strong contrast with the absence of such desire on the part of the vast majority of Hindus. The modern movement in Muhammadan education is due largely to the efforts of one man, Sir Syed Ahmad, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, comparable to the efforts of the Raja Ram Mohan Roy in the first quarter. The foundation of the Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh (now the Muslim University) was due to the former.

The number of 'depressed' classes who are regarded as 'untouchable' has been variously estimated at from 30 to 60 millions. The Simon Commission took the figure for British India as about 43·6 millions.¹ There are none in Burma. Children are in many places excluded from the schools on the ground of caste alone. Since 1922 the rate of increase in the number of the depressed classes under instruction has been greater than the general increase of all classes—a fact largely due to the political and social awakening of these classes themselves. But the number of boys of these classes who receive education above the primary stage is extremely small, except in Bengal; and the number of girls who receive such education is negligible. Provision for the depressed classes is mainly made in special schools; but an effort is being made, with partial success, to force local bodies to admit them to the ordinary schools, a solution of the difficulty which many regard as the best.

The Christian missions from various countries were among the first pioneers in education in all grades; and, especially in collegiate work, their educational activities have been almost entirely divorced from proselytizing activities. They have aimed at making their institutions schools for the training of character; and they have rendered great, and generally recognized, services to the country. Of late years, as other agencies have come into the general field, they have given increased attention to the education of the depressed classes, aborigines, and hill tribes.

The proportion of the total public funds which is applied to education varied in the provinces from 9 to 17 per cent. in 1927.² Government expenditure, however, forms only

¹ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (1930), vol. i, p. 40.

² It is to be remembered that since the Reforms of 1919 'education' is

a part, in some provinces less than half, of the total expenditure on education, the rest being provided by local board funds, fees, and 'other sources'. In Anglo-vernacular secondary schools the average annual fee paid by a boy is 21½ rupees (32s. 3d. or 7·84 dollars) and by a girl 13¼ rupees (20s. 8d. or 5·03 dollars).¹ In arts colleges for men the average fee is about £6 or 29·20 dollars.

A large number of Indian students complete their education in Great Britain and other countries. In 1929-30 there were over 2,000 Indian students taking university and professional courses of various kinds in Great Britain, and about 300 taking such courses in other Western countries (including about 200 in the United States). In Great Britain, as elsewhere, the cost of each student exceeds many times the fees in university institutions, and the number of Indian students admitted each year is generally limited. A considerable number of them are doing research work.² There is a special department under the High Commissioner for India which looks after the interests of Indian students in Great Britain, and administers a sum of about £30,000 yearly entrusted to it by their parents and guardians.

The extent to which English is used as the medium of instruction in secondary and higher education is indicated on p. 125. The Calcutta University Commission recommended that its use should be abandoned in the high schools except for mathematics and English; and there is

a 'transferred' subject in the hands of Indian Ministers in the nine Governors' provinces.

¹ The figures are taken from *Progress of Education in India*, 1922-7, vol. ii, pp. 160 and 220, and from *Education in India*, 1928-9 (Calcutta, 1931), p. 53.

² In the academic year 1929-30, five Indian students took the D.Sc. degree, one the D.Litt., and nearly fifty the Ph.D. degree in Great Britain (Report of the Education Department of the Office of the High Commissioner for India for 1929-30, p. 20).

a general feeling in favour of this policy; but in provinces with a number of vernaculars (e.g. Bihar, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Madras) difficulty is felt in conducting the school leaving or matriculation examination in so many languages. It has been urged on 'national' grounds that English should be replaced as an official language and as a *lingua franca* for India by a vernacular such as Hindi, English being taught as a 'second' or 'third' language in schools. The question is too complex a subject to be discussed here.

It is no doubt true that the present plan and system of Indian education with its qualities and defects are largely due to British educational administrators. Those administrators have loyally tried to carry out the policy laid down in the Despatch of 1854 with the financial means at their disposal, and they have grappled with immense difficulties. But the part of the teachers, of whom the vast majority are Indian, must necessarily be in many ways greater than that of the administrators; and in the universities, for a large number of years the majority, not only of the teachers, but of the senates or other governing bodies, have been Indian. It was decided after the Report of the Lee Commission (1924) that the Indian Educational Service, which furnished most of the European members to higher educational administration and teaching, should be gradually extinguished (see p. 99). Any Europeans appointed to higher educational posts in India will be appointed to individual posts, as local governments may decide.

It will be seen that India has been, to a far larger extent than is generally realized, responsible for her own education during many years. Perhaps the greatest danger ahead in education is a certain chauvinism, and an undue absorption in the glories of the past, as indicated by that advanced politician, the late Lala Lajpat Rai. The present

writer has faith in those younger Indians who are sharing with Western comrades the task of advancing knowledge in various fields, not for any one country, but for the world as a whole—the men who look forward and not backward. But the task of bringing the 350 millions of India up to the general level of Western education, will not be a light one. It is indeed colossal.

Chapter IX

ART AND CULTURE

By SIR E. DENISON ROSS, C.I.E., PH.D.

[Sir Denison Ross has been Director of the School of Oriental Studies in London since its establishment in 1917. He has travelled extensively in Central Asia, China, and Persia; and was for ten years Principal of the Calcutta Madrasah, the most important Muhammadan educational institution in Eastern India. He is Professor of Persian in the University of London and the author of numerous works dealing with Oriental culture.]

IT is perhaps difficult for us at the present time to realize how little was known of India and her great past even by the Indians themselves at the end of the eighteenth century. India had already become a reality to Europeans in the sixteenth century, but their interest in her was for long limited to the commodities she needed and produced.

The Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to establish themselves in any part of India, had on their first arrival no knowledge whatever of the country. Indeed, so limited was their knowledge of the world that they seem to have imagined that people who were not Christians must be Muhammadans, and they actually regarded the ceremony they witnessed in the first Hindu temple which they entered as a debased form of Christianity. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries neither they nor the French, the Dutch, nor the English seem to have displayed any curiosity in regard to the early history and culture of India. Many travellers, it is true, visited the court of the Great Mogul and wrote entertaining and instructive accounts of what they had seen, but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that anything in the way of careful study and research was undertaken.

The only language necessary for foreigners to acquire

in their dealings with the Delhi Court was Persian, and the practical study of this language which was duly encouraged from the outset by the authorities, did not in itself throw any light on the culture or history of India. Warren Hastings, himself a good Persian scholar, was the first European governor on Indian soil to realize that in order to rule over the Indians with justice and sympathy it was essential to acquire a knowledge and understanding of their laws and customs, and it was during his Governor-Generalship that the study of the ancient Sanskrit language and literature first received the serious attention of those Englishmen who were destined to make their careers in that country. It was actually under his successor, Lord Cornwallis, that the existing Hindu and Muhammadan laws were first codified.

The names of the first pioneers in the field of Sanskrit and Hindu studies make quite a formidable list, such was the deep interest aroused; and it must be remembered that all of them were busy men who only had their leisure time to devote to their researches, being otherwise employed in onerous posts, in a climate not usually conducive to the expenditure of superfluous energy. Men like Sir William Jones, the founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, James Prinsep, Colebrooke, Bryan Hodgson, and Wilson, all held important official positions, and it is a source of wonder that they should have found time for so much study of such difficult subjects. The work begun by these Englishmen was eagerly taken up by scholars in France and Germany, and it is hard for us to picture the effect which must have been produced on thinking men in Europe by the discovery of this ancient culture whose existence they had never suspected. The foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal by Sir William Jones marked the baptism, if not the birth, of Orientalism, and it rendered from the outset

invaluable services to scholars all over the world, both by its publications and by the impetus it gave to these studies. The *Bibliotheca Indica* instituted by this society, which still continues its activities, is a treasure-house of Hindu and Muhammadan literature.

There is an interesting minute by Lord Wellesley, dated 18 August 1800, which runs as follows: 'In the disorder which preceded the fall of the Mogul Empire all public institutions calculated to promote education and good morals were neglected and at length entirely discontinued.'

It was therefore the policy of the Government to combine with the pursuit of the traditional learning of India the discipline of well-ordered colleges, and already in 1781 the Government had founded a Muhammadan college or *madrasah* in Calcutta, and in 1792 a Sanskrit college in Benares.

By the middle of the nineteenth century enormous strides had been made and totally new branches of research discovered and developed. Among the outstanding names of this period are those of Monier-Williams, Edward Thomas, John Muir, and Max Müller. This last scholar perhaps did more to make known the legacy of India to the world than any man before or since, and India in her turn owes him a deep debt of gratitude. The earliest pioneers had taken up the study of Sanskrit more or less as a hobby, and even Sir William Jones's labours were prompted more by aesthetic enthusiasm than by mere delight in scholarship. As soon as opportunities came into existence for the study of Sanskrit and kindred subjects in Europe, it became possible for the Government of India to recruit orientalists for the educational service, which thus came to include such eminent names as those of Sprenger, Cowell, Thibaut, Hoernle, and Stein, to mention only a few.

It is quite evident that all these scholars benefited to an enormous extent by the learning of the Hindu pandits (learned men) whom they found ready to hand in Bengal and elsewhere, but in the early days it would appear either that the pandit was not interested in the results obtained by his pupils or else that these pupils did not trouble to explain to the pandits exactly what was their object. Examples of Indian scholars themselves making contributions to Sanskritic studies on modern lines were rare in early days, but later we do find among them such outstanding figures as Rajendralal Mitra, Sarat Chandra Das, Hara Prasad Shastri, and Bhandarkar, while in our own day India can point to many fine scholars who have produced valuable work in which is found the happy combination of traditional learning and modern methods of research. If a catalogue is made by an Indian to-day, it will not be a bare hand-list of titles and authors without further comment, but will contain all the information which a modern scholar requires; and if a text is published, the edition will be a critical one.

Up to this point I have confined my remarks to the ancient language and literature of the Hindus. Although much that has been said applies equally to Islamic literature, it is in the nature of things impossible to deal with these two subjects simultaneously, for at no point do they come in contact or influence one another. Both literatures are primarily based on religion, and while the former is of purely native and local growth, the latter is an exotic derived from a distant land and belonging to a distinct civilization. When, however, we come to consider the fine arts the same difficulty does not arise, and Hindu and Muslim are to be found working side by side, each exercising an influence on the other.

Apart from fundamental differences in cultures, it must

be remembered that the early Hindus had no taste for writing histories, their minds being engrossed with things less transitory than passing events. On the other hand, the various peoples who have adopted Islam since it was first preached in the seventh century have all shown an inclination to write history, and this tendency is found to a very marked degree among the Indian Muslims. Thus it is that from the beginning of the eleventh century onwards we have very full records, mostly in Persian, of the Muslim dynasties which ruled over Northern India.

Although the majority of early Muslim historians were not of Indian birth, the existence of so many histories presupposes a demand in India for this branch of literature. In the reign of the great Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030), the famous Persian Al Biruni (d. 1048), wrote what was the first work dealing with the manners and customs of India, a rich mine of information on every aspect of Indian culture. But his work was a solitary apparition, and it was not till the middle of the eighteenth century that ancient India was again made the subject of scholarly research, and this time also it was not the Indians themselves but the foreigner who embarked on the work. It was the great French scholar Reinaud who first drew attention to Al Biruni's *India* and the famous German orientalist Sachau who translated it (1879). So accurate was the information which Al Biruni collected and put down in the great Arabic work which bears his name that modern scholars, with all the resources of archaeological and other researches of a hundred specialists at their disposal, can only confirm and but seldom refute his statements.

The materials for the history of the Muslim dynasties in India was all ready to hand in numberless chronicles, containing the records usually made by the order of, or in

honour of, some great monarch. These histories, moreover, were written in a language not only simple but to all intents and purposes a living language in daily use among the educated Muslims of India, for Persian was the recognized medium for all their historians.

The case of Buddhist and Hindu history was far otherwise, and while on the one hand researches in this field entailed the study of a very difficult language, nothing was ready to hand to form the basis either of chronology or ethnography. When the knowledge of Sanskrit suddenly opened out a new world to the scholars of Europe, little help could be derived from the Hindus themselves beyond the profound knowledge their pandits possessed of their great language and of its literature. (Whether the work of Al Biruni was at any period made the subject of study by the Hindus we can never know, but we do know that nothing exists in Hindu literature on lines of similar research.) It remained therefore the task of Europe to introduce the ancient culture of India to the Hindus, and ultimately to arouse their interest in their historical past and make scholars of them on the Western model. It must not be thought that learning and a love of study at any period died out in India, either among the Hindus or the Muslims. At all times they had many seats of learning which produced scholars of one particular type. The first aim of the Hindu pandit was the perfect mastery of Sanskrit grammar, just as the subtleties of Arabic grammar were the root of all knowledge for the Ulema (Muslim doctors of sacred law). But if their learning was deep it was lacking in breadth, and it never occurred to them to go outside the limits of a certain fixed curriculum. They were content for ever to study and annotate the classics and to write super-commentaries on commentaries, but there seems to have been no desire on the part of the learned

to co-ordinate their studies or to deduce from them the history of their own past.

The country also had schools in plenty which were presided over by these learned men, but little was taught to the Indian boy, whether Hindu or Muslim, beyond the rudiments of grammar and the first principles of his religion. Everything he learnt was by rote only; and of the world around him, whether of science or of natural history or of geography, he had no chance of learning anything. A very small percentage of these students only would in their turn adopt the teaching career, and from among such as these were recruited the learned scholars who kept alive the great traditions of the past. If the learning resembled rather a deep well than an ocean, these pandits and maulavis (learned Muhammadans) possessed and handed on a knowledge not only of Sanskrit and Arabic but also of certain classical books to which no European could perhaps ever attain—a knowledge which has been of inestimable value to Western scholars in their studies of the languages and literatures of Hinduism and Islam.

It is devoutly to be hoped that the encouragement of the Western methods of scholarship and research in India may not result in the elimination of the scholar of the old type. That this danger need not be apprehended is clearly shown by the publications of a number of learned Hindus and Muslims, who in the last fifty years have done work of a quality to satisfy Western ideals by super-adding to their own traditional learning an acquaintance with European languages which enables them to appreciate and benefit by the researches of Western scholars.

The monuments of India had to wait far longer than her literature before obtaining recognition and the attention they so much needed and so richly deserved. It is difficult

to explain why this should have been the case. Not until 1862 was anything in the nature of an archaeological survey instituted in India, when Alexander Cunningham was entrusted with the survey of the monuments of Northern India. It was Cunningham who laid the foundations of archaeological research in India, but the sole aim was research and there was no question of the conservation of buildings. In 1874 departments were also instituted to deal with the monuments of Bombay and Madras. Writing in 1880 Sir Richard Temple tells us that 'the duty of conservation is being recognized by the Government of India and by the several local Governments and it is to be expected that some results will be secured'. In 1889, however, the Director-Generalship of Archaeology was abolished.

In 1902 Lord Curzon, horrified at the desecration of some monuments and the total neglect of all, brought about a complete transformation by instituting a central Directorship with control over all provincial departments. He had the wisdom and, may one add, the good luck to find outside India a trained classical archaeologist in John Marshall, who at once set to work on the conservation of monuments and the exploration of important sites. Such has been the progress made under Sir John Marshall's able Directorship that in the present year (1931) over three thousand monuments are being cared for or explored. Among Sir John Marshall's greatest achievements are his excavations in Taxila¹ and in the Buddhist sites of Bihar and Orissa. In 1923-4 he laid bare the hitherto unknown sites of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro which have revealed

¹ Taxila, which lies about 25 miles to the north-west of Rawalpindi, is one of the most important towns of ancient India. It was imperfectly excavated in the days of Cunningham, but since 1915 has been wonderfully dealt with by Sir J. Marshall.

buildings and yielded seals which carry back the history of India probably to 3000 or even 4000 B.C. The full reports on these excavations are shortly to appear and are naturally awaited with keen anticipation by the learned world. Among the treasures found in these sites are upwards of 150 seals bearing great similarity to the seals of Sumeria. Up to the present these seals have not yielded up their secret, but it has been suggested that they may eventually reveal to us not only the earliest traces of Indian mythology but also the origin of the Brahmi script.

It is to Lord Curzon in the first place that we owe the rescue of so many beautiful examples of Indian architecture from desecration and demolition. His labours in this field alone would entitle this great Viceroy to the gratitude of all lovers of art and of the people of India in particular. Nor was his interest in these matters merely academic. He himself visited nearly all the sites of interest and found time, in a post where the duties are enough to exhaust the capacities of most men, to enter into the minutest details of archaeological research. If he was fortunate in his choice of Director-General, Sir John Marshall was equally fortunate in serving such an enthusiastic and untiring Viceroy.

The admission of Indians to posts in the Archaeological Department has had far-reaching results, and Hindus and Muslims have shown themselves both eager and fit to carry on the great work of unveiling the hidden past of their own motherland. In fact the newly appointed Director-General of the Archaeological Survey is an Indian.

In connexion with the Archaeological Survey museums or parts of museums have been devoted to the preservation of movable objects. The first of these was the Indian Section of the Calcutta Museum. More recently the policy has been adopted of forming local museums near

important sites such as those of Taxila, Sarnath, and Nalanda so that these antiquities may be studied amid their natural surroundings rather than in some distant place.

Apart from special memoirs and central and local annual reports the Department issues from time to time the *Epigraphia Indica*, now in its nineteenth volume, and the *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, devoted respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan epigraphy.

No account of the preservation work in India would be complete without a reference to the Indian States. Some of these, including Hyderabad and Mysore, Kashmir and Gwalior, have their own Archaeological Departments.

Though the serious study of the monuments and ruined sites of India dates back over fifty years, the importance of Indian painting has only in quite recent times been recognized, following close in the wake of the keen interest aroused by the miniature art of Persia. In the rock-hewn temples of Ajanta and Bagh there have been preserved by the greatest good fortune a large number of mural paintings dating probably from the sixth and seventh centuries. Though much mutilated and weather-worn, they are in sufficiently good condition to give us a definite notion of the high standard attained by Indian artists at this period. Sir John Marshall declares that they 'will bear comparison with the best that Europe could produce down to the time of Michael Angelo'. Much labour has been spent in preserving these notable works of art, which are no doubt the prototypes of all later Buddhist paintings. Financial aid towards the preservation of these antiquities and the publication of descriptive memoirs has been furnished by both Hyderabad and Gwalior. Between these mural paintings and the miniatures of the seventeenth century there is an unfilled gap in Indian painting. The Moguls of

Delhi imported many Persian artists into India, and gradually there grew up a school of Indian miniature painters who created what is known as the Mogul School. Most of these artists were Hindus, and they very soon developed a characteristic style similar in many ways to that of the Persians but unmistakably distinct and different in presentment. Finally, there arose various schools of Indian painting which are known by such names as Rajput, Kangra, Himalayan, and so forth. It is Dr. Coomaraswamy who has done most to further the study of this branch of Indian art.

During the present century revivals of Indian painting have taken place, the Tagore family of Bengal having led the way. In spite of a marked European influence and a resultant sentimentality in these modern artists they show signs of a return to the classic Hindu style, such as did not manifest itself in the Rajput paintings, which could never quite rid itself of the Persian influence. The Government has done much to encourage these revivals in the various schools of art founded in Lahore, Calcutta, and Bombay. Apart from the action of the Government in India, there has been an increasing interest taken in Indian culture by the public in England, as is evidenced by the activities of learned societies, the promotion of exhibitions of Indian art and antiquities, and the publication of literature dealing with Indian art and its influence on the other countries of Asia.

Section 33 of the Act of 1813 relating to the privileges of the East India Company declared that it was the duty of this country to promote the interest and happiness of the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India, and Section 43 empowered the Government to expend not less than a lakh (100,000) of rupees on the revival and encouragement of learning.

It was during the administration of Lord William Bentinck (1828-36) that the great question arose regarding the adoption of English as the medium for secondary education. A battle was fought between the Anglicists and the Orientalists, the former being represented by the Governor-General himself, Macaulay, and Trevelyan, the latter by Wilson, Bryan Hodgson, and Prinsep. The Anglicists held that English must be the instrument for transmitting both Eastern and Western culture; the other party held that education to be effectual for the masses must be imported through the medium of the current vernacular. The victory of the Anglicists on the one hand, and the great prestige attaching to Sanskrit and Persian on the other, for many years retarded the growth and expansion of vernacular literature. For while English education meant the study of a quite foreign culture, the classical languages of India were incapable of modernization. The adoption of English thus created a gap in the cultural development of the intelligentsia of India, and we have the curious spectacle of thousands of Indians with practically no knowledge of their own culture becoming occidentalists: just as if Europeans were to become orientalists without first receiving a thorough education in the languages and literatures of the West.

The Hindus seem as a whole to have had no hesitation in accepting an English education; the Muslims on the other hand felt very strongly that the study of 'infidel' books might tend to shake the belief of the Faithful; and thus it came about that the Muslim community, independently of its inferiority in numbers, fell far behind the Hindus in higher education. It was at one time difficult to persuade young Muslims to take up the study of Arabic and Persian with a view to research on Western lines of scholarship. For while the strict Muslims regarded the

learning of Western languages as unorthodox, the advanced section of the community looked upon Arabic literature and learning as retrogressive and antiquated, and fit only for the old-fashioned moulavi, who imagines that the zenith of learning has been reached in the past, and that he has only to learn what others have learnt and taught before him. The truth is that there were until recent times very few Muslims in India who had any idea of the extent and wealth of Arabic and Persian literature or of the amount of material awaiting investigation. The prejudices of both factions have now almost vanished; and every encouragement is being given both by the State and by Muslim parents to young men who wish to devote themselves to Islamic studies, which in fact have occupied the devoted attention of some of the foremost savants of Europe.

One of the most important services which the Government of India has rendered to Indian Studies is represented by the great *Linguistic Survey* which was begun and completed by Sir George Grierson, who devoted no less than twenty-five years of untiring labour to this immense task, which comprises eighteen volumes. Here are to be found descriptions and specimens of nearly all the known languages and dialects of India, and of many of the neighbouring countries, making a grand total of over 850 languages and dialects. Truly a worthy monument to a great scholar. The value of his labours to the world of scholarship was recognized by the decoration of the Order of Merit, a distinction which no other person has ever received for services in connexion with India.

All through the long history of India, vernaculars—each with its special features—were of course being spoken in every part of the country. In Upper India these vernaculars were with few exceptions closely allied to Sanskrit.

As a result of the Muslim invasions and occupation of this country there grew up that mixed form of speech, half Indian, half Persian, which was called Urdu.

The earliest vernacular literature of India does not date back more than seven centuries, and for long it was confined to religious poetry. It was in Bengal that a vernacular prose style first came into being, and the two most notable figures in this great literary dawn were Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the novelist Bankim Chandra Chatterji. A similar movement was witnessed in the west, where Hari Narayan Apte produced the first original novels in Marathi. Bengali and Marathi poets, like Rabindranath Tagore and Tilak, have developed new types of poetry and composed verses of a totally new style both in subject and in metre. This movement did not, however, spread to Urdu, for among the Muslims poetry had always, with one solitary exception, retained its rigid classical traditions. The Arabs and the Persians, for example, still adhere to the metres employed by their earliest poets. Only in Turkey has there occurred, and that already in the nineteenth century, a revolt against the old Islamic metres and an attempt to copy the poetry of the West, especially of France, in form and in matter.

Urdu, which is the common medium of all Indo-Muslim poets, has not up to the present shown any signs of divesting itself of the classical Persian models on which it was originally based. It is to be hoped that before long Urdu poets may be inspired to turn this rich and flexible language to account and free themselves of this slavery to ancient forms. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the foremost living Muslim poet in India has indeed broken new ground in his Persian and Urdu poetry as far as regards subject-matter, but he adheres still to the old metres.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal from the very outset

included in its activities the natural sciences, which are equally with literature, history, and philology represented in its Journal and other publications. Nowadays special surveys devoted to botany, geology, and zoology are maintained by the Government of India: as early as 1786 the Royal Botanical Gardens were started in Calcutta. The Geological Survey was instituted in 1851 and the Zoological in 1916. The Indian Museum in Calcutta, which was opened in 1875, at first contained the material handed over by the Asiatic Society of Bengal; and since then the Museum has always been under the supervision of a zoologist, who now has under him five assistants, all Indians.

Though the Indians were late in taking up scientific investigation they have already produced a number of very remarkable chemists and physicists who have gained the coveted distinction of the Fellowship of the Royal Society.

Chapter X

PEASANTS, LANDHOLDERS, AND THE STATE

By W. H. MORELAND, C.S.I., C.I.E., B.A.

[Mr. W. H. Moreland is generally acknowledged to be the greatest authority of our day on the economic aspects of land revenue in India. As a member of the Indian Civil Service he was for some twelve years Director of Land Records and Agriculture in the United Provinces. He has devoted close study to, and undertaken original research on, the economics of the Mogul period; and his books, *India at the death of Akbar*, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, and *Jahangir's India*, are pre-eminent in their field.]

IT is a commonplace to say that India is a land of working peasants, not capitalist farmers, and that the peasants stand to the State in a peculiar relation, the most conspicuous feature of which is the seasonal payment, whether direct or indirect, of what is known as Land Revenue. When, however, we ask what is the nature of these recurring payments, we pass abruptly from commonplace to controversy, for while one school presents the system as an admirable financial expedient, another denounces it as a grossly oppressive and inequitable form of taxation. Between these hostile schools the only common ground is the paramount importance of the subject, and some explanation of it is indispensable to a survey of the country such as is presented in this volume.

Such an explanation must begin from the distant past, for this Land Revenue is in no sense a creation of British Rule. It is one of the oldest institutions in India, prescribed in the books which embody the Sacred Law of Hinduism, recognized by successive Muslim conquerors, and preserved during the British period with such modifications as were required to meet changes in the economic conditions of the country. The explanation which follows

cannot therefore be confined to the regions directly under British administration, but extends to All India in the geographical sense, States as well as Provinces. On the other hand, it does not apply to Burma, a country with an agrarian history of its own.

In the oldest Hindu polity of which we possess knowledge, that which is depicted in the writings constituting the Sacred Law, it was the duty of the peasant to cultivate the ground and pay a share of the gross produce to the King. So long as he performed this twofold duty, he was entitled to expect the King's protection; failure to perform it involved the sin of rebellion, and, apart from spiritual consequences, could be punished in this world by eviction from the land or otherwise. This 'King's share' of the gross produce of the land is the origin of the Land Revenue system as it exists to-day. Muslim conquerors made no material alteration in an arrangement which was substantially in accordance with the Islamic institutions of the time; but some of them laid increased stress in practice on the idea that failure to pay the revenue was an act of open rebellion, so that in the seventeenth century the sale of a defaulter's wife and children, as rebels, and consequently slaves, was a recognized process for the recovery of arrears due, while failure to cultivate sufficient land was punishable with flogging. This conception of the peasant's duty persisted right up to the establishment of British rule, and even at the opening of the present century it was familiar in some sparsely populated States: its disappearance from the greater part of the country has resulted almost entirely from the growth of population during the nineteenth century, and the consequent emergence of competition for cultivable land. On the economic side, this new fact is the chief differentia of British rule: so long as land was waiting for peasants, a State eager for

revenue had the strongest possible motive for extending cultivation; but when peasants were waiting for land, action in this direction became unnecessary, and an entirely new set of problems emerged, the attempt to deal with which will be described farther on.

In the Hindu and Muslim periods, the points in the system which concerned the peasant most closely were the share of produce claimed by the State, and the arrangements for its assessment and collection. As regards the amount of the share, the Hindu text-writers were not entirely unanimous, but, speaking generally, they regarded one-sixth of the gross produce as a reasonable figure; they allowed, however, that the King might take one-fourth or one-third in emergencies, of which he was necessarily the sole judge. Records of the Hindu period are too scanty to show what share was generally taken in practice: a few which have come to light indicate that it was nearer one-half than one-sixth; and it is a permissible conjecture that the maximum recognized by text-writers was in fact either the standard or the minimum prevailing in their time. For the Muslim period, precise records are more copious, and they establish the fact that, while in certain exceptional cases one-fourth was claimed, the ordinary standard ranged between one-third and one-half, with a definite tendency in favour of the higher figure. The claim to which the British administration succeeded was normally one-half, and very rarely less than one-third, of the gross produce of the soil, and this figure was increased by a large number of cesses, imposts, and exactions, individually small, but in the aggregate considerable and vexatious.

As regards administration, it would be a mistake to picture the State officials of the Muslim period as engaged regularly in the actual division of the produce as each field ripened. Some strong administrators did in fact deal with

individual peasants, either by estimating the produce and valuing the 'King's share', or by measuring the area sown and levying a fixed charge on each unit; but the general practice was to assess the annual revenue, not on the individual, but jointly on the peasants cultivating what is called in India a village, a term which, like the English 'civil parish', denotes merely a defined area, not necessarily inhabited, recognized as a local administrative unit. Assessment on the village took two forms. In one, the assessor came to terms annually with the representatives of the peasants for the payment of a lump sum equivalent, so far as it could be calculated, to the aggregate value of the 'King's share' of the produce of the village. In the other, the village was 'farmed', for a year or a term of years, to a speculator, who offered a satisfactory sum as revenue, and received authority to collect the 'King's share' from the individual peasants. Further, it must be remembered that under Muslim rule large areas were left in the hands of Hindu Chiefs, who paid, or accounted for, a sum fixed in advance by way of tribute, and had a free hand in dealing with the peasants.

When, therefore, British administrators took charge of a portion of India, they found that in all cases the peasants were prepared to pay Land Revenue, usually at the rate of half the gross produce, but they found also wide diversity in the methods of assessment. In some cases, the individual peasants expected to deal directly with the officials; in others, the 'village' expected to be assessed in a lump sum; in others again, the peasants expected that the assessment would be made on intermediate agents, whether farmers of the revenue, or Chiefs. The first British administrators were concerned mainly to bring the country into some sort of order, and they inevitably tended to accept whatever practice they found in operation, as offering the line of

least resistance; hence arose that diversity in the methods of assessment which makes it necessary to describe the existing system by regions. One general distinction may be drawn at the outset, which in the jargon of the early years was denoted by the terms 'ryotwari' and 'zamindari'; the former term means that the State deals with individual ryots, that is to say, peasants, while the latter means that the State deals with intermediaries or landholders; and it so happens that, broadly speaking, the former system prevails in South India, the latter in the North.

British concern with the Land Revenue may be dated from the year 1765, when the East India Company was appointed by the Mogul Emperor to be his Revenue Minister (*Dīwān*) for Bengal and some adjoining regions; the appointment was made on farming terms, the Company undertaking to make fixed annual payments to the Emperor, and depending for its remuneration on what it could collect in excess of these. At this period, the bulk of Bengal was in the hands of a comparatively small number of landholders, who were technically revenue-farmers, and paid as Land Revenue fixed sums supposed to represent nine-tenths of what they collected from the peasants; but both their receipts and their payments were in fact substantially greater. After various unsuccessful experiments, the Company made the best terms it could with these landholders. At first the assessment on them was made for a term of years, but subsequently it was declared to be permanent; the landholders were thus placed in the position of owners subject to the payment of a fixed annual charge or quit-rent, constituting the Land Revenue of the province, and the peasants became their tenants, not concerned directly with any payments to the State, but interested vitally in the amount which they were required to pay to the landholders as rent.

When British authority extended towards the north-west, the experience already gained in Bengal was utilized, but new difficulties were met. During the anarchy of the eighteenth century in this region, when the Mogul Emperor's authority had practically disappeared, the 'King's share' had become the bone of contention among many rival claimants—hereditary Chiefs and new usurpers, ex-officials, farmers, and mere adventurers; and various experiments and mistakes were made before the conflicting claims were at last sifted, and a body of landholders recognized as owners, subject to the payment, not of a fixed charge as in Bengal, but of whatever Land Revenue might be assessed on them from time to time. The original claim to nine-tenths of the landholder's receipts was reduced, first to two-thirds, then to one-half, and recently in some provinces to less; and the main problem of assessing the Land Revenue was to determine the income which the landholder realized from the land. This consisted mainly of the rents paid by the peasants, who had now become his tenants; and an effective statistical organization was gradually elaborated, with the aid of which the true rental-value of each estate can be ascertained with reasonable precision at each periodical assessment. These assessments, which in India are termed 'settlements', recur at intervals of twenty or thirty years.

Where then a landholder was found, assessment became a comparatively simple process, but in this region very many villages had originally no landholders, and in these cases the position was conferred on the peasants of the village as an organized body. In such villages there is no regular rental system, and the income of the peasants as landholders cannot be distinguished directly from their gross receipts as growers of produce; in order to assess them, rent-rates, varying with the soil and the locality,

are deduced from the adjoining areas where rents prevail, and these rates ordinarily form the basis on which the peasant-landholder's income is calculated, though in some regions, where peasant-landholders predominate, it is necessary to proceed on lines similar to those which are followed in the 'ryotwari' country to the south. Before describing these, it will be well to summarize the existing position in the 'zamindari' or landholders' country.

The peasant has become definitely a tenant, and now pays rent where formerly he paid the 'King's share' of his produce; but this fact, by itself, does not mean much to him, and many peasants use the same word to describe the two things. The landholder has become an owner subject to the payment of Land Revenue, whether fixed permanently, or reassessed periodically on the basis of his receipts from his tenants; and rent, not revenue, has become the vital question of the day. The original landholders were required, as an incident of their recognition, to extend cultivation and cherish their tenants. It cannot be said that this requirement was generally fulfilled; but extension of cultivation came of itself, and with disconcerting rapidity, as the result of increasing population and internal peace. Hence, by the middle of the nineteenth century competition for land had become acute; peasants were offering rents up to, or even in excess of, the Ricardian standard, rents which would not leave them more than a bare subsistence, or even that, while landholders were rapidly tending to regard such rents as their reasonable dues.

The result was a series of Tenancy Acts, adapted to the conditions of the different provinces. The legislation is too voluminous and complicated to be summarized in a few words, but the general idea is to prevent the level of rents from rising to the point which would be reached under

the régime of free competition for land, and so to leave the tenant a margin for improving his holding and raising his standard of life. The chief provisions curtail the landholder's power of eviction, and limit the enhancement of rents, usually by making the amount dependent on the order of a Court or Revenue Officer. These provisions have not been entirely effective, for the greed of some landholders and the land-hunger of many peasants combine to defeat them, but they have done very much to ease an agrarian position which would otherwise by now have become intolerable. As the law now stands, the gross produce of the land is shared by three parties, peasant, landholder, and State. The landholder's share is somewhat less than it would be if determined solely by competition: its precise evaluation is scarcely possible, but, speaking very roughly, it ranges from a maximum of one-fifth or one-sixth down to one-tenth or less of the gross produce, and half, or less, of this—say from one-twelfth to one-twenty-fifth of the gross produce—is paid by him to the State in the form of Land Revenue. The peasant's payment is thus on the whole definitely less than the proportion recognized by the Sacred Law of Hinduism as reasonable in normal times.

We must now turn to the 'ryotwari' system, the essence of which is that the State deals directly with each individual peasant, and not with intermediary landholders. In Madras, the first attempt at organization was to find, or establish, landholders as had been done in Bengal, and a substantial proportion of the province is in fact 'zamin-dari'; but, speaking broadly, the attempt failed, and for a century or more the bulk of the peasants have been assessed individually. At first the assessment was made on the basis of a share of the gross produce; but in the year 1864 a fundamental change was made, and it was decided

to assess on the net income, that is to say, the cost of production was to be deducted. The methods of assessment were elaborate. The gross produce was valued, with many allowances and deductions; this value was reduced by the calculated cost of production; and something less than half of the resulting figure was claimed as Land Revenue for the thirty years following the ascertainment, the actual claim being stated in the form of revenue-rates per acre, varying with the soil and other conditions. Calculations made officially early in the present century showed that the assessment was well below one-tenth of the gross produce, while more recently unofficial investigators have deduced a substantially lower proportion. In Bombay, the other great 'ryotwari' region, the claim on the peasant is also stated in the form of revenue-rates per acre, revised at intervals of thirty years, but the principles on which these rates are calculated have not, until quite recently, been formulated with the same precision as elsewhere, and their incidence has been a matter of some controversy: at the opening of the present century it was calculated officially to be between one-eighth and one-twelfth of the gross produce.

The actual position in British India may be summarized as follows. The peasant still surrenders, as he has always surrendered, a share of his gross produce to the State, either directly or through the landholder, but the share surrendered is very much smaller than it was in Muslim times, from an outside figure of one-fifth down to one-tenth or less, as against one-half or one-third. In 'zamin-dari' regions the peasant pays slightly more than in 'ryotwari', while the State receives distinctly less, the difference constituting the income of the landholders; but in those regions where the Land Revenue has been fixed permanently, the State receives comparatively little, and

the landholders enjoy a correspondingly larger income. The standards of the Muslim period left the peasant practically nothing for either 'better farming' or 'better living', to use the now classical phrases: the standards now in force leave ordinarily a substantial margin at the disposal of the peasant. An economic reformer may ask whether, looking at India as a whole, the landholders are 'worth their keep'. The question is of much theoretical interest, but in practice it does not arise; for, whatever their original claims may have been—and some of them were at the least dubious—they hold their present titles from the British Government in India. A more pertinent question relates to the use which the peasants have made of the margin left at their disposal, for the whole future of the country depends largely on the answer. Hitherto it must be confessed that, on the whole, the margin has been wasted, because a common tendency has been for the peasant to sublet part of his holding, set up as a small landholder, and rackrent his tenants as only a peasant can; while he has used the credit resulting from this margin to involve himself in heavy unproductive debt, incurred mainly for social extravagance. Of late, however, there have been signs that the outlook of the peasant in these matters is beginning to change, and should the demand for 'better living' develop, these unsatisfactory tendencies will become progressively of less importance.¹

Comparisons such as have been offered above between the past and present relation of Land Revenue to gross produce are sometimes criticized on the assumption that the fertility of Indian soils has declined in the interval.

¹ According to the *Agricultural Statistics of India* (vol. i, British India) for 1928-9 (Calcutta, 1931), the 'ryotwari' area covers more than half of the total area paying land revenue; a little less than one-third is in the hands of landholders subject to a periodic revision; and rather less than one-fifth is held on a revenue which has been fixed permanently.

Discussion of that assumption must be left to agricultural experts, but it may be well to explain here that no statistical basis for it exists. We possess, indeed, a record of the produce of all important crops in Northern India, as calculated for assessment purposes about the year 1540, but unfortunately the units in which it is expressed cannot now be ascertained. Of the two probable units of weight, one gives *average* productivity just about equal to that of the present day, while the other indicates a slight decline. The latter result is the more probable, because, when fertility is approximately constant, extension of cultivation to inferior soils must reduce the average of the whole region, and there is no doubt that large areas of very poor land have been brought under the plough during the last century. With the exception of this ambiguous document, no figures of the Muslim period have survived to furnish the basis of a statistical comparison.

The account which has been given above of conditions in British India necessarily omits a large number of minor tenures, prevailing in one region or another, and a mass of administrative detail, all of which would have to be mastered by a student who should desire to speak with authority on the subject. A few words must be added as to the position in the Indian States. Speaking very generally, the tendency has been to follow the British administration, but cautiously, and at some distance. Standards of Land Revenue have been lowered, but not to the same extent; there has been some reluctance to make binding engagements for so long a period as thirty years; and there has been a definite preference for the 'ryotwari' over the 'zamindari' system. No published data exist from which to draw even such rough estimates of the incidence of the revenue as can be offered for some of the Indian provinces.

Readers who have followed thus far will recognize that

the old controversial question whether Land Revenue is tax or rent is not susceptible of a simple answer, a fact which doubtless accounts for its persistence. As with all questions of classification, the answer depends largely on the definitions adopted. Taking the words in their everyday meanings, 'rent' as a periodical payment for the use of land, 'tax' as a contribution levied by the State on the population generally or on certain classes of it, there is no doubt that the payments made by peasants to landholders are rent; they are not levied by the State, and consequently cannot be classed as tax. Payments made by peasants in 'ryotwari' regions to the State are equally rent, because the peasant has to pay them in order to have the use of land: if he does not pay, he is evicted. They are, however, also tax, being a contribution levied by the State on a class of the population. Payments made by the landholders to the State fall equally under the definition of tax; but they can also be regarded, especially where they have been fixed permanently, as quit-rents payable by certain classes of freeholders. The controversy is thus as unfruitful as the fabled dispute over the colour of a chameleon.

If a Western analogy must be found for what is essentially an Indian institution, comparison should be made, not with rent or tax, but with the royal domain which in some European countries was assigned to the King to cover the cost of the administration. In such countries the King took all the produce of some of the land: in India he took some of the produce of all the land. Regarded as a fundamental political institution, either arrangement is eminently reasonable, and the difference between the two is insignificant. In some European countries improvident Kings alienated most of the royal domain; and in England, for instance, the receipts from the Crown lands now make

a very poor showing in the annual budget. Some Indian rulers were equally improvident, but the recorded practice of the country for the four centuries before British rule establishes the fact that their alienations were resumable, and on occasion were resumed, at pleasure. The East India Company succeeded therefore to the Indian royal domain practically unimpaired; but it introduced the Western idea that alienations made by its predecessors should be respected, and this change accounts for the large areas held in many parts of India free of any payment on account of Land Revenue. It proceeded further to make fresh alienations by the establishment of landholders with enduring titles. So far as these landholders represented old-established Chiefs, their recognition merely regularized the existing position: where they represented speculators or usurpers, the fact of alienation is undoubted, and it is to be justified, if it can be justified, on the ground of the social, economic, and political benefits accruing to the country from the change. The Company's early action in fixing permanently the Land Revenue payable over large regions is condemned by the present generation of Indian economists almost as wholeheartedly as by modern British administrators; but subject to these alienations, it may reasonably be said that the ancient royal domain of India remains substantially intact, for disposal by the self-governing nation now in process of evolution. This fact is recognized clearly by the peasants; for liability to pay the 'King's share' is admitted from one end of the country to the other, though the amount of the payment in any particular case may be vigorously contested.

In conclusion, a little must be said regarding certain tendencies which have recently come into operation, and which warn us not to regard the present systems of assessment as necessarily permanent. In the first place, an

important margin of safety has disappeared as a result of the entry of India into the world-market for agricultural produce. When British rule began, exports of produce from India were small, and the want of communications cut the country up into a large number of small independent markets. In each one of these, something like half the produce of the season had to be marketed in a great hurry in order to pay the Land Revenue; it was an exceptionally strong case of the harvest-glut familiar to all students of peasant economics. A series of unusually good harvests might ruin the peasants of a particular region; and, apart from such calamities, the ordinary peasant received much less silver for his crops than would have been the case under other conditions. During the nineteenth century Indian markets were unified by railways, while the opening of the Suez Canal placed the unified Indian market in direct touch with European consumers, for it rendered possible the export of food-grains, oil-seeds, and fibres on a scale previously undreamt of. The result was that Indian prices were gradually levelled up, and this continued rise in prices gave a margin of safety in the assessments of Land Revenue.

The first British assessors inevitably started from the standards which had been accepted by previous rulers, and the knowledge that these standards were ruinously excessive came only by degrees. Many early assessments were consequently higher than was desirable in the interests of the country; but rising prices saved the situation, and an assessment which was dangerous at the moment it was made might become moderate in less than ten years, simply because the peasants were getting more money for their produce. No such relief can be expected in future. Apart from the present (1931) 'slump', which is presenting the Indian administration with problems unfamiliar since

the time of Aurangzeb, the future, as forecast by most authorities, lies between stabilization and a gradual fall of prices resulting from increasing scarcity of gold. The first alternative would be consistent with the maintenance of the present systems of assessment, though the margin of safety would disappear: with the prospect of a gradual fall in prices, assessment for anything like thirty years would be out of the question, and the whole machinery might have to be reconstructed.

In the second place, it must be remembered that existing methods of assessment were closely adapted to the conditions in which they developed, and it is matter of common knowledge that in India velocity of change is increasing. It would be rash to attempt any forecast of the changes that lie ahead, but it appears to be probable that increased flexibility will be needed in order to adapt the system of assessment to changes in trade and industry, in wages, and in the standards of living of the people.

In the third place, political changes also must be taken into account. This statement may be illustrated from the recent history of Bardoli, an insignificant tract in Western India which not long ago became an acute political topic. The assessment of this tract was revised in the ordinary course; protests against the new revenue-demand were voiced by politicians; and eventually a further official inquiry established, to the satisfaction of the Government of Bombay, the fact that the assessment was altogether excessive. In this case the agitation was justified by the result, but its real significance lies in the establishment of a new precedent. Future re-assessments are likely to become increasingly the subject of political debate, 'lobbying' and 'log-rolling', and the tendency will be for the incidence of the Land Revenue to vary inversely with the political influence of the assesseees. To put the matter as